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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I trace the course of ethically founded notions of rights in the Soviet 
experience from 1917 to 1950, focusing on the “right to be helped” as the entitlement to state 
assistance felt by four marginalized social groups. Through an analysis of the requests for help 
written by social activists on behalf of disabled children, blind and deaf adults, single mothers, 
and political prisoners, I examine the multiple and changing ideas that underlie the defense of 
this right. I reveal that both the Soviet state authorities and these marginalized social groups 
tended to reject charity as a form of unwanted condescension. In addition, state organs as well as 
petitioners applied legal notions of rights arbitrarily and situationally. However, political leaders, 
social activists, and marginalized citizens themselves engaged in dialogues that ultimately 
produced a strong, ethically grounded consciousness of rights. What I call “the right to be 
helped” was a framework of concepts, practices, and feelings that set the terms for what 
marginalized individuals could imagine and argue in relation to state assistance. As such, the 
right to be helped fundamentally reflected Soviet understandings of disability, generation, 
gender, labor merits, and human suffering. 
Composed of five thematically and case-study based chapters, this dissertation begins 
with an analysis of Soviet welfare policies towards unemployed and uninsured citizens. Then, it 
moves to the ways in which four communities of activists implemented these policies and 
advocated on behalf of their constituents. Throughout the chapters, I pay attention to the forces 
that shaped help from below by examining how single individuals formulated, sustained, and 
contested narratives of help in their everyday lives. Within this structure, I analyze evidence 
coming from a vast archival body and including the administrative correspondence of key 
ministries, the printed reports and handwritten notes of medical professionals, the archival 
documents and journal articles produced by Soviet relief organizations, individual petitions and 
complaints, memoirs and other autobiographical materials. My methodology involves textual 
close-reading and analysis of cultural practices, but also relies on institutional history and 
biography. I focus my attention on the semantic significance of concepts and chart their changing 
social constructions over time. However, I also go beyond the level of representation by 
exploring the socio-economic and political everyday conditions in which marginalized citizens 
articulated their claims.  
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This dissertation reveals that the state’s criteria for approving requests for help were a 
blend of merits earned through one’s services to the collective (productive, military, or 
reproductive) and some sort of personal hardship (disability, loneliness, poverty, old age, or poor 
health). Disabled children and adults, unmarried mothers, and even political prisoners were 
entitled to help either by virtue of having given great effort or for having endured huge 
sacrifices. In either case, the Soviet state conceived their right to be helped as a form of 
remuneration. For Soviet marginalized individuals, it was a combination of legality, morality, 
and patronage that defined their right to be helped. Physically, socially, and politically deviant 
citizens relied on the power of personal patrons, but they also counted on laws and appealed to a 
shared ethos. While welfare legislation was set in a mesmerizing range of directives and codes, 
Soviet morality entailed an ensemble of ideas that – when resources were available – could 
effectively resonate with the targets of petitions for help. These ideas included evaluations of the 
performance of one’s duties and ideals of humanitarianism vis-à-vis poverty, disease and 
disability, generation, loneliness, and suffering. In the dialogues between state and non-state 
actors, all these factors were layered over and filtered through gender and traditional patriarchal 
visions of the family. 
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Glossary and Abbreviations 
 
batrachka (plural batrachki)  hired agricultural laborer 
bedniak (plural bedniaki)  poor peasant 
byt     everyday life  
GAPK     State Archive of the Perm’ Province 
GARF     State Archive of the Russian Federation 
invalid (plural invalidy)  disabled person 
kolkhoz (plural kolkhozy)  collective farm 
kolkhoznik (plural kolkhozniki) collective farmer  
Koopinsoiuz    All-Russian Union of Invalids’ Cooperative Association 
kormil’tsa (plural kormil’tsy)  wetnurse   
krasnokrestovets  
(plural krasnokrestovtsy)  member of the Political Red Cross  
 
Narkompros    Commissariat of Education 
Narkomsobes    Commissariat of Social Assistance 
Narkomtrud    Commissariat of Labor 
Narkomzdrav    Commissariat of Health 
NEP     New Economic Policy 
NKVD     Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
Ommlad    Department for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy 
pensioner (plural pensionery)  pensioner, individual unable to work  
PermGANI    Perm’ State Archive of Contemporary History 
PRC     Political Red Cross  
Rabkrin    Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection 
RAO     Archive of the Academy of Education 
sovkhoz (plural sovkhozy)  state farm 
Sovnarkom    Council of People’s Commissars 
SPON Section of the Socio-Legal Protection of Minors and 
Defectives 
sredniak (plural sredniaki) middle or average peasant 
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trudosposobnost’ ability to perform work 
trudoustroistvo job placement  
TsIK     Central Executive Committee 
udarnik (plural udarniki)  shock worker 
ukaz (plural ukazy)   decree 
UPM     educational-industrial workshop 
VIKO     Industrial-Consumer Union of Invalids  
VOG     All-Russian Society for the Deaf-Mute 
VOS     All-Russian Society for the Blind 
VTEK     Medical Expert Commission 
VTsIK     All-Russian Central Execuive Committee 
Zhenotdel Commission for the Improvement of the Work and Life of 
Women 
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Introduction 
After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the new socialist state put decisions about the 
social protection of suffering classes at the core of its identity and self-legitimation. To 
distinguish itself from the tsarist Russian government and the capitalist countries, the Soviet 
Union rejected religious charity and private philanthropy, rather identifying Soviet “help” as 
both a modern-state project and a paradigm of socialist morality. While the pre-revolutionary 
Orthodox Theological Encyclopedic Dictionary used to define “charity” (blagotvoritel’nost’) as 
“one of the manifestations of Christian love, taking place each time that a person provides 
beneficence and support to a fellow man in spiritual or bodily need,” the Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia explained that charity was the expression of bourgeois hypocrisy and a religious 
glossing over the social rule of the exploiting classes. At the same time that charity assumed 
negative connotations, words such as assistance (obespechenie), help (pomoshch’), protection 
(zashchita), and care (zabota) were positively defined and unfailingly accompanied by the 
attribute “social” (sotsialnyi). This semantics reflected the monopolization of the social sphere at 
the hands of the state, but also indicated the benign and humanitarian dimension of welfare in the 
socialist political order.
1
  
                                                          
1
 Compare Polnyi pravoslavnyi bogoslovnyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo P.P. Soikima, 
1912-1913), vol. 1, 339 and Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Institut “Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia,” 1926-1947), vol. 6, 466-471, vol. 43, 170-171, and vol. 52, 298-302. Scholars have mostly 
employed the term “welfare” to indicate “an ensemble of public interventions imbricated with the process of 
modernization, which provide protection in the form of assistance, insurance, and social security by introducing both 
specific social rights in case of pre-established events and specific duties of financial contribution.” Dorena Caroli, 
Histoire de la protection sociale en Union soviétique (1917-1939) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 21. See also Jen 
Alber, “Continuities and Change in the Idea of the Welfare State,” Politics & Society, 16:4 (1998), 451-468; and M. 
Ferrera, Modelli di Solidarietá. Politica e Riforme Sociali nelle Democrazie (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), 49. In this 
dissertation I almost interchangeably use the words “state assistance,” “social protection,” and “social welfare.” As 
an analytical category, however, I prefer the term help, because it better captures the socio-political as well as the 
humanitarian and moral dimensions of Soviet social services and interventions.    
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Soon enough, the double socio-political and moral logic of Soviet help led to a concept 
and a practice of social protection that were marked by intrinsic tensions. On one hand, state help 
was hailed as a tool of order, knowledge, and power to control – all discourses that involved a 
measure of discipline, coercion, and outright violence. On the other hand, help entailed equally 
powerful discourses and values concerning ethical notions of human dignity and, above all, 
moral rights. The interplay between control and rights yielded diverse and often contradictory 
welfare policies. Especially in approaching assistance to certain marginalized social groups – 
such as the so-called “defective” children, blind and deaf-mute adults, single mothers, and 
political prisoners – official state figures and welfare workers articulated competing views of 
what socialist help should be and who was entitled to it. Soviet people, for their part, pushed 
forward their own ideas about the nature of the help they wished to receive and the grounds of 
their entitlement.  
In this dissertation, I focus on four marginalized social groups and their communities of 
activists in order to explore a realm of social consciousness and social action that I call the 
Soviet “right to be helped.” This phrase indicates a network of concepts and practices setting the 
terms for what could be imagined and argued in relation to state assistance. The right to be 
helped was a framework that involved intellectual, moral, and emotional commitments, and that 
shaped human actions in demanding and proving help.
2
 Approaching this concept through a 
                                                          
2
 The concept of “the right to be helped” is my own. In defining it, I found some references particularly useful. One 
is Michael Urban’s characterization of discourse as “a set of deep categories authorizing and governing 
communication.” Michael E. Urban, Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of Elite Political 
Discourse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1. Another is Ross Chambers’s use of the French terms 
imaginaire and argumentaire. As Chambers writes, imaginaire “refers to the repertory of items (or images) that 
define what, for a given individual or collective subjectivity, it is possible to imagine.” Argumentaire instead is “that 
which it is possible to argue.” “Taken together,” Chambers continues, “these two terms describe the idea that there 
are limits…on what it is possible to think.” Ross Chambers, “Narrative and the Imaginary: A Review of Gilbert 
Durand’s The Anthropological Structures of the Imaginary,” Narrative, 9:1 (2001), 100-109, at 100. Finally, 
Douglas Rogers’s study of ethical dilemmas in rural Russia provides a model for tracking ethical ideas of rights as 
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study of the dialogues and interactions between marginalized people, social activists, and 
officialdom, I aim to present the breadth of the sense of entitlement to state assistance in Soviet 
Russia between the Revolution and the aftermath of the Second World War.
3
 My work makes 
clear the stakes that the Soviet state had in managing social rights and help claims – 
not necessarily as a part of its own original apparatus, but precisely in response to the push 
marginalized people and their activists made on it. Popular agency, which took shape in the 
actions of help-oriented organizations and in the writing of individual petitions for help, 
compelled the state to devise responses to people’s incursions. Sometimes marginalized people 
succeeded in securing their social rights and sometimes they did not. Beyond success or failure, 
the dynamics animating the right to be helped suggests that the state itself was responsive to 
marginalized people and put them at the center of its social and political project. 
I historicize the right to be helped as an idea and a practice which was sometimes shared 
by Soviet subjects and their leaders, and at other times turned into a field of political contention. 
From this perspective, a history of the right to be helped significantly contributes to our 
understanding of the early Soviet and Stalinist experience. First, it offers a multifaceted picture 
of how Soviet people related to their political system and its hegemonic discourses. Second, it 
reveals the degree to which intertwined notions of control and rights shaped the constitution of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they shift over time and interact in different contexts. Douglas Rogers, The Old Faith and the Russian Land. A 
Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).    
3
 This dissertation gives more space to variations in social status than to possible regional variations. The focus 
throughout is European Russia. I consider the lives of ethnic Russians and russified migrants west of the Urals. 
Within this group, I gave preference to cities, towns, and workers’ settlements over collective and state farms. The 
reason for this choice is that kolkhozy and sovkhozy were not under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Social 
Assistance. Practices of social protection in collective and state farms were managed by an organ called Central 
Committee of Funds of Public Mutual Help (Tsentral’nyi komitet kass obshchestvennoi vzaimopomoshchi), whose 
records I have not researched for this dissertation. 
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the Soviet social body and the definition of Soviet exemplary subjectivity.
4
 Ultimately, the 
strains inherent in the right to be helped allow us to think about Soviet socialism as a more 
complex and diverse experience than a unilateral focus on social control. 
The historical context of Soviet help and its problematic nature 
The connection between state assistance towards suffering people and ideas of social 
rights first emerged in the nineteenth century in the wealthy industrializing countries of Western 
Europe.
5
 By the end of that century, it also clearly appeared in the Russian liberal thought. Under 
the influence of Russian philosophy and German political theory as well as specific Bismarckian 
social security policies, many educated Russians abandoned traditional understandings of help as 
religious charity and the manifestation of a civic spirit.
6
 Instead, they argued that the legal right 
to assistance should be granted to every person in need – especially to all children under age 
fifteen, the physically and mentally incapacitated, the temporarily unemployed, and political 
prisoners.
7
 At that time, Russian lawyers and sociologists also developed a view of human rights 
that encompassed a combination of political and economic rights.
8
 B.A. Kistiakovskii, in 
                                                          
4
 By “subjectivity” I mean the social, political, and ideological apparatuses monitoring one’s social usability and 
how these apparatuses dialogued with individual agency within one’s Self. I use “identity” instead to indicate one’s 
life narrative and self-image.  
5
 Gaston Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1971).   
6
 See Adele Lindenmeyr, Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996) and Hubertus F. Jahn, Armes Russland Bettler Und Notleidende in Der 
Russischen Geschichte Vom Mittelalter Bis in Die Gegenwart (Paderborn: München, 2010). See also Nancy 
Kollman, By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1999), 70.  
7
 See Lindenmeyr, 90.  
8
 On turn-of-the-century Russian intellectuals’ views of natural individual rights see Ivanov-Razumnik, Istoriia 
Russkoi Obshchestvennoi Mysli (S.-Peterburg: Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1914), vols. 1-2. On the defense of human 
rights from a philosophical point of view see G.M. Hamburg, “Boris Chicherin and Human Dignity in History,” and 
Randall A. Poole, “Vladimir Solov’ev’s Philosophical Anthropology: Autonomy, Dignity, Perfectability,” in A 
History of Russian Philosophy 1830-1930, eds. G.M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (Cambridge, UK ; Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), respectively 111-130 and 131-149. For a treatment of the relationship between rights and 
citizenship in Imperial Russia see Yannis Kotsonis, “‘Face-to-Face’: the State, the Individual, and the Citizen in 
Russian Taxation, 1863-1917,” Slavic Review 63 (2004), 221-246; Eric Lohr, “The Ideal Citizen and the Real 
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particular, argued that human rights are the essential interconnection between definitions of 
rights and the social, economic, and political structure of a society. Writing in 1909, he viewed 
the institutionalization of individual liberties and the emergence in Russia of a constitutional 
government system as the training ground for the eventual development of human rights in a 
socialist society.
9
  
While legal rights constituted an integral part of the liberals’ program of political and 
social transformation, Russian socialists associated help to the needy not so much with the law, 
but rather with revolutionary plans and radical movements to end suffering and injustice. For 
Russian Marxists, communism held out the promise of a society in which every citizen might 
obtain satisfaction of his/her needs beyond empty declarations of rights. They considered it 
essential for Russia to establish first of all the socio-political conditions that could then lead to 
the realization and sustainability of rights.
10
 Most notably, Vladimir Lenin “lacked a coherent 
view of rights.” As Piers Beirne and Alan Hunt have argued, legal notions “played no positive 
part in his thinking about the means for securing the interests of the Soviet citzenry,” because 
Lenin regarded individual legal rights “as mere expressions of bourgeois individualism.”11        
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Subject in Late Imperial Russia,” Kritika, 7:2 (Spring 2006), 173-194; and Jane Burbank, “An Imperial Rights 
Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” Kritika, 7:3 (Summer 2006), 397-431. 
9
 Susan Eva Heuman, “Perspectives on Legal Culture in Pre-revolutionary Russia,” in Revolution in Law: 
Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917-1938, ed. Piers Beirne (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
1990), 3-16. B.A. Kistiakovskii, “V zashchitu prava: intelligentsia i pravosoznanie,” in Vekhi (Moscow: Tipo-lit. T-
va I.N. Kushnerev i Ko, 1909), translated in Canadian Slavic Studies 4 (Spring 1970), 36-59. The Russian 
philosopher P.I. Novgorodtsev similarly affirmed that only social insurance can guarantee “the right to a worthy 
existence to all human beings.” P.I. Novgorodtsev, Pravo na dostoinoe chelovecheskoe sushchestvovanie. O prave 
na sushchestvovanie. Sotsial’no-filosoficheskie etiudy (Saint Pertersburg: Izd. M.O. Vol’f, 1911), 3-13.  
10
 Nicholas Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976); Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (New York: Viking Press, 1978); Andrzej Walicki, A History of 
Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979). 
11
 Piers Beirne and Alan Hunt, “Lenin, Crime, and Penal Politics, 1917-1924,” in Revolution in Law, 99-135, at 128, 
footnote 20. Yet, already at the second congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in 1903, Lenin 
had advanced the key principles of material assistance to workers which would constitute the foundation of the 
future Soviet social security legislation. See V.A. Aralov and A.V. Levshin, Sotsial’noe obespechie v SSSR 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), 8-9; and V.S. Andreev, Sotsial’noe 
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Russian workers, on their part, picked up both the liberal and socialist strains of thought 
and often articulated the concept that all human beings share a natural dignity and the right to 
respect. In the revolutionary years between 1905 and 1917, when workers confronted employers 
with demands and strikes, they very often insisted on treatment befitting their worth as human 
beings.
12
 
The October Revolution set in motion developments that re-inscribed longstanding issues 
of economic justice and social equality within a completely new political context. Two questions 
emerged as particularly problematic. First, given that the socialist state associated help neither 
with charity (as in religious tradition) nor with the rights of the individual (as in liberal theories), 
how were then care and respect for human dignity to be understood? In other words, could ideas 
of assistance go beyond legal right and be rather related to notions of moral rights? Second, who 
were the carriers of these moral rights? Universal welfare, with its connotation of equality of 
access to social programs, represented a maximalist variation of state assistance that had a strong 
ideological appeal for Soviet officialdom. However, the new state was also extremely suspicious 
of all backward, socially dangerous, and politically disloyal elements among its population. 
Ironically, while the socialist mission included a message of help to all those in need, it also 
found ways to depict some social groups as aliens. After the Revolution, a moral language of 
dignity and rights continued to resonate in Soviet Russia, but it also came to coexist and be 
mixed with deep hatred for people now classed as “others” (chuzhie, byvshie, prochie) and 
sometimes stigmatized as “enemies” (vragi). The concept of the others – i.e. the subjects that 
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deviated from the physical, social, and political norm – altered and complicated the idea of 
universal welfare among the socialist population. It created the dilemma not only of 
understanding help beyond charity and individual legal rights, but also of deciding whether the 
others of the socialist state were worthy of any help.     
This dissertation explores how these dilemmas troubled the dialogue between Soviet 
leaders and Soviet subjects in the years between the Revolution of 1917 and the welfare reforms 
of 1949-1950. Instead of seeing a rupture between the Stalin era and what preceded and followed 
it, I treat this period as marked by concepts and practices that developed by the mid-1920s and 
remained rather stable throughout the end of the Second World War. Indeed, while the 
Revolution of1917 introduced the Russian people to a completely new system of social 
assistance, the welfare revisions of 1949 significantly foreshadowed the more thorough reforms 
that would be undertaken by the post-Stalinist leadership in 1956.
13
 It was not the death of Stalin 
in 1953 and the consequent change in political leadership, but rather the war that ushered in new 
ways to engage with the dilemmas of social assistance.   
And yet, despite the coherence of the early Soviet and Stalinist experience in ideas and 
practices of help, the thinking and the actions of both Soviet leaders and Soviet subjects – 
including the very others who were marginalized by state discourse – occurred against a 
background of changing social realities, economic criteria, and political considerations. Thus, the 
years immediately following the Revolution saw an explosion of innovations that directly 
touched upon the right to be helped. Out of universities, government institutions, and non-state 
organizations, initiatives sprang for the application of the most modern scientific ideas to the 
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field of public care. This was a positive phase in which the new workers’ state founded by the 
Bolsheviks was intent on catching up and surpassing the rest of the world in the articulation of its 
progressive and all-encompassing welfare system. Very soon, however, it became clear that 
neither the theory of Marxism nor the rhetoric of the Revolution offered a solution to the 
practical and financial problems of providing support to the numerous unemployed Soviet 
citizens who fell outside the scope of the social insurance agency. As the ideal goal of equal 
distribution was dangled before the eyes of the population, the reality of social protection in the 
early Soviet Union was constrained by economic and political exigencies. Standing in the way of 
prisoners’ rights, for instance, was nothing less than state security. In the case of disabled 
individuals, social protection was limited by Soviet leaders’ desire to maximize production. 
Especially with the great leap forward into industrialization of 1929, the Soviet state twisted its 
discourse of help and insisted that all costly activity of the citizenry be subordinated to the 
economically defined cause of socialist construction. Within a few years, the innovators 
advocating for “defective” children’s rights and the humane treatment of political prisoners were 
beleaguered and deprived of their budgets. Although a few activists struggled to preserve the 
rights of blind and deaf-mute people, for most of them the expediency of the first Five-Year-Plan 
replaced the revolutionary ideals with the goal of labor productivity. Similarly, the advocates of 
single mothers’ rights encouraged all women to mobilize for production and reproduction, often 
compelling them to accept jobs and pregnancies that they did not want. Later, in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, the picture of state assistance to marginalized populations changed 
again. As we will see through the cases of blind people and single mothers, the late 1940s saw 
the attempt – both among political leaders and social activists – to reintroduce humanitarian 
11 
 
beliefs and re-launch the less coercive mechanisms of help that had characterized the first post-
revolutionary decade.
14
  
Connecting help and rights 
Considering how the Soviet state grappled with the dilemmas of state assistance, early 
studies of Soviet social welfare limited themselves to functioning interpretations of institutions 
and initiatives, leaving unexplored the mutual influences between welfare policies and the 
culture of people’s everyday life. Although valuing the extensiveness of the Soviet insurance 
system (especially in comparison with capitalist welfare states), these works tended to read other 
Stalinist welfare policies as mere rhetoric and stressed the exclusion of non-productive social 
forces from state-guaranteed benefits and social insurance.
15
 More recent literature has moved 
historians’ attention from discriminating policies in the distribution of resources to the 
introduction of disciplinary measures in all state’s attempts to care for various social groups. 
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Scholars have shown that Soviet leaders adopted an approach in part based on larger pan-
European shifts towards modern disciplining welfare states, in part oriented by its own modernist 
ideology of raising the consciousness of a backward population, and in part shaped by its 
extreme defensiveness vis-à-vis deviant elements.16 
 Without denying the close connection between care and control in modern state projects 
(including their coercive and violent aspects), my objective in this dissertation is to unveil the 
less studied role of official and popular notions of rights in defining socialist state assistance, and 
to understand how the tension between control and rights variously underpinned Soviet help 
between 1917 and 1950. In pursuit of this goal, I build on previous research on social welfare 
and politics of control, but I also put this literature in conversation with other historiographical 
and methodological traditions, especially with studies of Soviet subjectivity and petitionary 
culture. Through the integration of these historiographies, I advance my definition of rights as a 
category of analysis and propose a methodological approach to link it to the category of help.           
“Right” is a notoriously vague word with multiple overlapping meanings. Men and 
women living in Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1950 refrained from precisely outlining their 
notions of rights (prava in Russian). Because of these silences in the articulation of what pravo 
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meant, scholars of legal history have tended to emphasize Soviet people’s lack of understanding 
of the law. Notably, John Hazard contended that “it would have been a rare individual who could 
have understood his (sic) rights or could have had the courage to demand observance of the 
code.”17 Historians of the Soviet human rights movement have built on this legal literature and 
located the origins of the defense of rights in the post-Stalinist late 1950s, closely linking rights 
consciousness to the emerging dissent of those years.
18
  
By forgoing definitions of formal legal rights, historians Golfo Alexopoulos and Dorena 
Caroli have shown that both the Soviet state and its citizens recognized rights but identified them 
differentially depending on an individual’s socio-political worth. The main criterion for enjoying 
full rights was one’s engagement in socially useful, productive work. Soviet power established 
labor as the condition to grant various incentives and confer benefits. It was also the means 
through which the authorities assessed citizens’ rights. In turn, Soviet people expected that those 
who served the state should correspondingly receive certain concessions and were not afraid to 
claim protection of their rights.
 
To put it simply, the central duty of all Soviet citizens to work 
determined their rights, and their labor entitled all working individuals to make demands on the 
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state. It was under these provisions, Alexopoulos and Caroli have argued, that Soviet leaders and 
citizens alike advanced their interpretations and demands for the implementation of what they 
understood to be their rights. They sometimes linked themselves closely to the letter of the law, 
while at other times used laws arbitrarily. Because rights were at the same time a privilege, a 
benefit, and a social entitlement, individuals could pursue them in and outside the courts, through 
legal as well as non-legal channels. The border between receiving help by right (po pravu) or 
through privilege and networks of patronage (po blatu) was rather elastic.
19
     
Building on this interpretation of rights, in the following chapters I will not use “right” as 
a narrow legal term, but rather as a signifier standing for an idea, a feeling, and a practice. As 
such, in my usage this term points to a collective understanding of entitlement at its experiential 
and practical core. The Soviet right to be helped was a form of consciousness and action, a set of 
largely non-legal governing considerations that shaped practice and political behavior and that 
can be exposed by analyzing people’s encounters with extreme poverty and marginalization.20 
Indeed, in their efforts to overcome complicated situations of need, Soviet people strove to 
preserve and affirm a sense of entitlement. Although the historical actors of this dissertation 
differently drew the boundaries of the domain of rights depending on the contingent 
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circumstances and the place in which they lived, their choices were determined by some 
common tendencies – reliance on labor (as previous literature has emphasized), but also on 
suffering, understandings of gender, and networks of personal patronage. It is in people’s 
orientations and decisions vis-à-vis these categories that I see a distinctive Soviet rights 
consciousness.   
Both the process of granting or denying the right to state assistance and the practice of 
claiming this right were crafted as evaluations of worthiness. Indeed, Alexopoulos’s research on 
Soviet subjectivity has shown that, since Soviet officials controlled the distribution of material 
and cultural resources, those who sought recognition from the state had to demonstrate their 
worthiness in prescribed ways.
21
 By focusing on citizens that deviated from the Soviet norm of 
fitness and worth in either physical, social, gender, or political terms, this dissertation explores 
how the unfit of Soviet society depicted themselves as deserving basic protection and justice. I 
show that a sense of entitlement as integral participatory members of the socialist state, 
understandings of suffering, and a combination of both were the grounds of marginalized 
people’s right to be helped. Those who could hardly earn rights to material assistance through 
labor constructed narratives of legitimation by effort or suffering. Gender played a crucial role in 
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creating a balance between service and suffering, since endured hardship was most often cast 
female and performed effort constructed as male. In any case, marginalized citizens who chose to 
demand help and the activists who advocated on their behalf told stories that imposed action and 
thus created a sense of dignity and rights for themselves. Ultimately, they activated concepts that 
moved them from the disenfranchised status of people marginalized and in need to the position 
of carriers of the Soviet right to be helped. 
In sum, labor, special merits towards the Revolution, and service in the construction of 
socialism, but also helplessness, desperation, orphanhood, and loneliness were the key categories 
of the right to be helped. They were the product of reciprocal relationships between state actors, 
social groups, and individuals; they were the outcome of a bargain in which the state owed the 
citizens and, when it kept the deal, it compelled the citizens to owe back;
22
 they were also the 
result of complex mutual influences between disciplining and emancipating historical forces. 
This argument complicates the vision of Stalinism as “a culture of the gift,” which implied 
citizens’ obligation to serve the state because of the latter’s presumed attention to the welfare of 
the population.
23
 Thinking of Stalinism from the perspective of gifting, historians have so far 
written about the social control of the Stalinist welfare and described citizens’ responses to it as 
eternal gratitude or tameness. Instead, my concept of the right to be helped and the tension 
inherent in it between socio-political projects and socialist moralities reveal a more diverse 
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spectrum of discourses, formative sources, and historical actors in real practiced and lived Soviet 
socialism.  
 As an idea and a practice, the right to be helped can be best historicized through a multi-
methodological approach that combines institutional history and discourse analysis with the 
study of everyday life. This method facilitates an examination of the conceptual underpinnings of 
notions of rights without losing sight of the socio-economic and political conditions in which 
Soviet rights consciousness was articulated. The institutional history of help-oriented 
organizations and the textual close-reading of their writings explain the right to be helped at the 
level of legislation and representation; the history of everyday life instead draws attention to the 
contradictions between the normative ideological context and the practices of Soviet men and 
women.
24
 Thus, alongside statutes, directives, regulations, administrative correspondence, and 
various books and articles on welfare, I analyze unpublished manuscripts, personal letters, and 
petitions for help. I examine the ideas, vocabularies, and images of help that Soviet people 
evoked in their writings, but I also explore how petitions were processed by local relief 
organizations and higher central institutions. The outcomes of individual petitions reveal the 
actual implementation of official and popular discourses, their strengths and limitations in the 
practices of everyday life.
25
 This method considers important arenas of life where verbal acts 
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such as petitioning and advocating transformed the non-verbal world of the Soviet people. 
Complementing the ideoscape and the narratives of help with the register of practice and the 
pragmatic results of petitioning and advocating, historians have a better access to the ways in 
which the right to be helped was experienced by its practitioners.  
Historical actors: marginalized people and social activists 
Defective children, blind and deaf-mute adults, single mothers, and political prisoners 
were among the marginalized of Soviet society.26 As unproductive others, these people were 
often accused of engaging in socially and political aberrant behaviors. Soviet official discourse 
claimed that they could neither fully participate in the social life of the community nor make 
positive contributions to the construction of socialism. These people were left at the edge of 
social and political consciousness and at the border of gender and sexual morality. Since Soviet 
society was supposed to be oriented towards enthusiasm and optimism, these physical and social 
misfits were often skipped over in silence. When they were noticed, they were talked about in 
disparaging ways – as a problem, a sore, an abscess in the otherwise healthy and happy body 
politic.
27
 And yet, while the Soviet state hid its unemployed others from a self-congratulatory 
public consciousness and discriminated against them in the distribution of resources, it rarely 
completely excluded them. 
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Indeed, the Soviet right to be helped did not operate by a rigid rule of inclusion or 
exclusion, but rather by degrees of marginalization. Those deemed physically, socially, and/or 
politically unfit were subjected to a transformation project and progressively integrated or 
marginalized as they succeeded or failed to accomplish the necessary transformation. The need 
to eradicate the problem represented by deviant citizens did not always lead to their excision 
from the socio-political body. Removal from the body social was the last resort in the early 
Soviet and Stalinist ethos of assistance, which – I would claim – usually started from the belief in 
the moral right of all suffering citizens to receive help and the faith in the state’s ability to 
emancipate deviant unfit subjects, transform them through care, and integrate them back in the 
collective. It is true that discipline and control were a byproduct of this transformative project, 
but – in the field of welfare – violent cleansing campaigns were mostly pursued when all the rest 
failed.  
This dissertation shows that help to the four selected groups of Soviet marginalized 
people coexisted with practices of removal. Special schools for defective children, for instance, 
were a means to attain the goal of re-education and future re-integration of socially and 
physically deviant children. A similar task was performed by the workshops for the blind and the 
deaf-mute as well as the Homes for Mother and Child that hosted single mothers. Even the 
prison accomplished this function. Inmates could be transformed, molded, and reformed, if 
placed under the proper tutelage. Theirs was the ultimate redemption and salvation, which turned 
a non-Soviet person into a Soviet citizen.
28
 Within this discourse, help to political prisoners 
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became conceivable because it entailed not only the promise of reintegration, but also the 
assertion that each and every deviant individual could become a valuable member of society. 
Both Soviet leaders and Soviet subjects imagined the process of transformation into 
productive citizens and the reintegration into the social body as the outcome of reciprocal 
obligations. The state welfare system had to provide jobs, education and vocational training, 
political and cultural stimulation. In addition, it had to be imbued with humanity and scientific 
rationality: the marginalized were not supposed to be humiliated, oppressed, and locked away 
forever; nothing should degrade or de-humanize them; nor was there supposed to be any 
sentimental coddling towards them. On their part, the marginalized were expected to eagerly 
embrace the hard labor of transforming their deviant selves and building socialism with the rest 
of the collective. As the following chapters will reveal, however, both parties often transgressed 
the terms of this bargain. The Homes for Mother and Child unceremoniously forced labor upon 
the disorderly women who passed through them. The same was true about the facilities for 
defective children and the workshops for blind and deaf-mute adults. Punishment was readily 
joined to production in the concentration camps. Marginalized individuals, on their end, did not 
always show the required enthusiasm for self-transformation through labor and frequently looked 
for ways to avoid rigid work disciplines.    
Thinking in terms of marginalization helps us see the wide spectrum of choices that were 
available to Soviet leaders and activists in attending to deviant social entities. It facilitates a 
better understanding of the shifting contours of the early Soviet and Stalinist socio-political 
boundary, because it conceives that society as a continuum of more or less integrated members 
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(instead of imaging the loyal as living peacefully together as part of the Soviet order and the 
hostile and untrustworthy as excluded from the body social). Finally, marginalization uncovers a 
more diverse range of acceptable Soviet subjectivities and reveals that authoritative hegemonic 
normativity (i.e. the male, healthy, skilled, waged, and industrially productive Soviet exemplary 
subject) was continually in dialogue with difference and abnormality.
29
  
Translating both the state’s policies and the needs of marginalized individuals was a 
group of historical actors whom I call “activists.” These were men and women who operated as 
liaisons between Soviet marginalized people and higher political or administrative officials. 
Some activists were employed in the Commissariat of Social Assistance and therefore had to 
deal with the petitioning marginalized as part of their everyday jobs. Some were doctors, 
pedagogues, and lawyers, who had professional reasons for the desire to help the marginalized. 
Others were disabled men and women, who chose to become involved to protect their 
communities’ rights. Although the activists assumed the role of spokespersons for the 
marginalized, they held official positions and tended to stay within the confines imposed by their 
status.  
The activists were responsible for disseminating and enacting policy, but they also dealt 
with local communities and often closely resembled the marginalized groups in which they were 
situated. For this reason, they can rarely be distinguished from their social and cultural 
surroundings. Activists absorbed, translated, and manipulated both community politics and 
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was (Un)Made: Cultural Fantasy and Male Subjectivity under Stalin (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
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official policy. They were forced to play by central and community rules. It is by now axiomatic 
in Soviet history to say that centralism did not operate effectively. The Commissariat of Social 
Assistance was not immune from this problem: its local sections often failed to manage their 
employees as instructed from the center; neglected by the state, local social workers just got on 
with the tasks that they had decided to perform and the pursuits that they had set for themselves. 
Most of the activists considered for this dissertation worked within the welfare system with 
mixed results and often worked independently from political controls because the controllers 
ignored them. Thus, their advocacy on behalf of marginalized citizens throws into relief a series 
of initiatives that, although channeled, monitored, directed, and controlled by the state, had some 
spontaneity too. In the chaos and heterogeneity of policy implementation, the activists’ pressures 
and reactions gave rise to variations in how welfare policy was made.
30
 
The activists populating this dissertation possessed hybrid identities and lived within 
multiple cultures.
 
They were shaped by their environments as well as by their political beliefs. To 
better understand these historical actors, I decided to take them away from their official 
capacities and re-insert them in their social contexts. The active members of the All-Russian 
Societies for the Blind and the Deaf-Mute (Vserossiiskoe Obshchesto Slepykh, hereafter VOS, 
and Vserossiiskoe Obshchestvo Glukhonemykh, hereafter VOG) are a prime example of Soviet 
activists working for the state and yet remaining disabled people and representing all that stood 
for disability. The defectologists of the Medico-Pedagogical Station (Mediko-Pedagogicheskaia 
Stantsiia) constituted a community which encompassed medical, psychiatric, and educational 
professionals: they were distinguished from the state by knowledge and skills, but also 
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fundamentally entangled with it. The doctors and midwives of the Department for the Protection 
of Motherhood and Infancy (Otdel Okhrany Maternistva i Mladenchestva, hereafter Ommlad) 
often maintained a subculture of care for women’s needs which went beyond the state’s changing 
reproduction policies. The members of the Political Red Cross (Politicheskii Krasnyi Krest) 
spoke out against practices of excess in the Soviet camps and prisons, but they always operated 
by the terms and conventions of the political discourse created by the revolution. All of these 
activists were caught between personal ethics, professional duties, and demands of state power. 
The relationship between these activists and the political leaders and officials with whom 
they interacted should not be framed in terms of resistance.
 31
 The defectologists, the members of 
VOS and VOG, and the activists of Ommlad did not have the mission to protect marginalized 
individuals from a state that mistreated them, but rather to help them through state intervention. 
As we will see in chapter 5, not even the Political Red Cross ever articulated the defense of 
prisoners’ rights as dissent. Its activists sought to preserve the authority of the law and spoke 
against illegality without openly criticizing Stalin’s policies or waging wars with the Soviet state. 
In my interpretation, these activists were neither political dissidents walking along a hard, lonely 
path of struggle with the state, nor its accomplices or its victims. Describing the four selected 
communities of activists, I strive neither to heroicize them nor to represent them simply as 
accommodators and adapters. Rather, I see them as people who had been somehow mobilized 
and transformed by a revolution that created political and personal possibilities for them. Their 
narratives and practices of help sometimes aimed at disrupting the all-pervasive Soviet power, 
but at other times sustained it.
 
Through help-oriented organizations, early Soviet and Stalinist 
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activists carved out non-oppositional spaces where the regime and the citizens could dialogue 
and cooperate in defining Soviet socialism and its moral order. 
A definite linkage between activism, the protection of rights, and resistance against the 
socialist state characterized the human rights movement of the late 1950s and 1960s. That was 
the time when Soviet thinkers began to invoke the human rights idiom of the Universal 
Declaration of 1948 and activists infused practices of assistance towards prisoners and disabled 
people with the idea of dissent.
32
 However, the association between the protection of rights and 
dissent was not a specific feature of the early Soviet and Stalinist experience. Between 1917 and 
1950 most Soviet marginalized individuals and their activists did not emphasize the 
incompatibility of the socialist state with the respect for rights and human dignity. Most activists 
encouraged their constituencies to have their lives mobilized, ordered, and planned so that their 
needs might be satisfied and their rights protected. The marginalized expected the socialist 
government to introduce a better reality for them, improve their status, and expand their rights. 
Ultimately, their understanding of Soviet socialism was couched in the language of a moral 
contract – not the post-WWII idiom of human rights and its implications of resistance, but an 
earlier Soviet human rights thinking that I call “the right to be helped.”  
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Outline 
The chapters that follow develop along a problem-centered exposition rather than a 
chronological linear progression. Each of them grapples with an aspect of the articulation of the 
right to be helped, but also fans out to intersect with issues addressed in other chapters. Chapter 1 
examines the nature of official policies and practices of welfare towards individuals who, for 
various reasons, did not fall under the care of the state’s insurance agencies. Here I lay out the 
institutional grounds on which the Soviet marginalized could base their demands for help. In 
chapters 2 through 5, I turn to the activists who had to implement the state’s policies of 
assistance to the uninsured and unemployed. Each of these chapters is devoted to one of the 
mentioned organizations and the assistance they offered to specific social groups. Chapter 2 
focuses on the Medico-Pedagogical Station and the educational help it offered to “morally 
defective” children; chapter 3 studies how VOS and VOG strove to provide help to blind and 
deaf-mute people by means of employment; chapter 4 assesses Ommlad and its gendered forms 
of assistance to single mothers; and chapter 5 interprets the Political Red Cross’s ambiguous 
defense of political prisoners’ rights. All of these organizations were to various degrees 
integrated within the state’s administrative system. By studying both their management from the 
top and their effects on the bottom, I strive to understand the forces that shaped the right to be 
helped from within. Throughout the chapters, I also pay attention to the voices of marginalized 
individuals themselves and investigate how they made sense of the slogans of Soviet welfare and 
the practices of its implementation in their everyday lives.  
 The following multifaceted story of the Soviet right to be helped is offered as a window 
onto the workings of a system, which – like many other modern state formations – was 
conceived not only to purge, but also to protect. I tell a story that redraws the picture of Soviet 
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socialism as both a disciplining and emancipating project. I also suggest a way to understand 
how marginalized historical actors always contest, shape, and alter understandings of rights. This 
story, however, painfully reminds us of the real play of power in very unequal relationships. My 
dissertation is about dialogues which are vertical. It bears witness to the uneven forces that are 
involved in shaping political and moral orders.  
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Chapter 1 
Social Assistance: The Narkomsobes’s Taxonomy of Help  
“All citizens owe their labor to the state and all have the right to the state’s social assistance.” 1 
 
While the Department of Social Insurance of the Commissariat of Labor had the 
ideologically and politically crucial task to protect the social rights of all “working elements,” 
another Soviet institution performed the less prestigious function of catering to the needs of the 
uninsured. This was the Commissariat of Social Assistance (Narodnyi Kommissariat 
Sotsial’nogo Obespecheniia or Narkomsobes). Through its various divisions and affiliated 
organizations, this agency provided help to multiple groups of non-working and non-insured 
people. It effectively expanded Soviet help beyond the restrictive terms of official decrees on 
social insurance, because it applied the laws drafted for the insured to a much wider range of 
individuals. In particular, its Pensioning Department provided material support to a vast clientele 
of so-called “pensioners” (pensionery).2 Conceptualized as “invalids” (invalidy) and “unable to 
work” (netrudosposobnye), the pensioners were an underprivileged social stratum within the 
work-based polity that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Dictatorship advocated as its norm. They 
were second-rank citizens who found themselves in a precarious economic position and were 
marginalized – both materially and discursively – vis-à-vis the insured workers. And yet, the 
pensioners were not completely excluded from the purview of Soviet help. By examining the 
groups of people that were assisted by the Pensioning Department, this chapter investigates why 
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the Soviet state imagined itself as having the responsibility to help its non-working uninsured 
population. Certainly, this help was part of the socio-political project to control those who fell 
beyond the jurisdiction of the social insurance agency and extract from them whatever labor 
productivity they might have. However, the disciplining motivation operated in tension with 
other strains and legitimizing categories, such as the ethics of Soviet socialism and its 
emancipating and egalitarian dimension. Political control and economic exigencies coexisted 
with humanitarian welfare as a paradigm of socialist morality. 
Scholars studying nineteenth and twentieth century systems of social protection in 
Western Europe and the United States have identified three basic tendencies in the legitimization 
of the right to state assistance. The so-called “contractual orientation” considers the right to 
benefits as something that the beneficiary personally earns, either through the payment of 
contributions or through the performance of work. A second kind of justification emphasizes 
status rather than contract. In this case the right to social welfare derives from the right to 
subsistence and those who depend on their labor for subsistence have a social right to income if 
their working capacity fails or if no jobs are available for them. A third tendency considers the 
right to income as a prerequisite of citizenship. In this case all citizens are entitled to protection 
regardless of how they earn their living.
3
  
To what extent is it possible to understand the early Soviet and Stalinist experience – and 
the emergence of the world’s first socialist social policy – within this framework? How was the 
longstanding practice of social help reinvented for Soviet life? And did the Soviet notion of 
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rights fit within the spectrum of principles that legitimized social assistance in other societies? 
Identifying social security for the insured (sotsial’noe strakhovanie) as its key welfare system, in 
theory the Soviet Union rejected the notion of help based on the economic need of the recipient 
and rather furnished social insurance benefits as a matter of rights earned through 
contributions/performed work.
4
 However, the fact that Soviet welfare included also social 
assistance for the uninsured (sotsial’noe obespechenie) reveals the inability of the socialist state 
to make a univocal choice between help as a right distributed in the work place and help based 
on need and the universal right to subsistence.
5
 David Priestland has contended that “the 
‘dialectical’ style of Bolshevik political thought encouraged Bolsheviks to deny the need to make 
choices between principles in tension with each other, and to argue instead over the balance 
between them.”6 The Soviet welfare regime was oriented both towards the implementation of 
economic support for its socio-political base and towards the provision of social services for its 
entire population. Various political and institutional agents argued over the relative importance 
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of these two principles. As a result, the privileging of one class – i.e. the insured industrial 
worker – coexisted and competed with the aspiration to achieve equality through distribution of 
resources.  
In this chapter, I will first describe the conceptual and institutional frameworks that 
undergirded social assistance at its inception between 1917 and 1921. Then, I will present a 
taxonomy of help deduced from the groups of pensionery that were assisted by the Pensioning 
Department and analyze four key groups: disabled people, family dependents, personal 
pensioners, and the “others.” These groups reflect degrees of marginalization within Soviet 
society, but also dramatize the key criteria according to which the state granted help. As a result, 
we will see that, since Soviet leaders were unable to decide whether eligibility for state help 
should be based upon work or need, they did not make consistent welfare choices informed by an 
internally coherent ideology. Several diverse ideas were connected to each other within welfare 
leaders’ discourse, which sometimes adhered to the productive labor principle and at other times 
to the minimum subsistence approach. The determination of who had the right to social 
protection turned out to be rather patchy and unreliable. Whenever benefits could be related to 
previous contributions, they had a more contractual character. However, Narkomsobes officials 
often assigned subsidies which were more consistent with the definition of benefits as a right to 
which all had the same claim. The two discourses of productive labor and need – or suffering – 
ran parallel one to other, sometimes contradicting and other times re-enforcing each other. Both 
were central to the Soviet state’s understanding of itself. 
Besides the ambiguous coexistence of social security and social assistance in the system 
of Soviet welfare, the very everyday practical choices of local Narkomsobes administrators and 
employees show that incongruities trickled down the entire edifice of Soviet help. For instance, 
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when Narkomsobes activists referred to the categories of “useful work” or “merits/services” to 
explain the assignation or denial of a pension, they clearly related help to labor contributions – a 
paradoxical practice in itself given the conception of their clientele as invalids. At the same time, 
Narkomsobes officials also considered the fact that those who needed help the most were the 
least able to earn it and frequently evoked the categories of need, disease and disability, 
loneliness, and suffering as well as traditional constructions of family and gender. The practice 
of Soviet help did not stand on solid ground precisely because it combined aspects from all these 
competing legitimizing categories.  
The economic conditions in which social assistance was implemented in Soviet Russia 
between the Revolution and the end of the Second World War constantly changed and added in 
to the ideological and institutional confusion of Soviet help. The years between 1918 and 1921 
were a formative phase in which the new state attempted to invent socialism, determine its 
politics of entitlement, and put in place categories of social assistance that would continue to 
resonate in the decades to come.
7
 However, those years were also a turbulent time of war, 
famine, deurbanization, tremendous flux, and genuine poverty. The categories that emerged at 
that time would later occur against different economic backgrounds. Indeed, beyond the 
formulation of principles, shifts in economy between periods of scarcity and times of relative 
stability conditioned the design and implementation of specific social assistance policies. For 
instance, the Civil War made certain pensionery more significant than others: the group “victims 
of the counterrevolution” clearly had passing importance, but temporary was also the 
significance given to the families of red soldiers. Unemployment rates impacted social assistance 
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too. While around 1925 unemployment began to accelerate and urban standards of living 
correspondingly declined, in 1930 the Soviet Union officially stated that unemployed had been 
“completely liquidated.”8 This change affected definitions of pensionery. Indeed, in 1932, within 
two years from unemployment’s death pronouncement and at the end of the first Five-Year-Plan, 
the state modified its official classification of disability levels by introducing more rigid criteria 
to establish people’s handicaps and their access to social assistance. Finally, the Second World 
War created new kinds of dislocations and enormously changed the social conditions in which 
social assistance policies were implemented.  
Thus, while the key principles of Soviet help – both its disciplining, work-oriented 
dimension and its egalitarian, need-based approach – emerged in the years between 1917 and 
1921 and continued to exist in tension with one another through the end of 1940s, each gained 
more or less prominence over the other depending on the context in which they were actualized. 
The definition of an individual’s state of need and the criteria for defining his/her labor 
contributions changed in connection with the shifting economic, social, and political conditions 
of the early Soviet and Stalinist experience.  
1.1 Conceptual and institutional frameworks at the inception of Soviet help 
A mere three days after the Revolution, on November 10, 1917, the Petrograd Military-
Revolutionary Committee declared that “the rich classes and their servants will be deprived of 
the right to receive products.”9 The Constitution of July 1918 fulfilled this promise by denying 
the right to vote to all “non-toiling” social groups and discriminating against them in matters of 
everyday life. Historian Matthew Rendle has explained that the disenfranchised (lishentsy) “were 
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 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ russkogo bibliogragicheskogo institute Granat, vol. 53, 608.  
9
 Quoted in the anonymous article “Bred sumashedshikh,” Gazeta dlia Vsekh, 10 November 1917, 1. 
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more likely to lose access to jobs, rations, housing, and education.”10 As the first Commissar of 
Justice I.Z. Shteinberg put it later from his political exile in Berlin: “only because you are a 
former bourgeois, you are deprived of the most ordinary, common human rights…”11 While the 
so-called “exploiting classes,” i.e. “the bourgeois, the priests, the kulaks, and the speculators,” 
were denied all political, social, and human rights, the post-revolutionary press constantly 
reminded Soviet readers that “our Soviet Republic has its laws and they are all directed at 
defending the interests of the poor.” Newspapers and journals encouraged all poor and suffering 
people to “turn for help to your Soviet regime. It will always come to your help.”12 
The new socialist state rejected the liberal principles of freedom, equality, and individual 
liberty. Denying any concept of rights that was independent from the politico-economic relations 
existing within society, Marxist-Leninist doctrine conceived rights in class terms and recognized 
only one liberty – “freedom from poverty.”13 Because it was based on an analysis of society that 
centered on the polarization between two classes, this initial discourse fostered a binary 
opposition between the rich capitalists and the poor proletarians. The former were seen as 
enemies of the revolution, infringing upon the entitlements of the latter and therefore to be 
deprived of any right. The poor classes, instead, had emerged from the revolution as the 
legitimate carriers of rights; they were encouraged to denounce any violation of their 
entitlements and actively turn for help to the Soviet regime. 
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The provision of help to suffering people was central to the Soviet state’s positive self-
image vis-à-vis the tsarist regime and the capitalist governments. As historian Juliane Fűrst put it 
describing the Soviet attitude towards homeless children, “the care and attention lavished on the 
weakest members of society was supposed to right the wrongs of the tsarist regime, while at the 
same time to signal to the capitalist world the moral and social superiority of the Soviet 
system.”14 Soviet welfare experts always emphasized the socialist state’s concern for human life 
and its care for all needy, deviant, and marginalized others. In a 1919 programmatic article on 
the notion of help, the Narkomsobes leader Z. Lilina thus commented on the Russian pre-
revolutionary and the foreign capitalist welfare systems: “there where the human person was 
ignored and the yoke of slavery burdened a strong, healthy, able-bodied population of millions of 
men and women, even less thought and care were given to the poor, the puny and weak, the sick 
and the children.” Instead, she continued, the Soviet Narkomsobes was the place “to which flows 
all the misery and all the pain of the people.” The very nature of help profoundly differed in the 
Soviet regime and in other political systems: while during the tsarist regime and under capitalism 
social welfare took the shape of alms, under socialism it had become a state business and was 
financed exclusively by the state. “Private philanthropy is out of the picture,” proudly stated 
Lilina.
15
 And a brochure issued by the Narkomsobes in 1923 echoed:  
The essence of social assistance consists in the fact that this form of assistance covers all 
social groups, extending to all those who need assistance, but at the same time assistance 
is carried out by the state…As the government earmarks funds for the army, the navy, the 
school, and the judiciary, so within the system of social assistance the state provides help 
from state funds to all those who need this help.
16
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The new Bolshevik regime did not accept any compromise with the charitable movement: 
it closed down all philanthropic organizations, prohibited the Orthodox Church and any other 
religious community to engage in charity, and put the entire sphere of social welfare under state 
control.
17
 In place of beneficence, almsgiving, religiously inspired pity, and reliance on the sense 
of civic duty felt by private individuals, the Soviet government advanced the right of all poor and 
suffering people to receive material assistance. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union made many of its newly established institutions available to the 
poor and the suffering for demanding assistance as a matter of right. If the primary need of a 
person seeking help was health care, this individual would be referred to the Commissariat of 
Health (Narkomzdrav). If the best way to solve a citizen’s difficulties was through training and 
education, he/she was sent to the Commissariat of Education (Narkompros). If the applicant for 
help was an insured member of the labor force in need of economic assistance, this individual 
was encouraged to turn to the Commissariat of Labor (Narkomtrud) – especially its Department 
of Social Insurance and Labor Protection – and, after 1933, to the All-Union Central Committee 
of Trade Unions. Finally, if an uninsured and unemployed applicant required custodial care or 
long-term economic assistance, this person was directed to the Narkomsobes. While for the other 
commissariats the welfare function was one among many others, social assistance was the only 
raison d’etre of the Narkomsobes.  
The first post-revolutionary incarnation of this welfare organ was called People’s 
Commissariat of Public Philanthropy (Narodnyi Kommissariat Gosudarstvennogo Prizreniia). 
This name was an awkward combination of the new commissariats with a carry-over term from 
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the tsarist time – prizrenie. It was quickly abandoned as inappropriate for a socialist society and, 
on April 30, 1918, changed into People’s Commissariat of Social Assistance. During the 
turbulent years of the Civil War, this commissariat’s status was repeatedly and unceremoniously 
changed: initially, it was an independent agency that had republic-wide jurisdiction and was 
flanked in its social welfare responsibilities by the Department of Social Insurance and the other 
mentioned commissariats; then, in January 1920, it was turned into a minor bureau within the 
Commissariat of Labor; finally, in June 1920, it was re-separated from it and given once again 
autonomous status. 
18
 
These fluctuations in status reflected the state’s difficulty in clearly defining the 
jurisdictional functions of the Narkomsobes vis-à-vis the Narkomtrud, and their relative 
importance in the Soviet structure of government. For instance, on March 27, 1919, a directive of 
the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) had identified broad responsibilities for the 
Narkomsobes:  
the defense of abandoned children (younger than 3) and mothers who remained without 
means of subsistence in consequence of the war, the counter-revolution, natural or social 
disasters; the defense and assistance of mothers and infants; the assistance of children 
(older than 3); the assistance of individuals who lost the ability to work during military 
service as well as the victims of counter-revolution, fires, floods, famines, epidemics, 
wars, and the abnormal social relations of the capitalist order, such as orphanage, poverty 
and begging, prostitution, physical and moral defectiveness.
19
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At the time of their final separation, however, a decree on the respective purposes of the 
Narkomtrud and the Narkomsobes stated that the former was to care for the needs of the working 
class, while the latter would preside over “invalids, peasants, and the indigent.”20 This official 
demarcation of functions led to a loss of institutional prestige for the Narkomsobes and its 
practice of social assistance: while the Narkomtrud’s insurance offices were given the pressing 
political task to make reliable assistance available to the Soviet workers, the Narkomsobes was 
left with the menial chore to assign meager pensions to the unemployed and uninsured 
population. In addition, since this organ was formalized only at the Republic level (while the 
other commissariats were All-Union), the Narkomsobes ended up having fewer resources and 
less skilled personnel.
21
 
In 1921, with the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Narkomsobes 
moved from a unitary system of help to all people who were not covered by the social insurance 
to a system which included different forms of assistance to different social groups. Peasants 
became the responsibility of mutual aid societies which helped widows and orphans as well as 
villagers incapable of working due to old age, disability, sickness, or maternity. Producers’ 
cooperatives were designed to provide employment to the disabled. These institutions were 
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supervised by the Narkomsobes, but largely developed their own mutual aid programs. A 
Pensioning Department (Pensionnyi Otdel or Otdel Pensionnogo Obespecheniia) became 
responsible for regulating the assignation of “pensions and subsidies” (pensii i posobiia) to those 
citizens who were eligible neither for social insurance nor for mutual aid.
22
  
Since its very establishment and throughout the following decades, the Pensioning 
Department office operated in a very chaotic and arbitrary context.
23
 Its biggest problem was that 
it let several separate pensioning systems randomly mushroom and be used by local 
Narkomsobes sections. These systems differed one from the other by the conditions and sizes of 
the subsidies they offered and by the order of assignation and payment of these subsidies. 
Depending on whether an applicant had ever been employed, subsidies could be assigned as a 
percentage of his/her former income, a percentage of a certain category's maximum income, or a 
minimum subsistence amount. As a result an individual’s pension could vary between 100% of 
the applicant’s former income and less than 10% of any income category.24  
Narkomsobes officials gave different interpretations of a pensioning legislation that was 
complex, unsystematic, and often encumbered with provisions no longer in force. As local 
Narkomsobes directors often admitted in their reports to Moscow, the employees working in the 
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commissions for the assignment of pensions had “a very poor knowledge of the pensioning 
legislation” and made “many mistakes.”25 Inundated with petitions for assistance and at a loss in 
handling an extremely fragmented and confused pensioning legislation, local Narkomsobes 
sections sometimes found it easier to apply to their uninsured clients the better advertised and 
explained rules of the social security. In other words, local officers had significant discretion in 
determining eligibility and often approved or rejected help to uninsured petitioners following the 
policies that had been elaborated within the social insurance system.
26
  
This situation characterized the administration of social assistance until the late 1940s, 
when criticism about widespread illegality and calls for socialist humanism prompted a desire for 
reform. In December 1949, the Minister of Social Assistance A. Sukhov wrote a “Document on 
the elaboration of a unitary law on pensioning.” His “Spravka” proposed to assign monetary help 
according to a unified and simplified system of pensioning assistance. Emphasizing the need to 
standardize the norms of assistance, the document stated: “the sizes of the pensions for disability, 
old age, and loss of breadwinner must be established in the same percentage for all the categories 
of assisted individuals and correspond to the levels so far applied to military personnel and their 
families.”27 Local Narkomsobes leaders urged their employees to follow the requirements of the 
new unified pensioning legislation.
 28
 This recommendation, however, led to unfortunate 
outcomes for many pensioners as around 10,000 individuals were taken off the rosters of the 
Narkomsobes, the amounts of many pensions were decreased, and many people were moved to 
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 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 1632, l. 41 and l. 42. See also Aralov and Levshin, Sotsial’noe obespechie v SSSR, 17. 
Madison has noted that insurance administrators too were quite inconsistent in adhering to official policies. Social 
Welfare in the Soviet Union, 50 and 83.  
26
 Caroli remarks that local Narkomsobes sections applied the norms foreseen by the social insurance system to 
people who had been employed in the field of education and to the disabled. The latter often complained about 
bureaucratic procedures which applied the insurance laws at the disadvantage of the weakest social elements. 
Histoire de la protection sociale en Union sovietique, 118 and 89. 
27
 See GARF 413, o. 4, d. 357, ll. 33-45 for the complete text of this “Spravka.” The quotation is from l. 43.  
28
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 2292, l. 21 
40 
 
less advantageous pensioning categories.
29
 The systematization of 1949 was the beginning of a 
process that would lead to the more thorough welfare reforms of the post-Stalin years. In 
particular, a law on state pensions issued by the Supreme Council of the SSSR on July 14, 1956, 
would finally provide welfare workers with a much clearer classification of who was entitled to 
what.
30
  
In sum, between 1921 and 1949, a poorly organized Pensioning Department and various 
Narkomsobes local sections struggled to deal with the demands for help of all the “poor and 
suffering” who were not covered by social insurance and could not rely on the mutual aid 
institutions. It is hard to find reliable official statistics spelling out their number. In the first half 
of 1920, the total number of pensioners helped by the Narkomsobes was indicated to be a half 
million people.
31
 After 1921, we can assume that the number of people turning for help to the 
Pensioning Department continued to be large, since it often included citizens who were de facto 
not covered by social insurance and not assisted by mutual aid institutions. Indeed, even for 
wage earners and salaried employees it was often difficult to receive regular social insurance 
benefits. Caroli has calculated that, by the end of the First Five-Year-Plan, the provision of social 
insurance touched 87% of the Soviet working population, thus leaving a good 13% uncovered. 
Even in the privileged industrial sectors, Caroli adds, only 30% of the workers “were considered 
as protected” in 1932. In addition, as Madison has explained, “social insurance benefits were 
inadequate to meet the minimum needs of even the industrial workers who were covered by 
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social insurance.” This situation blurred the distinction between insured and uninsured for all 
practical purposes and swelled the clientele of the Narkomsobes to great proportions.
32
   
To accomplish its herculean tasks, this organ attempted to break down its vast clientele 
into a manageable taxonomy of help, a categorization that would clarify not only who concretely 
carried the right to be helped but also why and in what forms.  
1.2 The recipients of social assistance and the reasons for helping them  
The Pensioning Department defined all its clients as pensionery and then divided them 
into four major categories (each in turn including various sub-groups):  
- pensioners of labor (pensionery truda): people who became disabled on the job due to the 
contraction of occupational diseases or to accidents in the workplace; elderly individuals who 
could no longer work or had accumulated enough working seniority to stop working; and family 
members of deceased breadwinners. The pensioners of labor assisted by the Pensioning 
Department were all individuals who, for one reason or another, were not covered by social 
insurance;
33
 
- military pensioners (voennye pensionery): people who became disabled on the battlefields and 
the family members of red soldiers; 
- personal pensioners (personal’nye pensionery): individuals whose past endeavors had won them 
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a special entitlement to assistance;  
- the “others” (prochie): individuals who were born with disabilities (invalidy detstva), especially 
the blind and deaf-mute; those who had acquired disability through some non-work-related and 
non-military accident (invalidy sluchaia); and “all other invalids who are not covered by the laws 
on social welfare.”34 The prochie were also identified by their economic poverty as “those with a 
low income” (maloimushchie) and “those who fell in need” (pavshie v nuzhdu). Prochie was a 
catchall category for those people whose economic need derived from social calamities not 
directly related to productive or military service. They were – quite literally – the left-overs of 
Soviet social welfare: those who did not fall under the scope of any other welfare regulation; 
those who could not possibly access labor in any of its forms or temporary dimensions. 
This taxonomy did not reflect rigid class identification.
35
 Rather, the main criterion to 
identify the recipients of social assistance and subdivide them in groups was their relationship to 
labor conceived in the broadest possible sense. This was quite paradoxical: while the pensioners 
were by definition needy unemployed individuals without full capacity to work, their identity as 
well as their access to welfare rights were always fundamentally related to labor. On one hand, 
Soviet help included social categories which before the Revolution had to rely on beneficence, 
begging, or prostitution; on the other hand, the Narkomsobes identified its taxonomy of help on 
the grounds of performed labor, that is depending on the type of relationship that various social 
categories had established with the surrounding economic system.  
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 Judging from this classification, entitlement to social assistance was grounded in one’s 
past performances or potential for future contributions in the form of productive, military, or 
reproductive work. It also included help based on need for those who could not possibly relate 
their identity to labor. This conceptualization turned the right to be helped into a large enough 
notion and practice to be applied to all Soviet people. However, it also inevitably created 
hierarchies of entitlement and, although it did not exclude those who could not access labor in 
the present, it nonetheless fostered their marginalization. 
The categories of “personal pensioners” and the “others” clearly reveal how relationships 
both to labor and to need shaped the state’s understanding of its non-working populations’ right 
to be helped, but also brought up clear degrees of marginalization in Soviet society. These two 
categories stood at the opposite ends of the Narkomobes’s taxonomy of help: the personal 
pensioners were entitled to special help because they had performed contributions so valuable 
that could not neatly fit into other categories; the “others” were granted a minimal right to 
subsistence despite the fact that they had never contributed and perhaps would never contribute 
to the common well-being of the country. The quality of these two categories’ relationship to 
labor found reflection in the quantity of financial help assigned to them: while the personal 
pensioners were in the most advantageous position among all pensioners, the “others” had to be 
content with miserly pensions.
36
 At the same time, while the categories of personal pensioner and 
invalids of labor or war tended to be approved as a reward to particularly deserving citizens in 
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times of acute crisis (such as the Civil War and the immediate post-WWII period), the humble 
designation as “other” seems to have remained more stable over the years.37   
As with any hermeneutic system, these categories were abstractions: no single person 
represented the perfect expression of any one category, nor were these categories mutually 
exclusive. In fact, one often found overlap between them. As a result, a person could be entitled 
to receive a pension on multiple grounds and from various organs. For instance, an applicant 
could have the right to a pension due both to old age and disability, or he/she could qualify 
according to the social insurance laws as well as to the other programs of social assistance. In 
these cases, the pensioner was legally entitled only to one pension.
38
 However, in the conditions 
of poverty that plagued many Soviet citizens, we can hardly imagine an applicant sticking to this 
rule, especially if provided with the chance to combine two miserly pensions. This taxonomy of 
help seemed to work for the Narkomsobes’s social workers too: its broad and vague categories 
allowed them to freely – and sometime arbitrarily – include or exclude petitioners. 
 The indeterminacy of pensioners’ categorization methods demonstrates the constructed 
nature of the Soviet social assistance typology. To allow for the possibility to construct the 
pensioners as deserving others, the Narkomsobes administrators developed schemes for 
translating identities and biographies into social assistance denominations. In the process of 
looking for the pensioners who deserved help and separate them from those who did not, the 
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Narkomsobes actually brought these pensioners into being.
39
 As we will see in the next chapters, 
specific help-oriented and advocacy organizations would in turn learn to identify their assisted in 
the new vocabulary of Soviet help and thereby contribute to shape this vocabulary. For now, 
however, let us remain with the Pensioning Department and consider four key groups of 
pensioners within its taxonomy of social assistance: disabled people, family dependents, personal 
pensioners, and the others.  
The disabled  
Disabled men and women constituted a significant group of pensioners. Disability in the 
Soviet Union was largely conceived as the loss of labor capacity, as a subtraction of performative 
power from a body imagined at its full productive potential.
40
 Disabled men, in particular, were 
viewed as deviations from a gendered norm of physical and also socio-political fitness. For 
disabled non-working men, to lose working capacity and be unemployed meant to forsake not 
only the ideal subject position of healthy productive members of the social body, but also the 
role of breadwinners for their wives and children, thus turning into a heavy burden both for the 
collective and their families.  
One of the first post-revolutionary projects of social assistance to permanently disabled 
people was drafted in 1921 by the Sovnarkom and remained in force until 1932. It suggested a 
categorization of disability based on levels of labor incapacity and inability to produce income. It 
included the following six categories of disability: 1) invalids not able to work for a salary and 
also needing help for the satisfaction of their everyday needs; 2) invalids unable to perform any 
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kind of work which would give them a salary, but who did not need any special care from their 
family members; 3) invalids who must give up their former profession and skilled labor, but who 
could still gain their bread by performing unskilled, temporary, and easy jobs; 4) persons who 
must engage in a less qualified, but still skilled labor; 5) persons who must give up their 
occupation, but could engage in a new one with the same qualification level; 6) persons who 
could continue to perform their former occupational activity but with decreased productivity.
41
 
People aspiring to the status of invalid were to be examined by medical expert 
commissions (vrachebno-trudovye ekspertnye komissii or VTEK) before any category could be 
assigned and a pension set. Although avowedly “medical” and part of the Narkomzdrav, these 
commissions were asked to pay attention to the non-medical factors that determined a person’s 
degree of disability. Two “social” criteria were particularly important: 1) the etiology of one’s 
handicap, that is whether the disability arose from employment or military service, was 
congenital, or caused by an accident occurred outside the job; 2) and its impact on one’s capacity 
to work. Privilege was given to the forms of disability that had arisen from military or work-
related injuries and occupational diseases. For instance, in the case of blindness, local VTEK 
tended to assign the first group of invalidity only to individuals who had become blind on the 
job. When disability was not acquired while performing one’s military or productive service to 
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the state, the applicants’ working seniority and the type of work he/she used to perform could 
compensate and still provide them with a set of entitlements. In other words, VTEK experts had 
to follow a political line in assigning applicants to invalidity categories, and economic 
expediency affected the establishment of “medical” criteria for determining entitlements. 
Ascription to one of the categories of invalidity and assignation of “quotas of help” (i.e. 
the rates of a person’s disability pension) varied in accordance with these circumstances. The 
right to full state assistance came only with the first category. It included the provision of 
prosthesis, housing in the institutions of the Narkomsobes, and other forms of “work-related and 
financial help” (trudovaia i khoziaistvennaia pomoshch’). The disabled of the second and third 
groups received assistance through the workshops and labor colonies of the Narkomsobes and 
the invalids’ cooperatives. All disabled pensioners who refused to be placed in the invalids’ 
homes of the Narkomsobes or rejected job offers from the invalids’ cooperatives, immediately 
lost their right to assistance. The right to a disability pension was not granted to disabled 
individuals ascribed to the last three groups of invalidity (unless they had acquired their 
disability on the job and were fully insured). A brochure issued by the Narkomsobes and 
published in English translation commented that the last three groups “had the right to be 
assisted to get an occupation.”42 For all practical purposes, being assigned to categories four 
through six had no significance for many disabled men and women. Until 1930, although they 
did not have any right to pensioning assistance as invalidy, all disabled people in the last three 
categories (even the uninsured and the victims of non-work related accidents) could receive help 
as unemployed when they registered with the labor exchange office (birzha truda). However, 
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with the official liquidation of unemployment in 1930, the laws regulating assistance to able-
bodied and disabled unemployed persons ceased to be effective.
43
 
Thus, disability pensions were decided in accordance with loss of labor ability and 
earning capacity. This approach followed in the German tradition of legislation providing for 
industrial compensation.
44
 However, this method of evaluation entailed a clear problem: it 
penalized the man or woman who tried to return to work as against those individuals who 
deliberately refrained from working. Disabled people were asked to work within their 
possibilities, but at the same time those who did work were excluded from social protection.
45
 In 
the Soviet case, this was in blatant contradiction with the discourse of help through employment.  
When Soviet policy makers realized this incongruity, they encouraged the VTEK to focus 
more on the applicant’s remaining labor ability and potential for re-training and alternative forms 
of employment. Especially after 1932, when the classification of disability was reduced from six 
to three categories and the VTEK were moved from the Narkomzdrav to the Narkomtrud, the 
main purpose of the experts’ examinations became to induce the disabled to seek some sort of 
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productive employment.
46
 This re-orientation was a direct result of the changing labor market. 
Although, the employment of the disabled had always been part of the Soviet social welfare 
programs, under the conditions of high unemployment of the NEP more accessible invalidity 
pensions were used to encourage the aged and the infirm to leave the factories. With the pressure 
of industrialization of the early 1930s, labor shortages began to replace unemployment as the 
principal labor problem and invalids became a valuable labor pool that the VTEK should not fail 
to exploit. In addition, the years between 1928 and 1931 were a period of acute shortage in 
consumer goods. The party leadership sought to minimize the obligations of the Soviet welfare 
and to supply deficit goods such as grain and housing only to those people whose productive 
labor served the interests of a rapidly industrializing country.  
The 1932 change in the classification of disability signified a reduced ability for Soviet 
men and women to fit into the nuanced positions foreseen by the former six categories. It meant 
that in the constant tension between ethics and discipline, between the integrating capacity of 
socialist labor and the emphasis on productivity, the state had decided to bend the stick towards 
control. And yet, the reality on ground was much messier than what the Soviet state’s regulatory 
power would have wanted. At the local level, the commissions’ evaluations were subject to a 
high degree of randomness and arbitrariness. For instance, different commissions could give 
competing assessments of the same applicant or, even more paradoxically, the same applicant 
could be ascribed to different groups of invalidity by the same commission. The Rostov VTEK 
was particularly kafkaesque: once, it recognized as fully able-bodied a man who had been 
assigned the third group of invalidity by the VTEK in Novocherkassk; another time, it assigned 
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two different groups of invalidity to the same man – the first category for his blindness and the 
third one for his general health.
47
 
The Second World War made the process of disability testing even lengthier and more 
inconvenient than what it used to be. Like before the war, each individual who desired to 
undergo disability examination through the VTEK commissions needed to have a referral from 
his/her family doctor. However, under the conditions of war mobilization, to receive a referral a 
person had to spend entire days in the polyclinic or the doctor’s ambulatory. After that, the 
applicant needed to stay in line to register for examination and often had to go several times to 
the VTEK offices before being actually seen. This is what happened to a certain Lebedev, who 
first went to the VTEK offices in the city of Perovo (Moscow province) on April 27, was ordered 
to come back on July 1, and actually examined only on July 5, 1944.
48
 Besides the 
disproportionate waiting time, people were sometimes illegally asked to pay a fee for their 
medical exams. In the Omsk province, the VTEK charged local inhabitants a fee of 15 rubles to 
undergo the invalidity examination.
49
  
Despite the more rigid classification introduced in the 1930s, with the onset of the war 
the constant tension in matters of social assistance between discipline and disorder saw a definite 
prevalence of the latter. During the war, many disabled Soviet people successfully refused to 
undergo examination at all. Resistance to the VTEK was particularly common among men and 
women who had been ascribed to the third group of invalidity. They rarely showed up at the re-
examination appointments, rightfully considering these visits a waste of their time. Indeed, the 
third category was in all effects a denial of disability because those ascribed to it were not 
                                                          
47
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 75, l. 4. 
48
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 456, l. 71-72. Waiting time to be admitted to examination was around one month in the 
Ivanovskaia oblast. See GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 456, l. 77.   
49
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 456, l. 77. 
51 
 
entitled to any regular pension and simply recommended to find a job for themselves. The scorn 
of being denied the right to assistance on grounds of insufficient disability and the fact that it was 
more advantageous to receive support as unemployed dependents determined the application 
strategies of many individuals (especially women). As one applicant wrote in 1944, to apply not 
as disabled but as unemployed dependent allowed her “not to work and be free.”50  
Unemployed invalids of the first or second category often did not undergo examination 
through the VTEK because they were afraid to be moved down to a lower category and be forced 
to work. Again, during the war, people who had been once recognized as disabled took 
advantage of the new social dislocations to position themselves out of the further surveillance of 
the state. Many disabled individuals chose whether to subject themselves to regular disability 
examinations – and when to undergo them – not so much in accordance with the state’s mandate, 
but rather depending on the circumstances of their private lives. For example, I.M. Alekseev 
(from the village Pushkino in Moscow province) underwent a VTEK examination in July 1943 
and received the third category of invalidity for a period of three months, after which he was 
supposed to undergo a new examination. However, Alekseev showed up at the Pushkino office 
of social welfare only one year later, in June 1944. When he was asked why he did not go to the 
examination when he was supposed to and what he did for a living, Alekseev answered that he 
worked in his neighbors’ vegetable garden and sold used shoes in the market. These activities 
allowed him to make enough money to support himself. In June 1944 he had decided to go to the 
offices of the social welfare because, as he declared, “this free life (volynka)” had bored him and 
now he wanted to have a stable job.
51
 Like Alekseev, other disabled men and women asserted the 
wish to be involved in a professional activity of their own choosing or simply to avoid the 
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compulsion to work. The unemployed invalid of the third category P.F. Khromov refused to 
undergo re-examination since he wanted to make a living “by selling my stuff.” As a 
Narkomsobes officer commented in 1945, “there are members of the party…who have been 
holding the second group of invalidity for the last two years, but they…trade at the Barashka, the 
market close to the industrial plant.”52 In 1944, the invalid A.P. Burtsev simply declared: “I do 
not work and will not work.”53 
Even when the Soviet disabled did not manage to completely avoid the scrutiny of the 
social welfare organs, they could still make it very difficult for these state agencies to keep count 
of them and know their whereabouts. For instance, when asked why they had not been re-
examined at the due time, the invalids of the second category I.P. Chizhov and I.A. Dudkin 
explained that they were travelling, busy visiting a sister in the Smolensk province and a mother-
in-law in the Iaroslavl’ province. The invalid of the second category L.G. Fokin delayed his re-
examination for a period of five months because – as he declared – he was busy delivering 
foodstuffs to the neighboring markets. When the VTEK of the Moscow province went to visit the 
disabled A.M. Turin and A.I. Shustikov in their homes, the two men were not to be found 
because they had gone to the neighboring village to trade.
54
  
In sum, in the 1940s, the mobility of the disabled added to the displacements brought 
about by the war to disrupt all the disciplining efforts that the Soviet state had put in place in the 
1930s. Local welfare sections often lamented that the disabled men and women of their regions 
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“do not settle (ne osedaiut),” preferring to freely move around the country.55 As a Narkomsobes 
administrator wrote:  
We must put an end to these volatile job-changers (letuny), who move not only from one 
enterprise to the other, but also from one corner of the Soviet Union to the other…They 
tour tens of cities and walk into tens of organizations setting up scandals of various 
nature…We must stop those people who move from one boarding home to the other 
within one province and throughout the Soviet Union, alone or with their entire 
families.
56
  
This administrator’s vehemence in condemning the mobility of the Soviet disabled is a sign that 
the warring Soviet state had serious problems gluing its disabled population to a fixed place of 
residence and job position.  
Wartime mobility, however, was a mixed blessing. While it played to the advantage of 
some disabled because it loosened the state’s controls on them, it made others unable to produce 
the necessary documentation to support their applications for help. For instance, the invalid of 
war A.P. Lisitsyn turned to the Krasnoural’skii municipal Narkomsobes section with the plea to 
reinstate his disability pension. In his petition, he declared that he had a heart attack when he was 
evacuated from the town of Anzhero-Sudzhensk to his new place of residence in the 
Krasnoural’sk province and accidentally lost his documents. The Krasnoural’skii Narkomsobes 
investigated the case by writing to the Anzhero-Sudzhenskii section, but the latter replied that 
Lisitsyn had never been on their pensioning roster. Lisitsyn then indicated other Narkomsobes 
sections, but all their replies were negative. Lisitsyn was not able to clarify where his pensioning 
file was held and his application was never approved.
57
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Family dependents 
Another significant group of pensioners included dependent individuals (izhdiventsy) left 
without means of subsistence after the death of a breadwinner (kormilets). According to official 
regulations established within the system of social assistance by 1921 and then confirmed in the 
social security directives of 1928 and 1930, children, siblings, parents, and spouses could qualify 
as dependents if they were minors, elderly, or otherwise unable to work. Age and working ability 
notwithstanding, any adult was entitled to help as dependent when he/she was taking care of the 
minor children or siblings of the deceased breadwinner. The conditions and the “quotas” of this 
type of social assistance varied based on the causes of a breadwinners’ death: time and again, 
work-related injuries and occupational diseases were the preferred circumstances. In case the 
dependent was an adult, assistance was frequently provided by placing the applicant in the 
Narkomsobes facilities – invalids’ workshops, cooperatives, and working communes. Minor 
dependents under 16, who became full orphans after the death of the breadwinner, were sent to 
children’s homes, shelters, and other facilities of either the Narkompros or the Narkomzdrav. A 
subsidy in nature or in cash could be offered depending on the resources available to the local 
Narkomsobes section handling the application and only if housing was not already provided.
 58
 
The implementation of the laws regulating help to family dependents reveals how 
patriarchal conceptions of family and gender inflected the rules of state assistance and, to a 
significant extent, re-scaled the premium given to productive work in favor of reproductive 
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labor. Indeed, despite the neuter gender language of legislation and the rhetoric of women’s 
emancipation under socialism, the Soviet state’s ideology attended to a traditional model of the 
family as the foundational unit of society. In the administration of social assistance, the 
patriarchal family was a central category, a key factor in determining access to state-controlled 
goods. Women received state help mainly in their capacity as mothers and, in the case of military 
families, as red soldiers’ wives.59 The Pensioning Department was more lenient in assigning a 
dependent pension when women were affected by “loss of [male] breadwinner” than the other 
way around. The very formulation “loss of breadwinner” closely echoed the key legitimizing 
category for Soviet help – “loss of working ability” – indicating that state assistance was to 
compensate for the deficit of a fundamental good, either a job or a spouse. And yet, the equation 
between the two values was highly gendered. Indeed, single women busy at raising their 
offspring were considered unable to work until the children turned 8, but this labor incapacity 
was never attributed to fathers.  
The absence of a breadwinner in the family was often qualified as “loneliness” 
(odinochestvo). This term described an emotion, but it also had economic and social 
connotations: those who lived alone without kin represented an economically precarious social 
type, which did not have the same safety net that was available to the other categories of 
pensioners.
60
 Indeed, “loneliness and poverty” were indicated in a 1923 brochure on the 
activities of the Narkomsobes as the first factors facilitating the growth of prostitution among 
“young girls” (followed in third instance by the “lack of working habits”).61 As the causal 
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association between one’s celibacy and female prostitution clearly reveals, gender shaped the 
emotional and socio-economic meanings of “loneliness.” Women who were “left alone” 
(ostavshiesia odinokie) by the death of their husbands and the mobilization in the army of their 
sons seemed to be morally vulnerable and thus have a greater entitlement to help than their male 
counterparts. Instead, in the case of male applicants “loneliness” was often a reason to deny help. 
For instance, Vasilii Ivanovich Babich did not have a family to support and lived with his 
parents; he defied his gender role as male breadwinner and therefore did not qualify as pensioner 
in the eyes of the authorities.
62
 Other similar cases seem to confirm that single men were less 
entitled to state help.
63
 
When a dependent demanded compensation for the death of a breadwinner in court, the 
plaintiff’s gender, working abilities, and access to additional means of subsistence were the most 
significant factors ruling the decisions of Soviet judges. In theory, when women were able to 
work, they ceased to qualify as needy and the state was not legally responsible for helping them 
materially. In practice, however, it was quite easy for women to find good reasons for their 
unemployment.  For instance, although a certain P.N. Puchkova was completely able-bodied, she 
was identified as unable to work, because she had three small children (of 13, 9, and 2 years) and 
duly assigned a pension for “loss of breadwinner.”64  
As we will see in more detail in chapter 4, the Soviet state showed a marked desire to 
care for and discipline female dependents throughout the period between 1917 and 1950. When 
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contingent situations, such as the dislocations of the Second World War, swelled the ranks of 
single women and unmarried mothers, the aspiration to help and control them turned into a 
urgent political and social exigency. Thus, in July 1944 the Presidium of the Supreme Council 
issued a decree “On the strengthening of state help to pregnant women, mothers of many 
children, and single mothers”. Many women who were denied insurance compensation for loss 
of breadwinner by local factory committees became able to claim their rights to social assistance 
by reference to this decree.
65
  
Personal pensioners 
Personal pensions (personal’nye pensii) were assigned to individuals who had 
distinguished themselves through their special contributions (zaslugi) to the country or to their 
local communities. The idea of giving subsidies to persons with special merits was first 
mentioned in a Sovnarkom directive dated March 24, 1920. A later directive dated July 16, 1920, 
identified special contributions as: 1) “the participation in the struggle against the international 
imperialists and the bourgeois states that had sided with the counter-revolutionary movement;” 
and 2) “the construction of socialism and party work.” Those who qualified as personal 
pensioners by these criteria would receive a pension in case they became disabled. Although 
personal pensioners achieved this status through their personal endeavors, when they died, their 
privileges could be transferred to their dependents.
66
  
At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s, the VTsIK and the Sovnarkom issued a 
series of new directives concerning personal pensions. By that time, the performance of 
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productive activities had more weight than participation in the civil war.
67
 However, in the 
1940s, military service was again added to “the field of productive and social work,” as local 
Narkomsobes sections and executive committees granted or denied the “right to a personal 
pension” depending on the petitioners’ special merits on both accounts.68  
The story of Vasilii Stepanovich Vinokurov is a textbook case. Involved in communist 
political circles since 1901, Vinokurov used to distribute illegal political literature and had been 
arrested by the tsarist police several times. In 1918, he established a Bolshevik party cell 
comprising 150 people. After having served in the civil war, he worked in the field of leather 
production until 1929. He began to receive a regular personal pension in 1933 and, in 1948, 
obtained an increase in his monthly allowance. In formulating the reasons for this rise, the Perm’ 
section of social assistance referred not only to Vinokurov’s revolutionary services and his 
difficult material situation, but also to the fact that he was supporting a sick and unemployed 
wife.
69
 Similarly, the former Red Army soldier and invalid of war Il’ia Ivanovich Galashev was 
assigned a personal pension in 1940 for his “active participation in the civil war and in the 
consolidation of Soviet rule.”70 Vasilii Ivanovich Muromtsev, former Red Army soldier, red 
partisan, veteran of the civil war, and old member of the Bolshevik party, was an invalid of the 
second group who, despite his disability, worked as director of an industry in the Kungurskii 
district of the Perm’ province. He was assigned a personal pension in 1948 for his merits towards 
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the country on the front of the civil and in the field of work as manager of a productive unit.
71
 In 
the same year, however, another ex-serviceman and civil war participant, Ivan Antonovich 
Pautov, was denied a personal pension because he had not performed any productive activity.
72
  
Sometimes, local Narkomsobes organs and executive committees disagreed on what were 
to be considered “special merits.” Such was the case of Aleksandr Petrovich Sannikov, who had 
participated in the Second World War, received three medals for military merits, left the 
battlefield as an invalid of the first group, and could not find employment anywhere. Reviewing 
his application in 1948, the Narkomsobes section of the Perm’ province considered Sannikov’s 
special services at the front and his complete loss of working abilities as sufficient merits for 
qualifying as personal pensioner. However, the Perm’ executive committee rejected Sannikov’s 
application and suggested to assign him a pension “on general grounds.”73 Indeed, the executive 
committees often functioned as gate keepers to the benefits coming with the status of personal 
pensioner. In the period between January 1947 and December 1948, for instance, the Perm’ 
executive committee received 150 recommendations for personal pensions from the local 
Narkomsobes administration, but it approved only half of them.
74
 Local executive committees 
frequently asked the Narkomsobes sections to double-check all the documents presented with the 
application and thus delayed or stalled the entire application process.
75
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Because this kind of pension was merit based, it could be easily taken away if the 
pensioner proved unworthy of it. The most frequent instances of withdrawn personal pensions 
concerned people condemned by Soviet tribunals. Sentenced and imprisoned individuals lost not 
only their allowances, but also the possibility to be reinstated in the rank of personal pensioners 
after release from prison. Such was the story of Aleksandr Vasil’evich Averin, an invalid of the 
Second World War who was rewarded with medals and a personal pension, but who could never 
enjoy it because he had been found guilty of unspecified crimes by the military tribunal of the 
Perm’ railways. Upon release from prison, the pensioning sector of the Kirov province reinstated 
Averin’s pension, but when he moved to Perm’ to work in a kolkhoz, the local Narkomsobes 
refused Averin any help due to his arrest. Averin was recommended to apply for a pension as 
invalid of war or to obtain social insurance (since he worked in a kolkhoz).
76
 Arrest was 
sometimes seen as a sign of moral unworthiness. The case of Ipat Aleksandrovich Iakovlev is a 
good example. This man used to receive a personal pension for his services during the civil war. 
In 1937 he was arrested and spent five years in prison. Upon release, the revision commission of 
the Perm’ province refused to renew his right to a personal pension not only because he had been 
arrested, but also because “he turned out to be a morally unstable person.”77  
Besides arrest, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a personal pension were similar to 
the reasons for denying any other pension. They usually included the applicant’s ability to work 
or the presence in the household of family members who were able to work. For instance, 
Tat’iana Vasilevna Kuznetsova used to receive a personal pension for the merits of her deceased 
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husband, but in 1948 she stopped being entitled to it because her two children reached majority 
of age, became able to work, and could therefore support their mother.
78
  
In many respects, Kuznetsova’s case was an exception, since – as we have seen in the 
previous section on family dependents – female gender made it generally easier to receive help. 
In December 1948, out of 8 applications for personal pensions reviewed by the Perm’ executive 
committee only 1 was accepted and it came from the widow Minna Kolchanova. A housewife 
without working abilities, Minna used to be supported by her husband. After his death and their 
son’s mobilization into the army, she began to live alone. Considering the merits of her deceased 
husband towards the country, her “loneliness,” and her difficult material condition, the Perm’ 
Narkomsobes petitioned for the assignment of a personal pension to this woman and the local 
executive committee entitled Kolchakova to a pension of 150 rubles a month.
79
  
A good economic situation could be a strong ground for denying personal pensions. In 
the case of widows, however, a woman’s economic condition seemed to have less weight than 
other parameters, such as the merits of her deceased husband and the presence of many children. 
Anisiia Vasil’evna Pirozhkova, for instance, was the widow of a personal pensioner and herself 
an invalid, unable to work and unemployed. She used to be supported by her husband and did not 
receive any subsidy in her own name. Her son and her daughter lived independently with their 
own families. Despite the fact that she had a house, a cow, and a vegetable garden, in 1948 
Pirozhkova was assigned a personal pension for the services of her deceased husband, her 
disability, and her “loneliness” as woman-widow.80  
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In short, to have the right to a personal pension, uninsured citizens had above of all to 
demonstrate special merits related to some kind of labor: revolutionary, party, military, 
productive, or reproductive. Work in the field of culture, education, medicine, science, and art 
could be a special merit too, although rarely and only when this kind of labor was “long and 
sacrificial” (dolgoletnii i samootverzhennyi), “creative and Soviet” (sozidatel‘nyi i sovetskii). 
Applicants were required to have an unstained past history of military medals and awards for 
Stakhanovism. “Patriotic feelings” emerged in some documents as another important marker of 
merit. Finally, to have occupied a leadership positions in the party or in the union was definitely 
a plus.  
Time and again, most of these characteristics were gendered. Merits were imagined as 
constituting a male applicant, while for women it was above all the conditions of poverty and 
loneliness that mattered. To put it simply, women were assigned personal pensions for the merits 
of their husbands or sons. They were relegated to the roles of faithful companions, housewives 
and mothers living in the refracted light of their men. The self-portrayals that applicants for help 
sketched in their petitions were consistent with the images of men and women that emerged in 
the reports of the Narkomsobes. Men demonstrated valor and heroism, and were awarded all 
sorts of state recognitions; women were first of all sacrificial mothers and as such deserved pity 
and compassion. Disease and disability were certainly important factors for both men and 
women, but they seemed to have more weight when the applicant for a personal pension was a 
woman. 
Besides the applicant’s services, merits, and gender, the difference in receiving a personal 
pension was sometimes made by the patronage that either an agency or a specific leader were 
willing to offer. Scholars have noticed that, in the fields of education, science, literature, and the 
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arts, the interventions of members of the government and famous cultural personalities 
constituted a significant factor, often determining the survival of impoverished intelligentsia 
members.
81
 As we will see in chapter 5, however, patronage played a huge role not only in the 
assignation of merit pensions, but also in helping many men and women accused of political 
crimes.    
Browsing through the Narkomosbes decisions in 1920, we find that in that year of famine 
the state’s organ for social assistance proved quite responsive to the interventions of patrons on 
behalf of famished artist and scientists. A textbook case is the story of B.N. Shaposhnikov, a 
professor of the Moscow Institute of Veterinary Medicine who had been sent to the Vladimir 
province to study parasites and had later died of typhus. Because Shaposhnikov's wife and two 
children had been left without any support and because Shaposhnikov had died while performing 
his working duties, the Department of Higher Academic Institutions asked the Narkomsobes to 
assign a personal pension to his family. The request was approved and this family began to 
receive a subsidy that was equal to the late Shaposhnikov’s salary.82 Another time, the 
Narkompros asked the Narkomsobes to assign the maximum amount of social assistance to the 
librarian Olga Sergeevna Everts, in view of her lack of any means of subsistence, but also 
because of her long work seniority and her engagement in social work.
83
 The Union of Workers 
of Education and Socialist Culture and the administrations of various single universities also 
used to intercede for their members and associates, similarly grounding their appeals in Russian 
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teachers’ long and indefatigable labor, involvement in local schools and social activities, and 
contributions to “people’s education.”84 In the early 1920s, the Narkompros Commissar Anatolii 
V. Lunacharskii and the Sovnarkom member Vladimir D. Bonch-Bruevich were generous 
patrons, frequently intervening on behalf of a wide range of protégées – not only sick and lonely 
widows, but also the parents of important political leaders and impoverished artists.
85
  
The weight of personal patronage as a legitimizing category of social assistance for the 
Soviet intelligentsia would change in the 1930s. At that time, many of the patrons who used to 
intercede for personal pensions fell out of grace and ended up in prison. In addition, the 
country’s relative economic stability between the mid-1920s and the outbreak of the Second 
World War made the distribution of special subsidies such as the personal pensions less 
necessary. Outside of periods of acute crisis, such as the Civil War and the Second World War, 
the Narkomsobes Commissar A.N. Vinokurov tended to reject patrons’ intercessions by denying 
the applicants’ qualification as personal pensioners, but often arguing for their right to be placed 
in an invalids' home.
86
 
The others 
The state of “being in need” (nuzhdaemost’) was generally a plus for all pensioners. It 
was the crucial legitimatizing category for the “others.” Indeed, while relationships to labor and 
family arrangements still mattered, in order to become eligible for state help as “others,” Soviet 
men and women were required to prove above all their destitution. Most petitioners submitted a 
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statement certified by either the manager of the building in which they lived, the local militia, or 
the local soviet. In addition, applicants’ material situation and the degree of their economic need 
could be subjected to investigation by the welfare personnel. Narkomsobes investigators were 
asked to verify scrupulously whether an applicant’s condition was indeed poor and whether this 
person really lacked the clothes and basic goods that he/she claimed to need.
87
  
A form entitled “Act of investigation of the level of invalidity, family composition, and 
economic situation of the citizen applicant” listed the questions that Narkomsobes inspectors 
were supposed to ask when they visited applicants in their homes. First of all, the inspectors 
enquired about the working abilities and potential for employment of all the household’s 
members: whether any family member was employed (and their monthly salaries); who among 
the family members could work but was unemployed at the moment of the inspection; which 
occupational skills were available to the unemployed family members; whether the applicant was 
registered at the local office of labor exchange and since when. Then followed a series of 
questions concerning the family’s economic situation: what forms and amounts of state subsidies 
each family member was already receiving; what were the size and condition of the apartment in 
which the family was living and how much they paid for rent; whether the applicant had any real 
estate property or financial means of any other kind.
88
 As we see from these questions, both the 
applicant as an individual and his/her family were subjected to investigation. Neighbors were 
sometimes interviewed too in order to check whether the applicant was in truth unemployed and 
to clarify the specific reasons why he/she was not working.
89
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At the bottom of the form was a blank space for the investigators to write their personal 
comments. Usually, Narkomsobes officers added information on the whereabouts of the 
applicant and more details on his/her family situation. Sometimes, they used this space to make 
an explicit argument either in favor or against the applicant. In the formulation of final decisions, 
much was left to the investigators’ discretion and personal assessment. Sometimes, inspectors 
unceremoniously required that the local Narkomsobes section reject an applicant’s petition 
because he/she lived in a decent apartment or simply because he/she had enough clothes.
90
 Other 
times, investigators were more inclined to help and used the space at the bottom of the form to 
emphasize the applicants’ most urgent material needs.  
Thus, Narkomsobes investigators played a significant role in determining applicants’ 
state of need and controlling their access to state help. As in the case of the VTEK, however, 
these state agents operated in very chaotic conditions of everyday life and were constantly 
challenged by people’s ability at manipulating the system of care and control. Although the 
Soviet Union was a modern state invested in enforcing its regulatory apparatuses of control, it 
rarely fully implemented them. People moved around and escaped the state’s investigations. 
Many inspectors’ notes simply stated: “there is no such person living at this address. They left 
the apartment.” Other times, it was the petitioners themselves who took the initiative in 
demanding that an investigation of their material situation be performed. In their eyes, the visit 
of a Narkomsobes inspector indicated that their case was (finally) under review. People often 
                                                          
90
 As an example see GAPK f. 9, o.1, d. 112, l. 30 and l. 33. This is an undated application for help written by a 
certain Iakim Feodorovich Onianov. His request for a new fur coat was rejected because the investigator had 
discovered that the Onianov family did not live in need at all. The fur coat, as the investigator wrote, was the only 
object that this family was lacking! 
67 
 
perceived these visits as the first step towards the provision of the assistance to which they felt 
entitled.
91
 
Conclusion
 
From its very inception, the Soviet state established the principle that every worker has 
the right to receive state assistance if he/she becomes unable to work. Policy makers built a wide 
system of social security provisions based on the proposition that freedom from want is a 
fundamental right of every worker. At the same time, next to a strong social insurance agency, 
the less prestigious Narkomsobes upheld the right of uninsured citizens to be assigned a pension. 
This office did not elaborate a well-defined legislation of social assistance to complement the 
laws of social insurance. However, officers in this agency significantly contributed to shape 
uninsured citizens’ right to be helped every time that they approved or rejected their applications 
for assistance.  
When the Narkomsobes shaped welfare decision-making, ideology interacted with other 
structural factors, such as the institutional architecture of Soviet politics and the demands of 
economic development. Single administrators’ choices concerning uninsured citizens’ right to be 
helped might have been affected by personal ideological preferences, but they could also be 
influenced by institutional interests, patronage networks, and the changing requirements of 
economic development.
92
 Under these conditions, the social insurance position gained 
supremacy, but the social assistance approach never completely disappeared.  
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This chapter has also shown that a mixture of care and control underpinned Soviet help to 
the uninsured. Indeed, social assistance offered the state an apt field for combining protection 
with discipline at multiple levels of its most marginalized populations’ everyday life. As we have 
seen, Soviet social assistance largely consisted in the identification, computation, systematic 
surveillance, and imposition of work-discipline over many groups of marginalized citizens. The 
latter, on its part, looked at the state as a source of both problems and solutions. Both state’s 
agents and marginalized citizens were aware of the twofaced task of social assistance and strove 
to find a balance between its humanitarian and disciplining impulses. As an administrator 
pointedly wrote in a letter to the Perm’ provincial Narkomsobes section,  
On one hand, we need to verify the cases in which…the invalids and the 
unemployed…are in fact hiding their real incomes, underground jobs, etc. On the other 
hand, control very rarely achieves any goal apart from having a negative moral 
significance…When everyone will know and understand that social welfare is the 
effective and just distribution of goods among all the members of a working family, then 
nobody will think about taking advantage of the social welfare.
93
  
Besides the core tension inherent in the Soviet right to be helped as a politico-
governmental construct, this chapter has revealed that the specific assumptions and conventions 
legitimizing this right were in themselves marked by ambiguities. Through an analysis of the 
Narkomsobes’s reasons for either sustaining or denying its clients’ petitions, I have exposed an 
often incongruous blend of merits and personal suffering. Unemployed and uninsured people 
were entitled to help either by virtue of having given great effort or for having endured hardship. 
The Soviet state conceived their right to be helped as a form of remuneration for service and 
sacrifice, both of which included the duration, the intensity, and the harshness of the productive, 
military, and reproductive work performed. Thus, the social security principle of distribution in 
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accordance to one’s productive contributions was embedded in the model of social assistance. At 
the same time, the Narkomsobes’s social warranties were earmarked for those who could not 
support themselves through labor and were assigned according to their needs. Finally, both labor 
and need were layered over and filtered through with conceptions of gender and traditional 
patriarchal visions of the family. 
In the next chapters, we will see that the contradictory pressures that molded the Soviet 
state’s welfare policy and philosophy of help affected also understandings of the right to be 
helped among four specific communities of social activists: the defectologists of the Medico-
Pedagogical Station, the members of VOS and VOG, the doctors and social workers of Ommlad, 
and the activists of the Political Red Cross. We will observe that a clear tension between 
discipline and ethics variously underpinned the articulation of the right to be helped also in their 
discourses and practices. In addition, I will discuss how these four groups of activists largely 
maintained the two fundamental tenets of productive labor and need/suffering that determined 
entitlement in the eyes of Narkomsobes officials. However, they proposed their own vision of 
what should have been the respective weight of these two criteria in legitimizing the rights of 
their assisted. Finally, the case-studies of the next chapters will allow me to analyze how the 
distribution of social services functioned beyond the assignment of “pensions and subsidies” and 
what impact the system of social protection had on the education, employment, gender relations, 
and other aspects in the life of marginalized people.
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Chapter 2 
Science: The Defectologists’ Approach to Children’s Rights 
A child is an instrument and one must know how to play it…even when the instrument is 
damaged and sounds wrong.
1
 
Every child, however serious his defectiveness, shall be given the opportunity to find himself and 
his place in life.
2
 
 
Nastia was a “normal” Russian child. Born on April 22, 1906, she grew up surrounded by 
the love of her parents and two older siblings. Her life was happy and materially comfortable. 
When she turned seven, however, her parents died and Nastia moved into the house of an aunt. It 
was at that point that she began to be increasingly different from the other children and appeared 
to her aunt as “difficult to rear.” “Left completely alone,” – as the girl would later write in an 
autobiographical poem
3
 – Nastia was taken to an institution called Medico-Pedagogical Station 
(Mediko-Pedagogicheskaia Stantsiia). There, Nastia was scrupulously examined: her entire 
body, past experiences and present behaviors, intellectual development, verbal skills and artistic 
abilities, moods and wishes, emotions and worries, phobias and interests, her social skills, ethical 
outlook, and sense of aesthetics – everything was searched for defects. As expected, pathological 
traits were found. Nastia was diagnosed with “moral defectiveness” and required to join a group 
of other sixteen “morally defective” boys between the ages of 6 and 14. Some of them were 
considered exceptionally talented; others were discovered to have a slight mental retardation. All 
were identified as deviant children in need for help because of their “pathological psyches” and 
“personality defects.” All were subjected to a process of “rational education” and “medico-
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pedagogical correction” that would have ultimately re-integrated them in Soviet society.4 This 
chapter tells the story of the early Soviet professionals and social activists who wrote scientific 
constructions of child defectiveness and used them to advocate for marginalized children’s 
access to social services and integration within the Soviet social body. My goal is to understand 
the role of pedagogical science as a type of knowledge informing the notion of the right to be 
helped and nurturing the tension between control and emancipation that was at its core.  
In the years between the opening of the Medico-Pedagogical Station in 1918 and its 
dismantlement in the mid-1930s, the science of defectology contributed to shaping many of the 
motives and considerations behind Soviet help that I have discussed in the previous chapter – its 
disciplining impulse as well as the moral ideas of rights and human dignity inherent in it, the 
focus on labor as well as the attention to suffering and need. Indeed, the diagnosis of 
defectiveness was essential to processes of control. At the same time, through a construction of 
problematic children as defective (instead of criminal or degenerate), Soviet defectologists were 
able to entitle this marginalized population to state help. In contrast to other forms of expertise 
and scientific knowledge, early Soviet defectology largely constituted a source of optimism, 
which allowed its practitioners to argue for defective children’s corrigibility and re-integration in 
the collective. As such, this science allowed activists to advance claims about marginalized 
children’s right to be helped not only as a disciplinary practice, but also as an objective social 
value grounded in scientific laws and in the morality of the socialist state.  
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Childhood is a shifting social construct: its meanings have been variously crafted by 
different groups of adults in different historical periods and its representations have impinged on 
different treatments accorded to children.
5
 Particularly troubling for modern states at the turn of 
the nineteenth century was the issue of how to represent and handle children who deviated from 
“the norm” of social conduct.6 Historian Daniel Beer has discussed how, since the 1880s and 
throughout the 1920s, Western European and Russian doctors, psychologists, and pedagogues 
perceived youth both as the potential host of deformation and as the necessary basis for social 
renewal. The unstable times and especially the whirlwind of political novelties and utopias of the 
early twentieth century were believed to affect the fragile bodies and shaky psyches of the 
younger generation. In Russia, an ever increasing number of orphaned children and socially 
derailed teenagers led professionals and experts to elaborate biomedical theories of deviance 
which emphasized the destabilizing, destructive, and even contagious properties of individual 
youths. Drawing on international studies of criminal anthropology and evolutionary biology as 
well as on experiments to establish the physiological foundations of behavior, a powerful 
discourse of degeneration (vyrozhdenie) articulated a biologized vision of children in modern 
societies. This vision, Beer has argued, “survived the upheavals of 1917 and went on to shape the 
Soviet regime’s program of social transformation.” Degeneration framed the project of Soviet 
modernity in terms of cleansing. It translated into harsh forms of control, essentially promoting 
coercive rehabilitation, the isolation of socially dangerous minors, and their excision from the 
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body social. Ultimately, the calls of biomedical professionals to exclude degenerate individuals 
“lent…a theoretical sanction to the burgeoning Soviet gulag.”7  
Alongside the degenerative model and its impulse to expel and purge, Russian and 
international attitudes to behaviorally difficult children included also the urge to save and 
reclaim non-conforming youths for society. Although Beer has emphasized experts’ ordering 
desires and coercive choices, this scholar has also recognized that “the sciences were…genuinely 
emancipatory in their aspiration” and that professionals often “labored under an acute sense of 
responsibility for the downtrodden and downcast in their society.”8 Juliane Fűrst has studied the 
two competing impulses to save and expel in state attitudes towards vagrant children in the post-
WWII period, identifying the origins of these two discourses in legal and ideological 
development of the late 1930s.
9
 In this chapter, I reveal that these discourses had been animating 
professionals’ approaches towards difficult children since at least the 1910s, one prevailing over 
the other in connection with changing socio-political realities.  
Indeed, in the 1910s and 1920s, various countries saw an idiom of child defectiveness run 
parallel to that of degeneration and offer activists and parents alike an alternative way to 
articulate the notion of child deviation from the accepted norm.
 
In this discourse, “defective” was 
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any child who diverged from a supposed average either in physiological, intellectual, or 
sociological terms. This construct combined bodily disability, mental incapacity, and social 
vulnerability under the rubric of defectiveness, presented children’s non-conformity as a 
pathology, connected this representation with ideas of social neglect, and appealed to save 
defective children through medical and educational non-coercive methods. In particular, this 
discourse – and the advocacy that it generated – strove to decriminalize children in precarious 
social conditions by reversing the logic of crime and punishment as well as that of degeneration 
and expulsion. The stress on neglect entailed that these children deserved not punitive systems, 
but care and control in greater doses than their normal peers. On a practical level, this approach 
encouraged the establishment of special schools, shelters, and various forms of guardianship. 
Conceptually, it shifted the blame from the children and placed the duty of re-education on the 
larger social and political body to which they belonged.
10
 
In pre-revolutionary Russia, the idiom of child defectiveness was actively promoted by a 
group of scientists who called themselves “paedologists” or “defectologists.” Unlike the 
scientists supporting the degenerative model, the defectologists argued for the possibility to avert 
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the dangers of degeneration and harness children’s energy for the sake of society by uniting 
medical and pedagogical knowledge into one discipline. Under their pressure, the Russian 
educated public of the early twentieth century engaged in reflections over children’s rights and – 
like public opinion in other countries – asked the tsarist government to reform its old legislation 
on education, health care, and children’s welfare. However, the efforts of Russian pre-
revolutionary activists were often frustrated by the imperial government’s unwillingness to 
sustain reform movements concerning public health and education. Although the defectologists’ 
scientific expertise gave some prestige to the discourse of defectiveness, these professionals 
lacked the necessary institutional supports to gain relevance and put their knowledge into 
action.
11
 
After the October Revolution, concerned activists campaigned with the new authorities 
for the creation of a state organ that would provide social assistance to the growing population of 
juvenile delinquents and waifs with personality problems, whom they collectively called “moral 
defectives.” Following the pre-revolutionary usage, this phrase continued to indicate a volatile 
and extremely varied group drawn from orphaned, abandoned, and runaway children fleeing 
from their parents as well as mentally disturbed youngsters.
 
After 1917, however, the idiom of 
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defectiveness was used both by the new social workers employed in the state’s commissariats 
and the old experts in defectology. The former adopted it together with general notions of 
socialist humanitarianism and coupled it with specters of disorder and economic collapse (if the 
state would have not intervened to help defective children). The defectologists, instead, 
continued to rely on the exact knowledge of their science, married it to the specific moral and 
socio-political project of new socialist state, and gave an optimistic spin to their demands for 
state help to morally defective children.
 
Through their claims of scientific legitimacy, the post-
revolutionary defectologists managed to make their advocacy particularly relevant and appealing 
to the new socialist state’s political aspirations and concerns.12 
The defectologists’s scientific discourse entailed two components, both of which 
resonated with official understandings of the right to be helped. First, these experts constructed 
child defectiveness as “insufficiency” or “lack” (nedostatochnost’) and thereby identified 
children with deviant behaviors as suffering individuals in a state of need. Second, they invoked 
the rehabilitative powers of science to prove the corrigibility of these children and their potential 
for future contributions. In other words, dysfunctional children were not beyond help. To the 
contrary, their social dangerousness and economic uselessness could be corrected and even 
prevented. With this two-step construction, the defectologists inscribed help to Soviet 
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marginalized children within the state’s project: they proved that rational education was the best 
vehicle for a transformation of the individual that would benefit the whole collectivity.
13
 Their 
diagnosis of defectiveness and their cure for it echoed the key legitimizing categories of state 
help – the need/suffering of the individual and the labor/contributions for the sake of the 
collective – and combined them in a seamless discourse.  
The defectologists’ approach was certainly part of broader pedagogical trends targeted at 
the transformation of recalcitrant children. Inspired by Western progressive educators, many 
Soviet pedagogues of the 1920s designed rehabilitative models that integrated instruction with 
experience and that incorporated socialist ideology regarding the value of work.
14
 Most 
famously, under the motto “man must be changed,” the Soviet educator Anton Makarenko 
stressed the benefits of manual labor and the importance of order and discipline in imbuing 
homeless and delinquent children with the values of the Soviet project.
15
 However, more than 
other educational experts, the defectologists strove to use “rational education” to foster not only 
the transformative and disciplining, but also the integrative and emancipating dimension of the 
right to be helped. They stubbornly rejected any form of isolation, exclusion, and violent 
punishment by empirically showing Soviet help’s integrative abilities. Their medico-pedagogical 
correction of defective children could not have included the strong destruction component of 
Makarenko’s methods, because defectology revealed that children’s self was not qualitatively 
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bad but only “lacking.” The defectologists loudly argued that, no matter how complex the child’s 
psyche was, their science could help him/her without “dragging him forcefully by the ears until 
he fits into the norm.”16 Reliance on science allowed the defectologists to combine the goal of 
social fitness and usefulness for the collective with a deep-seated care for the psychological 
aspects of the children’s existence. Indeed, they often mentioned joy as a correction tool and 
personal happiness as the outcome of education through labor. In their view, scientific expertise 
could function only in dynamic relation with a sympathetic approach. Their rational re-education 
(perevospitanie) injected not only a positivist, but also a positive emphasis into the wide-spread 
Soviet process of re-forging.
17
  
In the following pages, I will first analyze defectology’s construction of child 
defectiveness in the writings of a leading defectologist of the time, Dr. Vsevolod P. Kashchenko.
 
Then, I will examine how defectology’s scientific and humane approach was implemented in the 
Medico-Pedagogical Station. Finally, I will assess the officialdom’s attitude towards 
defectology’s diagnostic and curative interventions and how it changed in the years between the 
Revolution and the systematization of Soviet special education in the mid-1930s. Kashchenko 
was not the only Soviet defectologist and the Medico-Pedagogical Station was not the only 
facility for Soviet defective children. They have been selected for this chapter because they 
represent ideal embodiments of Soviet defectology and as such crystallize the tensions present in 
this scientific approach to the notion of the right to be helped.
18
 Not only do they illuminate the 
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tension between the two legitimizing principles of need/suffering and labor, but they also reveal 
the drive to build socialist help both on rational and humane grounds. 
2.1 The scientific construction of individual suffering and potential for the collective  
In 1919, the Narkomsobes inspector Sofia Kopelianskaia wrote a letter to her superiors in 
which she advocated for the provision of state help to “those who really need it.” These, 
continued Kopelianskaia, were “THE HELPLESS” – a group that she broke down in the 
following categories: the elderly, the sick and the wounded, pregnant women, and, above all, 
neglected defective children.
19
 Kopelianskaia picked the latter as the focus of her activism and 
deluged the Narkomsobes with a series of reports that identified child neglect as the number one 
factor creating a mass of Soviet defective children – “antisocial and criminal minors; intellectual 
defectives; and physical defectives.”20 Child neglect, Kopelianskaia wrote in an emotional 
language, was a “nightmarish social plague” that killed Soviet children and “every killed child is 
a mute reproach, a dark stain on the conscience of those in power.”21  
Kopelianskaia’s conclusion was clear: “the socialist government cannot sit with its arms 
folded.”22 As she accusingly reminded the Narkomsobes’s leaders to whom she addressed her 
reports,  
a lot has been said and written about the fact the children are the future… the builders of 
the new life… the carries of the new ideas and the beauty of the nation, etc. etc. But, in 
fact, if we look at what has been concretely done for the children, we find little 
consolation….Everything is on the paper, but in the meantime children’s state of neglect 
is growing, the cadres of children-beggars, children-prostitutes, children-speculators, and 
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children-criminals are growing at a nightmarish speed…It is clear that we cannot go on 
like this.
23
  
Defective boys and girls, continued Kopelianksia, should be entitled to the provision of a 
form of help that ought to be “social, planned, and indispensable.”  
Social, because the state itself provides this help. Planned, because the socialist state 
cannot reconcile itself with the idea of random private philanthropy … And indispensable 
help, because in a properly organized state there cannot be and should not be parasitism. 
The working principle must be a duty for everybody.
24
  
According to this Narkomsobes inspector, charity underscored an understanding of help 
as a privilege granted to a few children. Instead, help offered through the state organ of social 
assistance would extend to the totality of Soviet children. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the rejection of religious beneficence and private philanthropy in favor of social 
assistance as a socialist right was a tenet of the new government. In 1919, at the First All-
Russian Congress for the Protection of Childhood, none other than Lenin’s sister Anna I. 
Ul’ianova-Elizarova opened this large meeting of pedagogues and social activists by saying that 
Soviet help to neglected defective children was no longer charity, but “the right of every child.”25 
The Narkomsobes inspector Kopelianskaia called for a “magna charta libertarum” including all 
questions of children’s rights.26 In reality, as Catriona Kelly has written, “discussions of 
children’s rights had a limited impact upon actual legislation, which defined children’s rights 
more or less exclusively within the family.” 27 While the Soviet Union had a Code on Marriage 
and the Family, it never developed a Code of Children’s Rights. Legislation was scattered in 
                                                          
23
 GARF, f. 413, o. 2, d. 327, l. 22. 
24
 Ibid.. 
25
 “Pervyi vserossiiskii s’ezd po okhrane detstva,” Zhurnal narodnogo komissariata sotsial’nogo obespecheniia, 
June-July, no. 5-6, 1919, 38-50. 
26
 GARF, f. 413, o. 2, d. 327, l. 23.  
27
 Kelly, Children’s World, 65.   
81 
 
family law codes, labor protection codes, and civil and criminal codes. Kopelianskaia’s official 
charter of children’s rights was never written.   
In the conditions of extreme shortage that characterized the Soviet Union in 1919, when 
thousands of children were starving on the streets and in emergency institutions that lacked the 
most basic provisions, the idealistic enterprise of helping morally defective children through 
state assistance at a national level clashed with a harsh economic reality.
28
 Kopelianskaia was 
well aware of this, but still attempted to legitimize state help to this marginalized population by 
playing on the young state’s fears of social disorder and economic collapse. As she wrote, 
saving children from a criminal career is a double economic saving: we avoid future 
expenses for the maintenance of adult criminals and places of imprisonment, and we give 
the state citizens ready to work instead of spongers and parasites…The more children we 
save, the more children receive vocational education, the less there will be parasites, 
purulent outgrowths on the body of the state, future criminals, less expenses for 
maintaining prisons and courts, and less unutilized human energy.
29
 
The peril of a future population of ignorant adults and the consequent regress of the entire 
nation was dangled in face of Soviet authorities by other activists too. Towards the end of the 
Civil War, the author of an anonymous letter to the Narkomsobes complained that many 
buildings assigned to defective children immediately after the Revolution had been taken over by 
local military organs. This situation was not uncommon. Alan Ball has explained that “in many 
regions military authorities commandeered buildings in use or intended as juvenile facilities – 
and sometimes proved reluctant to surrender the structures…after hostilities had ceased.”30 If the 
situation remained like that after the war, the petitioning activist averred, defective children  
                                                          
28
 On the economic devastation that accompanied the civil war period and how it undermined various educational 
programs see Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse and Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution. 
29
 GARF, f. 413, o. 2, d. 327, l. 8 and l. 22. 
30
 Ball, And Now My Soul is Hardened, 98. 
82 
 
will grow in ignorance and slow down the state’s development. On the contrary, a child 
who is introduced in the school system in time turns into a citizen able not only to 
support himself autonomously, but also to be useful to the state.
31
 
The social necessity to help defective children did not go amiss to the defectologist 
Vsevolod Petrovich Kashchenko.
32
 He joined the chorus of activists’ voices in explaining the 
state’s obligations towards its marginalized minor population and emphasized that “without the 
help of the socialist state, no child can receive those rights which must be granted for his correct 
upbringing and education.”33 However, speaking and writing as a scientist, he introduced a 
dimension that was escaping the attention of other activists and worried citizens – the scientific 
possibility to correct the shortcomings and incorrect traits of neglected difficult children.  
Indeed, some educators considered homeless children with personality problems and 
psychopathic disorders as depraved to an extent that precluded any prospect of rehabilitation and 
integration into Soviet society. Those who were entrusted with the task of placing minor 
delinquents on the road to recovery were often impatient with defective children’s parasitical 
lack of productivity and expressed doubt that these problematic children would have ever been 
able to change their ways.
34
 Countering these hesitations, Kashchenko and other defectologists 
argued that, since heredity was not decisive and social conditions carried great weight in the 
formation of “insufficient personalities,” the society that had generated moral defectiveness in its 
children had also the ability and the duty to cure it.
35
 As Kashchenko put it, “child defectiveness 
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is first of all a social vice…and the struggle against it must be based on encompassing social 
interventions.”36 The correction of defectiveness, averred the defectologists, was possible 
through measures of pedagogical nature. 
Like Kopelianskaia, Kashchenko was keen on demonstrating the political and economic 
advantage for the socialist state in engaging “the war against defectiveness” as if it were “a war 
against a national tragedy.” Yet, more than his fellow activist from the Narkomsobes, 
Kashchenko insisted on the positive outcome for the Soviet state of “a war that could be won.”37 
Always relating individual suffering to the welfare of the entire collective, the defectologist 
warned the state that a citizen with “a crippled will and unbalanced emotions” did not fit with the 
interests of Soviet society because this individual “slow[ed] down the construction of socialist 
life.” Thus, the “underdeveloped” child had to become “fully-fledged;” the “heavy ballast” had 
to turn into a citizen “able to work.”38 In a 1926 book co-authored with the defectologist G.V. 
Murashev, Kashchenko used an industrial imagery to remind the Soviet state of its duty to 
correct defective children:  
When in the factory’s yard a worker notices some unused material or parts of a machine 
abandoned there to waste, the day after we read in the newspaper about the need to call 
the careless administration to account for it. Can we remain silent when it is our precious 
reservoir of fighters and builders of communism to perish?
39 
Kashchenko compared the failure to fix defective children to committing one of the worst 
economic crimes in the Soviet Union. This similitude allowed him to frame the issue of help to 
defective children as a priority economic task: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Moskovskoe Aktsionernoe Izdatel’skoe Obshchestvo, 1926), 123-174, at 131; and V.P. Kashchenko and G.V. 
Murashev, “Pedologiia iskliuchitel’nogo detstva,” 192.  
36
 Kashchenko and Murashev, Iskliuchitel’nye deti, 5. 
37
 Kashchenko, “K bor’be s detskoi defektivnost’iu,” Izvestiia, 3 December 1921, 3.  
38
 RAO, f. 113, d. 128, l. 1.  
39
 Kashchenko and Murashev, Iskliuchitel’nye deti, 9.  
84 
 
Picture this scene: the tools of a blacksmith or a sewing machine or a bicycle are thrown 
out in the street and get rusted under the rain. All these objects seem to us so necessary, 
so valuable, that we would not walk by indifferently. But what if a child is neglected? 
The mechanism of his brain seems unusable…and we just walk by….But this because we 
don’t know the value of these mechanisms…we are unable to use them correctly and 
advantageously…Thus, even if you see in the child only the most perfect machine, then it 
is purely for the economically correct usage of this machine that we must know it…We 
cannot thrown in the wind what represents great value.
 40
 
Kashchenko and other Soviet defectologists proved defective children’s perfectibility and 
their potential worth for the Soviet state by elaborating a scientific approach that first diagnosed 
the causes of children’s individual suffering and then proposed a cure to enhance their potential 
usefulness for the collective. These two scientific corollaries had a greater purchase with the 
Soviet state than Narkomosbes’s vague taxonomies of help because they offered finite categories 
as a viable method to deal with the thorny question of the social rights of marginalized 
populations. Since the defectologists’ construction was allegedly derived from scientific 
principles, they could frame their assessment of deviant children as rational, i.e. logical and 
dispassionate, judgment. The defectologist turned difficult children from a problem of law and 
order into a scientific issue, from the object of police attention into the terrain of scientific inquiries 
and medico-pedagogical interventions. Through this scientific discourse, they advanced powerful 
arguments about difficult children’s entitlement to social services on par with all the other Soviet 
children. Ultimately, they proposed an order in which pedagogues and doctors were a scientific 
“avant-garde” teaching “to respect children’s rights.”41    
The defectologists located the genesis of children’s defects in a finely interwoven net of 
what they called “socio-pathological” and “bio-pathological” causes. “If we look back, we see 
that since the beginning of the war the bio-pathological and socio-pathological conditions of life 
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have become more complex,” said Kashchenko in 1923 at the organizational meeting of a 
Society for the Study and Liquidation of Child Defectiveness and Neglect.
42
 It was these bio-
social pathological conditions that had caused an exponential growth of juvenile crime, 
subversive conduct among children, and child defectiveness of various types. Anti-social forms 
of defectiveness, averred Kashchenko, had become particularly widespread because the tragedies 
that accompanied the war (mobilization, death, exile, famine, poverty, and ethnic hatred) had left 
a heavy imprint on children’s fragile bodies and minds.43 
Kashchenko believed that the social milieu (sreda) had a huge significance in the 
formation of children’s personality, exerting multiple influences on their bodies as well as 
psyches. “The influence of heritage,” argued Kashchenko, “is not unique and not unconditional.” 
The transmission of certain diseases and dysfunctions to one’s offspring was not an absolute 
truth for the defectologists – in fact, sick parents could have healthy children. The tendencies and 
predispositions set up by nature were subjected to a complex re-working under the influence of 
the family, the first teachers, the friends, and the school in general. Urban conditions and broken 
families were taken to have a deadly impact on children. Parents’ mistakes – such as the creation 
of a suffocating family atmosphere, abrupt changes, and swings of mood – destroyed the correct 
functioning of children’s nervous system and produced fertile ground for the development of all 
sorts of defects. Finally, the lack of light in the house, humidity, and dirt – “both the physical and 
the moral one” – had a huge negative impact on children’s growth. In Kashchenko’s view, these 
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sociological influences had a determining weight. From them “depends whether the sick genes 
(boleznennye zachatki) that the child received from his progenitors will become stronger and 
develop further” or, conversely, whether a child born “without the burden of heritage” will 
develop defectiveness. Indeed, Kaschenko went so far to argue that defectiveness, as the 
presence of “sick or incorrect traits,” frequently owed its origin exclusively to nurture.44  
The defectologists’ method for diagnosing moral defectiveness did account for 
physiological factors such as the circumstances of the child’s conception (whether he/she had 
been conceived by a couple in love or sexually incompatible partners; under conditions of 
drunkenness or narcosis, etc.), pregnancy (the psychic and physical conditions of the mother, her 
eventual use of narcotics, her hygienic standards and nutritional habits, her muscular and 
intellectual activities), delivery and the first days of life (whether the child was full term, the care 
the child received immediately after birth, the nutrition in the first days of life and the psychic 
and physical mood of the woman who was breast-feeding the child). However, these variables 
were always defined as “biologically-mediated socio-economic conditions.”45 
Thus, Kashchenko emphasized first of all the role of sociological elements in determining 
defectiveness and assigned only a secondary role to biological factors. He rejected both the 
views of the Italian geneticist Cesare Lombroso on the in-born character of criminality and 
Russian theories that rooted a-normality in heredity and associated it with degeneration. 
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Although Kashchenko admitted that “anomalies of the personality and perverted tendencies and 
inclinations” could be partially related to biological factors and as such constituted a “pre-
disposition” to criminality, he preferred to see moral defectiveness as a “social insufficiency” 
which could be compensated.
46
 This was the hypothesis that animated his whole defectological 
approach and that he strove to test through pedograms and other experiments.    
Kashchenko had been arguing for the meaning of social factors in the development of 
children’s defects since 1912 when he published his first significant work and the first Russian 
textbooks on defectology, Defective Children and The School (Defektivnye deti i shkola). 
However, in his later monographs Nervousness and Defectiveness (Nervnost’ i defektivnost’, 
published in 1919) and Exceptional Children. Their Study and Education (Iskliuchitel’nye deti. 
Ikh izuchenie i vospitanie, co-authored with Murashev and published in1926), Kashchenko 
explicitly related the social conditions determining children’s moral defects to theories of class. 
In particular, he located the foundation of moral defectiveness in a society that was not 
harmonically organized in class terms. According to him, both the proletarian and the bourgeois 
classes could be characterized by features that, although at the opposite extremes, increased the 
percentage of defective children. “Not only tsar Hunger creates a sick and defective child. He is 
helped by tsarina Luxury.”47 Among the proletariat, these traits were hunger, abandonment, and 
neglect. Among the bourgeoisie, they were satiety, spoiling, and a “monstrous education.” The 
street, with all its temptations and bad influences, marked the path of an escalating process of 
moral defectiveness that touched upon all social classes. “The accuser’s bench,” wrote 
Kashschenko, “is the destiny of the bourgeois child who was brought up in what seemed to be 
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the best material and spiritual conditions.”48 The suffering of Soviet defective children derived 
from “the socio-economic order of a bourgeois society in which the poor worker writhed and 
suffocated.”49 Kashchenko had seen cases of juvenile hooliganism, feeble-mindedness, and 
pediatric psychopathology in both classes. This application of Marx to the discipline of 
defectology entitled defective children from all classes to Soviet help, because it identified all of 
them as suffering victims of the old social order. As we will see, this discourse would cease to be 
appealing to the Soviet officialdom when the latter proclaimed to have erased all traces of the 
past but problematic children were still roaming in the Soviet streets.  
To make the most effective claims of scientific legitimacy, Kashchenko insisted that the 
study of the social factors causing child defectiveness needed to have not simply a qualitative, 
but above all a quantitative character. Only then it would have been possible to find scientific 
laws regulating the relationship between “socio-economic conditions” and “types of psycho-
physical constitution.” As we can see in Figure 1, a “social profile” in the form of a graphic table 
offered a rule for the numeric calculation of the children’s development. The instruction on how 
to use the “social profile” stated:  
after a thoughtful and careful ranking of the social factors, insert their numeric value in 
the grid of coordinates. Mark a point in the middle of the line corresponding to the value. 
Connect with a line the resulting series of points. The sum of numeric values of the social 
factors …must be divided by 23 (i.e. the number of factors). The result will be the 
average level of social conditions in the development of the child under study.
50
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Figure 1: The social profile of Alik S. Source:  Kashchenko and Murashev, Iskliuchitel’nye deti, 49. 
Soviet defectologists of the 1920s and1930s highly praised Kashchenko’s social profile 
as a rigorous, complete, and objective method in the experimental study of children’s moral 
defectiveness.
51
 Some doctors complemented it with other types of experimental examination. 
For instance, the Soviet defectologist V.A. Artemov revamped a test elaborated by A.F. 
Lazurskii in the 1910s and known as “natural experiment.”52 A.M. Schubert proposed his own 
method to perform tests on the level of defective children’s intellectual development.53 G. V. 
Murashev suggested a program to investigate defective children's “social behavior” by gathering 
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and analyzing their “collective reactions.”54 E.V. Gur'ianov elaborated an empirical method to 
pin down children's defects in reading, writing, doing mathematical calculations, and performing 
various types of manual work.
55
   
The experimental study of child defectiveness matched with the Soviet emphasis on 
planning, reporting, and controlling.
 
 Indeed, the Soviet “passport state” must have liked a 
method that gave each child a “pedogram,” i.e. a document that made children’s personality 
traits and inherited features immediately legible to the educator and to the state as well.
56
 
Legibility and surveillance, however, were not the exclusive goals of defectology. The scientific 
collection of experimental data and their presentation to the authorities and the general public 
had the purpose to shape understandings of defective children as suffering individuals in need of 
help.
57
 
Kashchenko even devised a scientific formula to define the defective child’s self (I = 
S+R+P, where I stood for individuum, S for stimulus, R for reaction, and P for production)
58
 and 
stated that “before setting any demand on the child, the pedagogue should know precisely – as a 
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doctor knows a diagnosed disease – that each child taken by himself is an individuum.”59 As 
Kashchenko and Murashev explained in their contribution to the Pedagogical Encyclopedia: 
As much as it is impossible to cure a sick person without having determined his disease 
and without having established a precise diagnosis, so it is impossible to straighten and 
correct the insufficiencies of an exceptional child, if we do not study the nature of his 
deviation from the norm, if we do not give a faithful assessment of the personality of the 
given individual child.
60
 
 
The child’s person (detskaia lichnost’) became defined by identificatory physical and 
moral qualities that could be measured. Like other scientists all over the world, Russian 
defectologists believed that deviance from the norm could be identified.
61
 However, Kashchenko 
and his colleagues did not criminalize child deviance. For them, to reveal the social, psychic, and 
physical traits of non-conforming children was the first step in constructing their individual state 
of suffering and need, and thereby “the most rational means” to legitimize medico-pedagogical 
help on their behalf.
62
 
If certain social circumstances could pre-condition mishaps in children’s personality, then 
a different social environment would have been able to correct their defects. As Kashchenko 
argued, 
if an abnormal, monstrous environment cripples the child, creates unsuccessful and 
nervous children, moral monsters and so on, then a healthy one – one that is adapted to 
the peculiarities of the child and that is willing to take him into account – cures him and 
can re-educate him.
 63
 
A physically and psychically healthy environment led children to becoming healthy in their 
bodies and minds. Kashchenko insisted that positive influences “washed away” the hereditary 
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defects.
64
 They “rationally uprooted the undesirable results of inheritance,” echoed the journalist 
M. Ballas.
65
 This rational extirpation of children’s defects was attempted in the Medico-
Pedagogical Station, a model facility where the most engaged Soviet defectologists of the 1920s 
and 1930s strove to create a “healthy” environment and implement a non-coercive pedagogy that 
would have transformed both children’s bodies and their psyches.  
2.2 The implementation of rational and humane help to defective children  
The three major state organs involved in the provision of social welfare – the 
Narkomsobes, Narkompros, and Narkomzdrav – readily embraced the defectological approach 
and its conceptualization of children with subversive behaviors as suffering and re-educable 
individuals rather than irreversible criminal personalities. After a state decree mandated that all 
former private institutions for deaf, blind, retarded, mentally disabled, and morally deviant 
children be included in a large public system of defectological education, each commissariat 
pressed claims to administer the newly nationalized institutions. In 1918, the Sovnarkom put the 
care for all needy Soviet youths in the hands of the Narkomsobes. However, Narkompros and 
Narkomzdraz lobbied for a greater share of responsibility in this area. In the fall of 1919, the 
Sovnarkom issued a series of decrees that attempted to spell out the domain of each agency. 
Narkomzdrav (especially its School-Sanitary Department) was made responsible for physically 
and mentally handicapped children who required constant medical care; Narkompros (through its 
section for the Socio-Legal Protection of Minors and Defectives, or SPON) dealt with “normal” 
orphans as well as with all categories of defective, difficult, and law-breaking children; 
Narkomsobes (as usual the last wheel of the cart) ran an unspecified variety of facilities. As this 
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assignation of duties reveals, defectological education for moral defectives was generally the 
responsibility of the Narkompros, but, in 1922, the Narkomzdrav assigned itself the right to 
operate “curative educational colonies for morally defective children” if the latter happened to 
suffer from a physical ailment of some kind.
66
  
The Medico-Pedagogical Station began to operate in 1918 amid the commissariats’ 
wrangling and, after January 1919, fell under the aegis of an interdepartmental organ called 
Council for the Protection of Childhood.
67
 Although the Medico-Pedagogical Station had 
inherited the territory, the buildings, the furniture, and even the personnel of a former private 
institute called School-Sanatorium for Nervous Children, official propaganda presented it as “a 
completely new institution” – an experimental model home fully sponsored by the Soviet state. 
Instead of the two-story house with a few small bedrooms that had constituted the pre-
revolutionary School-Sanatorium, by the end of a massive restoration in the fall of 1919, the 
Medico-Pedagogical Station presented itself as a system of nine pavilions, a museum of child 
defectiveness, and a building hosting a medico-pedagogical consultation for outpatient services. 
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The Medico-Pedagogical Station was no longer a common foster home for “nervous” children 
and a site of bourgeois private philanthropy. It was a laboratory of scientific research and rational 
pedagogical work, in which help to morally defective children had a scientific and humane 
character, and science was married to the state’s purpose of correcting its deviant minor 
population.
68 
 
Indeed, scientific examination marked children’s lives in the Medico-Pedagogical Station 
from their first admission as morally defective individuals to their release as corrected, socially 
useful members of the collective. All children were subjected to an initial diagnostic visit of 
medical and psychological nature that determined to which pavilion they should be assigned. 
From then on, they were constantly and systematically examined. All sorts of observations on 
their psychic life, anthropometrical measurements, interviews with their parents, and pedagogical 
remarks were daily registered in the child’s personal journal.69 Each year a new photograph was 
taken (both front and profile) and added to the child’s file. Every change in the child’s 
development was carefully recorded. A final report on his/her “psycho-physical personality” and 
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“socio-professional suitability” was compiled when the child left the Medico-Pedagogical 
Station. This report went either to the parents or to the facility to which the child was further 
assigned. The gaze into the children’s worlds continued even after release since the 
defectologists often attempted to keep in touch with their former students.
70
   
The children’s everyday regime in the Medico-Pedagogical Station is another clear 
example of defectology’s controlling and disciplining dimension. The defectologists insisted on 
implementing a “rational and hygienic sanatorium regime,” which entailed a “precisely 
elaborated system of therapeutic-pedagogical measures.”71 The typical day started at 9 in the 
morning. The children woke up, washed themselves, and cleaned their rooms; then, they drank 
tea and, until 10, stayed under the care of an educator. Afterwards the children were passed on to 
the head teacher, who read with them and carried out “conversations.” At 2 o’clock in the 
afternoon the children had lunch and then spent the rest of the day in the courtyard, resting and 
playing under the control of an educator. In the evenings, from 6 to 8 pm, they worked again 
with a teacher. At 8 they had dinner and at 9 went to sleep.
72
 Unbalanced, nervous children with 
unstable natures were believed to receive crucial help from an unchanged order of daily 
activities.  
The children worked in the Station’s workshops and in its vegetable and flower gardens; 
they played games, worked-out, participated in storytelling and reading activities, went for 
excursions, watched performances, attended art and music classes, and took singing lessons.
73
 
The defectologists assigned great importance to physical education, since they believed that by 
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educating the movements they cultivated the children’s intellect and emotions as well.74 Over-
tiredness, however, was considered even more harmful for defective children than for normal 
ones. For this reason, their physical work was not supposed to be grueling. To the contrary, rest 
and sleep were essential: after lunch the children took a nap and the duration of the night sleep 
was longer than that of normal children of the same age group. The relative proportion of work-
time and free-time was precisely measured and strict control was applied to the balance between 
intellectual and muscular activities. Prolonged sleep, the alternation of work and rest, open-air 
play for 4-5 hours a day, physical exercise, sufficient space in the lodgings, extra-caloric 
nutrition (by the standards of the time) – all this was part of what the defectologists called 
“physical and psychic hygiene.” It facilitated the development of children’s nervous system by 
acting on it almost as a chemical formula that changed the pernicious influences of the 
“unhygienic” surrounding environment.75    
Children’s nervous health could be significantly upset by bad sexual habits. The 
defectologists strove to avert them in all possible ways. Strict vigilance, “frank talks” about sex, 
a healthy regime, cleanliness, psychological therapy, and even comfortable clothes were all 
methods with which the staff of the Medico-Pedagogical Station “fought against abnormalities” 
in the realm of children’s sexuality.76 For instance, one boy was brought to Kashchenko’s special 
school because he showed interest only in sexual matters: 
No matter what he looked at, with whom he talked or on which topic, everywhere he 
strove to see the sexual act and always wanted to talk about the sexual act. In addition, all 
his drawings and the objects that he made with clay were obscene… 
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The defectologists “sublimated” the boy’s sexual impulses into intellectual interests by giving 
him books about the life of animals and plants.
77
 Another child was diagnosed as defective 
because he had shown a “premature development of sexual instincts” and was “cured” by turning 
his attention to theater (the child was asked to create the setting for Pushkin’s play Boris 
Godunov with decorations and representations of all the play’s characters). In a third recorded 
case, a child’s “deformed development of sexual emotions” was corrected by directing his 
interest to religious themes. Initially, the boy was asked to copy old icons and create small 
models of churches. However, in the growing anti-religious environment of the 1920s, religious 
subjects were not a good alternative to sexual anomalies and the child’s art was further shifted 
towards love for animals and interest in natural sciences.
78
 
All activities inside and outside of the classroom employed a combination of 
pedagogical, psycho-neurologycal, and plainly bodily interventions that the defectologists called 
“complex” or “combined” method (kompleksnyi metod).79 This pedagogical approach was the 
means for a re-education and correction that transformed the motoric apparatus, the senses, the 
speech, the intellect, the aesthetic taste, and – most importantly – the social orientation of the 
child. It “made the behavior of the child normal and straightened it in social terms.”80As such, 
the complex method perfectly fulfilled the professed goals of defectology as the science of help 
to defective children: to correct their shortcomings and turn them into socially fit subjects.
81
 
 This description of the Medico-Pedagogical Station uncovers the invasiveness of the 
defectologists’ approach. Yet, we should consider that the life of children diagnosed as moral 
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defectives was not so grim in comparison with that of many other children who lived on the 
street or were arrested and ended up in labor colonies and regular orphanages. In addition, the 
intrusiveness of defectologists’ diagnostic and educational methods and the disciplining thrust of 
their ultimate goals operated in dynamic relation with their integrating and humanitarian 
aspirations as Soviet activists. The defectologists insisted that no child was to be locked up in a 
punitive institution. The facilities for defective children should have turned neither into prisons 
nor into factories, but remained children’s homes, that is relief institutions with didactic-
educational purposes. Kashchenko and his colleagues were horrified by the use of isolation 
rooms (kartser) and other prison-like “unfounded and cruel” forms of punishments, which they 
defined as “monstrous anti-pedagogical educational measures.”82  
Contemporary admirers of defectology praised this discipline for having “the marvelous 
simplicity of an authentically scientific thought,” in which accurate observations combine with 
attention and love towards difficult children.
83
 Kashchenko himself wrote that “there is no 
education without heart, without love and care for the child.”84 The personnel working in homes 
for defective children were not supposed to be guards (nadzirateli), but teachers with 
“extraordinary energy and love for their job.” Kashchenko conceived the profession of educating 
children as “a special form of social service.” At the same time, the “most ardent desire to help” 
was powerless by itself and each pedagogue needed to be familiar with the main principles of 
defectology.
85
 To deliver this concept, Kashchenko used a similitude: 
one can feel the music very well, but not knowing the technique, he is unable to produce 
the sounds, even if whole symphonies resounded in his ears. The child is the instrument 
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and one must know how to play it…even when the instrument is damaged and sounds 
wrong.
86
  
In other words, a heartfelt, loving attitude towards the defective children was very important, but 
it could lead to the correction of their defects and their re-birth to a new, socially useful life only 
when combined with scientific knowledge. Defectology was believed to offer the scientific 
conditions for raising and educating difficult children and making them fit for socialist life. 
Indeed, the defectologists adamantly rejected defective children’s isolation from life, 
because their stated goal was to connect non-conforming youths to the new socialist society and 
allow them to take direct part in it. To achieve this goal, the defectologists gave their assisted 
some basic education and taught them working skills. Thus, while the facilities for defective 
children were not to turn into factories “where the children cease to be children and become the 
soulless gears of a huge mechanism,” labor education was still considered very important.87 Not 
only vocational training allowed the acquisition of a profession, which would have given these 
children the possibility to have an income upon leaving the Medico-Pedagogical Station, but 
labor was also the only possible antidote against social marginalization. As Kashchenko wrote, 
through labor “abnormal children cease to be invalids, are joined to the socially useful and 
creative labor of the Soviet people building the communist society.”88 State facilities for 
defective children were not supposed to be dens where spiritually de-moralized children 
dissipated the financial means assigned to them. To the contrary, these facilities were an 
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investment in future young citizens, who were being educated in the spirit of “conscious work, 
respect for themselves and the other, faith in the future and in their strong, young energies.”89 
The defectologists’ attempt to combine labor with self-confidence and other positive 
emotions was certainly directed at creating productive subjects who would have enjoyed the hard 
work of building communism.
90
 However, their constant desire to inspire “creative joy” in 
otherwise apathetic young people reveals an attention to these children’s well-being that cannot 
be completely subsumed under productivist motives. Kashchenko once argued: “children’s joy 
and laughter are so precious that any child institution should encourage and protect them like the 
pupil of the eye.”91 The defectologists looked for didactic materials that might catch the 
children’s interests and put a lot of effort in providing children with diverse experiences, 
believing that the joy that the children would thus feel could improve their whole psyche.
92
  
Although the defectologists were not always successful in inspiring creative joy in the 
children they assisted, their approach seemed effective in shaping an ideal of future happiness. 
The defective girl Nastia, for instance, did not like the Medico-Pedagogical Station and rather 
projected the achievement of happiness in a future of integration trough labor. As she wrote in a 
poem,  
Yes, I must suffer for a long time 
Still 6 years have to go by 
And the heart will resound with joy 
When their end will come. 
 
Then I will go to my dear town 
To be a teacher there 
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And there with all my energy 
I will love Varia and Irochka. 
 
I will work a lot there 
And eat the bread of my labor 
Then the scolds of a sick soul  
I will no longer fear.
93
 
 
Nastia’s dream was to go back to her hometown, find a job, and enjoy the love of her 
siblings. Working and loving her family, Nastia would have entered into the normal life that – 
she was made to believe – everybody else was living around her. She would no longer have felt 
remorse for her defective morality. As it turned out, Nastia was a successful student and, upon 
completion of her re-education, she found a job in a library.
94
  
While the defectologists acknowledged that their charges were difficult, they also 
watched keenly for signs of their better nature. For instance, after admitting “a boy with a very 
bad heritage” who “did not show interest for absolutely anything and did not want to engage in 
any activity,” the defectologists observed and studied him for some months. One day, during a 
visit to a museum, they noticed that the child had an interest for hieroglyphics. The 
defectologists built their didactics around this first manifestation of interest. Soon, the apathy and 
indifference that characterized the child at his admission into the school disappeared and within 
some years “the boy turned into a talented historian.”95 The defectologist I. Kiselev explained 
that, in the Soviet establishments for defective children, the correction of individual personalities 
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did not happen by “ironing out” children’s distinguishing traits, but rather by looking for ways to 
make individual characteristics perform useful work for the collective.
96
  
One of defectology’s most difficult and important objectives was to combine the idea of 
individualized medico-pedagogical help with the requirement to forge members of a communist 
society. To achieve this goal, they strove to inspire “feelings of social belonging 
(obshchestvennost’) and comradely solidarity” in allegedly anti-social children. 97 Cultivating a 
sense of collectivity was closely related to correcting the individual, since the morally defective 
child was first of all a person with “deformed social conditions” which, in turn, were easier to 
rectify through the collective. For this reason, the defectologists claimed that the 
individualization of education did not hinder the development of collective habits in the children. 
Kashchenko wrote that, “the personality [of each child] and the principle of individualization 
must be taken into account alongside with the development of the social ideal.”98 In a rationally 
organized and scrupulously planned community, each defective child could find “the best field to 
work on the defective forms of his behavior.”99 As we have seen, everything in the Medico-
Pedagogical Station, from the pavilion living arrangement to classroom work and recreational 
activities, was oriented at making individual defective children socially fit.   
It was defectology’s scientific approach, Kashchenko and his colleagues argued, that 
facilitated the emergence of “social emotions” without denying the individual.100 Their 
scientifically-grounded use of art was a primary example. Kashchenko argued that music, dance, 
and theater “capture all of us and compel us to experience collective emotions;” they “draw 
people together and make them closer, like the members of one family;” they “put them in 
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unison.” Strong collective experiences such as singing or reciting poems together constituted the 
base for bringing the individual closer to the collective. In the defectologists’ correctional 
pedagogy, art education was not supposed to cultivate “passive aesthetes,” but rather raise full-
fledged members of the communist society and “fighters for its ideals.” Kashchenko praised all 
artistic processes as the manifestations of children’s creativity and taste. They were valuable 
because they gave space to individual vocation, but at the same time provided children’s labor 
with social significance. When art was closely related with the commonly shared everyday 
components of children’s lives, it could prevent defective children from developing feelings of 
unworthiness and traumas that would have estranged them from the larger social body.
101
  
Time and again, the ultimate goal was not to exclude social degenerates, but to adapt and 
integrate problematic personalities to the socialist living environment. The re-education of the 
individual defective child happened through the collective and for the sake of both the individual 
and the collective. To help defective children meant to make them fit for what these activists 
imagined to be a “normal” Soviet life.  
2.3 Defectology’s successes and failures in the 1920s and 1930s 
Throughout the 1920s, the defectological approach to help to defective children enjoyed 
great success. The First All-Russian Congress for the Struggle against Child Defectiveness, 
Delinquency and Homelessness (Pervyi Vserossiiskii S’ezd o Detskoi Defektivnosti, Prestupnosti 
i Besprizornosti), which met from 24 June to 2 July 1920 under the leadership of A.B. 
Lunacharskii and Maxim Gorky, supported the new centralized system for educating all 
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categories of defective children.
102
 In September 1921, the Narkompros organized another All-
Russian Conference for the Struggle against Child Defectiveness, which discussed how to 
develop the web of defectological educational institutions. In addition, it issued a program for 
preparing future cadres of defectologists and for the publication of specific methodological 
literature.
103
   
Kashchenko was entrusted to form specialists in defectology and nominated rector of the 
Pedagogical Institute for Child Defectiveness, which by the academic year 1923-1924 counted 
540 enrolled students and which would train generations of Soviet defectologists in the decades 
to come.
104
 Another similar institute was organized in Leningrad by A.S. Griboedov under the 
name of Pedagogical Institute of Social Education of Normal and Defective Children. Later a 
Medico-Pedagogical Department based on defectology’s principles was opened in the University 
of Kiev by the defectologists Shneerson and Vladimirovskii.
105
 On the model of the Moscow’s 
Pedagogical Institute, a subsection of the Narkompros called Children’s Social Inspectorate set 
up shorter training courses involving the study of child psychology, psychopathology, and 
criminology as well as practical work with abandoned and delinquent children.
106
 Delegations of 
teachers from the Povol’zhe region, Kuban’, Viatka, and Kiev visited the Medico-Pedagogical 
Station and its museum throughout the 1920s. These included pedagogues working in regular 
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daycares and schools as well as the professionals working in collectors for minor criminals, 
pioneer homes, and labor colonies.
107
 Apart from those who visited the museum, pedagogical 
experts and activists working in various parts of the Soviet Union could familiarize themselves 
with defectological approaches in the pages of the journals Questions of Defectology (Voprosy 
defektologii) and Pedology (Pedologiia), which were published between 1928 and 1932. The 
curriculum proposed by the defectologists in Moscow was adopted by auxiliary schools, colonies 
for morally defective children, special schools for blind and deaf-mute children, and even the 
isolation wards of some psychic hospitals throughout the country. In the Urals, for instance, a 
certain Doctor Zhan Genrikovich Putnin opened a Psycho-Neurological School Sanatorium that 
operated on Kashchenko’s defectological principles.108 Various Soviet organizations included 
work on behalf of defective children among their activities: the well-known society Children’s 
Friend (Drug Detei) and the less famous League for the Struggle against Child Defectiveness in 
Baku are two examples. In 1927, the methods and results of Soviet help to children deviating 
from the norm were showcased abroad as Kashchenko participated in an exhibition on work-
oriented education in Copenhagen.
109
  
In the mid-1920s, defectology was in such good standing with the state authorities that 
the defectologists launched some new initiatives to help Soviet defective children. For instance, 
the medico-pedagogical consultation, whose building had been built already in the fall of 1919, 
began to offer regular outpatient service in 1925-1926.
110
 In addition, in 1926, the defectologists 
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established a summer camp for defective children in Pushkino, a village in the Moscow 
hinterland. This summer camp was a site in which enjoyable activities such as playing outdoor 
games, going for long walks, swimming, rowing a boat, working in the vegetable or fruit garden, 
and cultivating flowers were proposed as appropriate correctional measures with a “scientific 
foundation.” 111 It was also a space where summer educational work was imbued with the social 
goal of serving the rural population. By having defective children read aloud to illiterate peasants 
and help rural nannies take care of small children, the defectologists became implicated in the 
Soviet government’s massive campaign to transform Russian backward peasants. Defective 
children left the Medico-Pedagogical Station and went into Soviet society to perform work in it 
and for it.
112
 
All these initiatives received official approval and encouragement. In 1926, after a 
particularly well-attended and successful conference, some Soviet officials in the audience 
defined defectological help as “extremely valuable and useful.”113 In the same year, an official 
inspection confirmed that “the Medico-Pedagogical Station conducts an extraordinarily valuable 
and needed work” which “matches with the principles of the Soviet school.”114 
 In the early 1930s, however, the Medico-Pedagogical Station and other medico-
pedagogical model institutions which had been proudly marshaled in the 1920s were dismantled 
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and absorbed within a more centralized system of special education.
115
 Indeed, following a 1931 
decree “On the introduction of general mandatory elementary education for physically defective, 
mentally retarded, and children suffering from speech defects,” the Narkompros decided to take 
steps to build a better organized net of institutions for defective children.116 A so-called “Second 
five-year plan on child defectiveness,” dated June 19, 1932, aimed at “rationalizing” the 
upbringing and education of defective children.
117
 A directive of the Sovnarkom and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party dated May 31, 1935, brought about a realignment of 
functions and a new division of responsibilities among the organs concerned with child welfare. 
Specifically, children’s homes for “normal” as well as “difficult-to- raise” (but without criminal 
convictions) were identified as the charge of the Narkompros; special homes for children 
needing prolonged medical therapy were put under the direction of the Narkomzdrav; isolation 
homes, working colonies, and points of reception for law-breakers were to be managed by the 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD); finally, a net of institutions for physically defective 
children as well as minors with serious mental retardations but still able to perform some manual 
work was established under direction of the Narkomsobes.
118
  
The Medico-Pedagogical Station had never represented a mass organization integrated in 
the larger system of Soviet special education. As a model institution, it had set an important 
precedent, but, with the passing of time, it was difficult for this institution to stand the ground 
against the pressures of a centralizing state. The mentioned decrees and directives created an 
avenue for absorbing the help offered by the Medico-Pedagogical Station into the state 
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bureaucracy. The reorganization that they prompted greatly centralized Soviet help. Elizabeth 
Waters has argued that, “when the country, with Stalin at the helm, plunged towards 
industrialization, all professional groups, including the doctors, lost status and social influence.” 
According to this scholar, most alliances made between professionals and the party in the 1920s 
did not survive the first five-year-plan.
119
 Other historians have shown that, by 1936, many 
volunteer societies, such as the Children’s Friend, were closed down and a strong 
institutionalization wave was washing away all islands of more autonomous activities.
120
 As we 
will see in other chapters, in the field of state assistance this centralization led to the closure of a 
semi-institutionalized organization like the Political Red Cross, while it bolstered groups, such as 
the All-Russian Societies for the Blind (VOS) and the Deaf-Mute (VOG), that were more 
coherently integrated in the mechanism of Soviet governance. 
In addition, against the background of this institutional reorganization, the discipline of 
defectology became the target of a conceptual re-assessment. Many scholars have remarked that, 
from 1930 onwards, Soviet authorities began to show growing resentment against defectologists 
and paedologists.
121
 Soviet ideologues in the field of pedagogy denounced the Medico-
Pedagogical Station for producing an overtly negative appraisal of the Soviet minor 
population.
122
 On July 4, 1936, the Party resolution “On the Paedological Distortions in the 
System of National Education” castigated the defectologists for conducting “false experiments” 
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and “an endless amount of investigations” with the deplorable goal of finding a maximum 
number of pathological dysfunctions in the Soviet children, their parents, and their social 
environment. The defectologists were accused of looking for excuses to offer special help to 
completely normal children who were only undisciplined and showed temporary learning 
difficulties.
123
  
Theorizations of individual child defectiveness as the effect of a defective environment 
were necessarily meditations on the broader social context in which Soviet children were 
growing and, as such, could generate subtle indictments of that context.
124
 While this approach 
was admissible throughout the 1920s (when the country was still believed to suffer from the 
tsarist heritage and the defectologists’ professional skills were crucial in healing the civil war 
damage in the first generation of Soviet children
125
), by the mid-1930s the Stalinist social order 
could no longer be identified as a scientifically proved cause of child defectiveness. The 
unfortunate existence of children damaged by the environment in which they lived contradicted 
the official claim to a happy Soviet childhood. The pressing ideological need to keep up the 
appearance of an ideal childhood against the background of the mid-1930s purges ensured an 
approach that hold individuals rather than the system responsible for deviant behaviors and left 
little room for the integrating practices of defectology.  
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Although early defectological theories remained fundamentally unchanged and continued 
to be supported by some activists and professionals,
126
 in the mid-1930s new state policies 
encouraged holding minor recidivists and waifs with personality problems responsible for their 
antisocial acts. A rougher-handed approach to juvenile disobedience and delinquency was 
evident in the 1935 edicts that made children as young as twelve fully responsible for any 
criminal act, briefly introduced the death penalty for under-age offenders, abolished the 
Commissions on the Affairs of Minors, transferred complete responsibility for minor criminals to 
the Procuracy and the courts, and placed all labor colonies and reception points under the 
jurisdiction of the NKVD. These laws resulted in a wave of arrests and trials among Soviet 
teenagers.
127
 Juliane Fűrst has commented that this approach was “determined to eradicate the 
juvenile problem through spatial separation rather than to solve it through policies of 
integration.” Thus, in the mid-1930s, the trend to exclude social misfits won out in the treatment 
accorded to young marginalized members of Soviet society and, according to Fűrst, would 
continue to provide strong competition to the “narrative of salvation” in the post-war period.128      
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed how Soviet defectologists of the 1920s contributed to shaping 
marginalized children’s right to be helped. Through an analysis of their theoretical writings and 
their practices of rational education, I have explored the fundamental tensions that animated 
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these activists’ drive to help problematic children by integrating them in the Soviet “big loving 
and hardworking family.”129 I have argued that the defectologists’ scientific construction of 
defective childhood both as a form of individual suffering and as a potential resource for the state 
opened a space for reclaiming marginalized children into the collective and for the collective. 
This pedagogical science entitled children to protection and help from the state, while also 
subordinating their interests and needs to those of the larger Soviet socio-political body.  
The approach favored by Soviet defectologists vis-à-vis troublesome, non-conforming 
children was based on a progressive and humanist tradition of pedagogy which had deep roots in 
the pre-revolutionary times. It was very successful between 1918 and the mid-1930s because its 
conceptualization of help as something resembling science coalesced with the Soviet state’s 
desire to handle social questions with a rationalized and secularized, but also humane approach 
that was in keeping with its socialist moral values and its socio-political goals. The premise that 
child defectiveness was determined by social as well as biological factors and that both could be 
measured through empirical scientific methods made it possible to intervene and correct the 
children, transforming both their individuality and their social existence. In addition, 
defectologists’ social activism combined firm roots in a supposedly rational, systematic, and 
science-based knowledge with a direct involvement in the economic growth of the country. 
Finally, defectological science not only revealed the materialist explanations for the emergence 
of defectiveness, but also offered a humane model to deal with deviant children. Under these 
conditions, defectology appeared as a practical technology that could be harnessed for human 
betterment and social progress. To its practitioners as well as to the officialdom, it seemed a 
suitable form of intervention aimed not simply at defending the well-being of deviant children, 
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but also at sustaining the interests of the Soviet state. As Kashchenko once wrote reversing the 
directionality of help, defectology “could be of big help to the state.”130  
The defectologists’ scientific definition of child defectiveness as “lack” contributed to 
shaping the state’s notion of help to its marginalized populations as an inextricable combination 
of care and control. This definition encouraged viewing deviant members of the social body as 
suffering individuals in a state of need, but it also imposed societal restrictions on them. Indeed, 
as Kashchenko’s theoretical writings implied and as we saw in the practice of the Medico-
Pedagogical Station, the type of help implemented to compensate children’s “lack” was a rather 
invasive form of disciplining and re-making. The cure to defectiveness, which in the 
defectologists’ vision was to be implemented “freely and creatively,”131 lost much of its ideal 
spontaneity and joyfulness as it was pursued for the purposes of normalizing children and fitting 
them into society. 
In the next chapters, we will see how other activists constructed the right to be helped of 
marginalized adult populations who showed forms of deviation and “lack” in physical, gender, or 
political terms. They all engaged with similar issues of discipline and emancipation, but 
proposed to solve them in different ways. VOS and VOG did not appeal to science, but rather to 
a conceptualization of disabled peoples’ labor as a path to integration and happiness. Ommlad 
promoted science largely as a masculine force offering moral criteria by which Soviet single 
women were to be gauged and helped. The Political Red Cross attempted to rely on law to 
articulate dispassionate judgments of individuals lacking political fitness, but also largely fell 
back on patronage and socialist morality to sustain their right to a humane treatment. 
                                                          
130
 RAO, f. 139, d. 238, l. 3. 
131
 RAO, f. 113, d. 150, l. 10. 
113 
 
Chapter 3 
Labor: 
VOS’s and VOG’s Advocacy for the Rights of Blind and Deaf-Mute People 
 “Without hearing and speaking 
Forgotten we could have stayed forever.  
But…the Soviet state finds a job for every poor fellow.”1 
  
Nastia once composed a poem about a blind musician. She wrote that, “fighting for the 
happiness of other people,” this man “had forgotten his own unhappiness and suffering.” He had 
also proved that “the blind lot is not inferior to the seeing folks.” In the poem written in July 
1921 by a “morally defective” teenager going through a process of re-education, work for the 
well-being of the collectivity appeared as the means to overcome the unhappiness caused by 
disability. It was also the best way to demonstrate equality with the healthy members of the 
collective.
2
 In this chapter, I will discuss how the disabled activists staffing the All-Russian 
Societies for the Blind (Vserossiiskoe Obshchestvo Slepykh, hereafter VOS) and the Deaf-Mute 
(Vserossiiskoe Obshchestvo Glukhonemykh, hereafter VOG) indeed considered work as a 
concrete instrument of transformation from helplessness to fitness and the key legitimizing 
category of their right to be helped in this process. I will also trace how their notion of labor as a 
locus of integration and a path to happiness changed in the years between the October 
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 Kollektiv glukhonemykh tipogr., “Luchi,” in Pervomaiskii sdvig. Odnodnevnaia gazeta, vypushchennaia 1 maia 
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vol. 2 (Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia Literatura”, 1974) 234-239. 
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Revolution and the aftermath of the Second World War.
3
  
Analyzing the relationship between the right to work and the right to state assistance in 
the context of blindness and deafness, I address two key themes. The first is the meaning of the 
socialist culture of labor for non-able-bodied people. The second is the strain between the 
disabled’s desire for integration through work and the state’s disciplinary compulsion to 
productive labor. These two themes are inextricably linked since the Soviet culture of labor 
increasingly turned productivity into the prime goal of the entire Soviet socio-political body and 
this productionism created the context for a deep and abiding tension between ideals of help and 
notions of labor fitness, personal value and social capital. Competing interpretations of the 
disabled’s right to be helped through labor were played out when official rehabilitation 
philosophies articulated this notion, disabled activists re-elaborated and altered it in their 
advocacy, and disabled individuals expected or rejected it in their everyday lives. Juxtaposing 
the discourse analysis of activists’ writings and congress debates to the examination of the 
personal experiences of some blind and deaf-mute individuals, in this chapter I reveal a 
fundamental contradiction inherent in the Soviet right to be helped through labor. Namely, that 
the idealized, loudly advertised, and much desired participation in joyful, enabling, and 
transformative labor was disjointed from a problematic reality of unemployment and popular 
prejudices against blind and deaf-mute people.        
As a large body of scholarship has shown, labor was “a central category of self-
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 The term “activist” is used in this chapter to describe the disabled individuals who were active in the formal 
administrative structures that developed on behalf of the Soviet blind and the deaf-mute after 1917. It is intended to 
exclude the blind and deaf-mute who did not participated in local administration or leadership. Concerning 
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change in terminology from “deaf-muteness” to “deafness” happened only after 1948. The definition “deaf-mute” 
disappeared from the name of VOG in 1959. See Claire Shaw, Deaf in the USSR: “Defect” and the New Soviet 
Person, 1917-1991 (PhD Dissertation, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 
2010), 164. 
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identification” for Soviet workers, while “unemployment challenged the very core of [their] 
identity.”4 Able-bodied, non-marginalized citizens – such as male workers in the major cities of 
the Soviet Union – tended to recognize the salience of work, because it was in and through the 
workplace communities that they obtained the means and opportunities for a full social life. At 
the same time, as labor historian Diane Koenker has argued, Soviet workers clearly claimed the 
right to choose what form their social life should take: while the official model of labor relations 
was above all committed to production, workers altered this model to address a more 
consumerist vision of socialism that included entertainment and leisure as well as production.
5
  
Like the male urban workers richly investigated by social historians, the less studied 
Soviet blind and deaf-mute also participated in the articulation of a socialist culture of labor both 
through their discursive interventions and their everyday practices.
6
 In particular, those among 
them who chose to be actively involved in VOS and VOG vigorously engaged in elaborating and 
promoting their own vision of labor and socialist work culture. Similarly to many unionized 
workers, the disabled activists of VOS and VOG altered the official model of labor and 
challenged its narrow productivist bias in order to voice their needs. As non-able-bodied and 
marginalized individuals, they specifically engaged labor to articulate an enabling, participatory, 
and integrative vision of socialism.      
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 Diane P. Koenker, Republic of Labor. Russian Printers and Soviet Socialism, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 194-195. Many other scholars have discussed Soviet workers’ identity in relation to 
cultures of labor. For a classic treatment see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in 
the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
5
 Koenker, Republic of Labor. 
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 Among the few scholarly works written in English on the Soviet blind and deaf-mute are the collection of essays 
edited by Lewis Siegelbaum and William O. McCagg The Disabled in the Soviet Union: Past and Present, Theory 
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for instance, Beate Fieseler, “The Bitter Legacy of the ‘Great Patriotic War’: Red Army Disabled Soldiers under 
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In general terms, the socialist right to work meant that, once an adult man or woman had 
acquired certain occupational skills, a job had to be offered to him/her – and this was the state’s 
duty. In the cases of marginalized populations such as deviant children, disabled adults, and 
single mother, the official conceptualization of work as a right combined with that of work as 
therapeutic tool. This combination applied even to political prisoners, who were given the “right” 
to transform themselves through labor in the Gulag camps.
7
 In any case, work therapy required 
determining how to help a deviant member of society reintegrate into the collective. It must also 
be said that the intention to return society’s marginals to productive labor was not a unique 
Soviet aspiration. For instance, the British state deemed “curative work” necessary for all 
disabled ex-servicemen after the First World War and the Germans promoted Arbeitstherapie for 
all categories of disabled individuals.
8
 One of the central ideas in the Soviet work-oriented 
welfare method, however, was that labor satisfied the disabled’s own urge to participate in the 
country’s development and made social integration the best path to personal happiness.9  
Official discourses and policies did not explain how disabled people’s integration into the 
collective was to take place concretely. Bernice Madison has written that work therapy “assumed 
that once the disabled person was sufficiently healed to work and had been taught the skills for a 
specific job, other things would take care of themselves.”10 The vagueness of official definitions 
of job placement (trudoustroistvo) as a form of help on behalf of the disabled deprived VOS and 
VOG activists both of a blueprint for emancipation and of concrete state support in realizing 
their integrative and participatory vision of socialism. At the same time, grappling with these 
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 Stephen Kotkin has written that “convicts were required to work not merely to make good their ‘debt’ to society 
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ambiguities, VOS and VOG disabled activists could propose their own rehabilitation philosophy 
and emancipatory program.  
The social integration desired by VOS and VOG activists was to be achieved not only 
through the elimination of illiteracy and the spreading of primary and secondary school 
education, but, even more effectively, through vocational training and employment. Indeed, the 
key goal of Soviet adult disability rehabilitation was to increase the disabled’s ability to carry out 
work (trudosposobnost’). As Lennard Davis has remarked, the compulsion “to perform 
successfully in order not to be viewed as disabled” had emerged among the disabled 
communities of many industrializing countries already in the nineteenth century, when the 
standards for quantifying the human body were related to the standardized movements demanded 
by factory work.
11
 In the Soviet Union, the mandate to learn a trade that produced an income 
derived from the Marxist-Leninist approach which saw poverty as an oppressive reality and labor 
as a means to express the most valuable traits of Man’s personality. As a result of incremented 
working abilities, the blind and deaf-mute would no longer be the dependent invalids of the 
tsarist era. Nor would they be the lonely, ignorant, and helpless victims of capitalist social 
relationships. Rather, they would become the active participants of joyful socialist labor, the 
fully-fledged builders of the new society and its radiant life. For the activists of VOS and VOG, 
labor was the best way out of the social impasse of blindness and deafness, that is the condition 
of being forgotten and left behind.
12
  
In their struggle for integration, VOS and VOG disabled activists did not see the 
condition for inclusion in the possession of physical abilities, but rather in the will to overcome 
                                                          
11
 Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, 10.  
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their disability, acquire working capacities, and thereby support themselves independently 
through work. Claire Shaw has argued that “deaf people wrote themselves into the Soviet 
narrative of ‘overcoming’, challenging their ‘defect’ by seeking to demonstrate that their 
capabilities matched…those of the hearing.”13 Keith Livers has similarly suggested that Soviet 
disability was ultimately understood as a positive stimulus to self-development.
14
 Engagement in 
socially useful labor and the subordination of one’s individual desires to the collective good were 
key values of Soviet socialism. Blind and deaf-mute activists held the state to these values, 
pushing it to assess their fitness for membership not against their suffering disabled bodies, but 
vis-à-vis their efforts to surmount invalidism and be useful to the Soviet community. In this 
respect, for the disabled activists of VOS and VOG the suffering coming from disability could 
have never become the ground for special privileges. Quite to the contrary, need and suffering 
represented a challenge that could be faced and vanquished with the necessary state support. 
This approach led disabled activists to consistently emphasize effort/labor contributions 
over need/suffering in legitimizing their right to be helped. However, the meaning that they 
assigned to labor as a key ground for state help and as a concrete tool to achieve integration 
changed in connection with the shifting discourses and policies adopted by the Soviet state 
between 1917 and 1950. In the following pages, I will trace changes by focusing on three 
moments – the years between the emergence of a Soviet disability advocacy and the 
administrative consolidation of VOS and VOG in the mid-1920s; the occurrence of a discursive 
shift in the late 1920s-early 1930s in connection with the onset of the Stalinist industrialization; 
and the reconstitution of disability advocacy after the wreckages of the Second World War. 
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Throughout these three periods, Soviet disabled activists strove to demonstrate their social 
capital in terms of their fitness and general capability within the symbolic framework of socialist 
labor. Since the first years after the Revolution, the blind and the deaf-mute portrayed themselves 
as capable to overcome their disability and work alongside the able-bodied Soviet masses. 
Caught in the production drive of the 1930s, embattled activists particularly stressed their 
constituencies’ place in the factories because these were the epicenters of Soviet economic life. 
However, at the peak of industrialization, the drive to inclusion in the country’s working life 
became an aspiration bordering on total mobilization for the sake of the collective and a rather 
de-humanizing melding into it. Only after the Second World War, disabled activists rescaled the 
productivist cult of labor and promoted a discourse that took into account the price of the 
suffering endured by disabled veterans and the value of achieving not only productivity, but also 
human dignity through labor.       
Focusing on the discursive and policy changes shaping the connection between help and 
labor in the context of disability, this chapter shows that the disabled’s right to be helped was 
formed as a relational process. It was a social construct forged in webs of interrelations between 
the policymakers of the Narkomsobes, the disabled activists of VOS and VOG, and – as I show 
in the last section of this chapter – the blind and deaf-mute individuals who refused to belong to 
these official organizations.  
My argument in this chapter is based on numbers that are difficult to verify because there 
are no reliable statistical data on the extent of blindness and deafness in the Soviet Union. 
Specific statistics on the number of deaf-mute and blind individuals in Russia were separately 
compiled in the 1920 and 1926 censuses. For the following years, however, the censuses had no 
120 
 
separate section for the computation of these categories of the Soviet population.
15
 The official 
count of the Russian deaf-mute given at the Second All-Russian Congress of the Deaf-Mute in 
January 1929 was 73, 000.
16
 The unofficial statistics compiled in 1928 by the defctologist N. 
Lagovskii calculated a total of 145,119 deaf-mute individuals in the Russian Republic only. 
According to the data presented by the Narkomzdraz, in 1923 there were 472.000 blind people in 
the whole Soviet Union. Some unverified statistical data suggested a total of 800,000 blind.
17
 
Only around 7,000 deaf-mute and 8,800 blind were members of VOG and VOS in 1926. By 
August 1951, VOG membership had risen to 61,000, while VOS membership reached 45,874 in 
January 1950. These numbers corresponded to around 66% and 60% of the supposed overall 
Soviet deaf-mute and blind populations.
18
  
Aware of the risks entailed in lumping together heterogeneous groups, I still believe that 
there are strong reasons for considering blind and deaf-mute activists together as a case study 
illuminating a fundamental aspect of the Soviet right to be helped. First, Russian adult disability 
rehabilitation was imbued by a holistic tradition.
19
 Second, the institutions of VOS and VOG 
acted on behalf of their respective constituencies in very similar ways and, over time, developed 
a similar relationship with the state. Third, the story of how the Soviet blind and deaf-mute were 
placed on the job market is characterized by a similar pattern of ebbs and flows for both groups. 
More importantly, the Soviet blind and deaf-mute shared common interests and used a common 
language to express their claims to help. At the same time, whenever possible, I will be explicit 
about some distinctions between the two types of disability and the advocacy performed by the 
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two organizations.  
3.1 Disability advocacy between 1917 and 1928 
 An active advocacy movement among Russian blind and deaf-mute people emerged only 
after the Revolution of February 1917. In the months following this event, two groups of 
disabled activists (respectively called Union of the Blind and Union of the Deaf-Mute) sought to 
harness the revolutionary potential of the moment by advocating for the legal emancipation of 
their constituencies. Early organizers protested against a law that imposed legal guardianship 
over adults with physical impairments – as though they were minors or insane persons – and 
campaigned for the endowment of full civil and political rights (polnopravie) and the recognition 
of the disabled’s juridical equality with the able-bodied (ravnopravie). In this initial legal flare-
up, the juridical status of the blind and deaf-mute almost exclusively occupied the attention of 
Russian disability advocacy.
20
 
Following the October Revolution and the constitutional conferral of equal legal rights to 
people with disabilities in July 1918, the administrative status of the two Unions underwent some 
important changes. They gradually ceased to be independent forums for the articulation of their 
constituencies’ requests to the state and became more integrated in the Soviet administrative 
system. Already at the Second Congress of the Deaf-Mute in October 1920, the majority of 
delegates suggested to pass the organization’s leadership over to the state. In that venue, the 
future chairman of VOG, Pavel Alekseevich Savel’ev, argued that the Union of the Deaf-Mute 
was impotent and unable to advance the defense of an uncultured constituency in any effective 
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way. Therefore, continued Savel’ev, the organization should be closer to the state apparatus and 
include in its leadership able-bodied representatives from the Narkomsobes, Narkompros, 
Narkomzdrav, and NKVD.
21
 The activist Sergei Ivanovich Sokolov went so far as to recommend 
that the functions of the Union be completely absorbed into other state organs. In his opinion, 
there was no point in creating a “parallel private apparatus,” since “the state is stronger than the 
Union and does everything for the deaf-mute.”22  
Within a few years from these statements, both Unions became All-Russian Societies, 
were endowed with officially approved statutes, and included in the system of invalid producers’ 
cooperatives (VOS in 1923 and VOG in 1926). The Societies were administratively incorporated 
within the Narkomsobes, under whose leadership and control they kept operating throughout the 
Soviet period. The subsequent institutional history of both associations would be characterized 
by a tension between the disabled activists’ partial control of their own interests and the state’s 
drive to run their decisions past the organs of central planning and fully integrate their 
workshops within the organizations of the able-bodied.
23
  
As the state took into its hands the provision of welfare services more firmly, blind and 
deaf-mute activists were denied the ability to organize themselves in independent groups. 
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However, giving up autonomy and being consolidated within the structures of Soviet governance 
had some positive sides too. Indeed, in the years between 1918 and 1928, the two Societies 
strengthened their institutional standing and acquired enough legitimacy to enter an intense 
dialogue with the state’s ideological apparatus.24 Interacting with Narkomsobes leaders and 
policymakers from a position of insiders, VOS and VOG activists were able to advance their 
own conceptual framework for sustaining the disabled’s right to be helped and for shaping the 
meaning of labor as this right’s fundamental legitimizing category.  
Two key concepts underpinned the activists’ vision of the right to be helped and the role 
of labor in it: the denial of their members’ helplessness and invalidism; and the real possibility 
for them to overcome the darkness of disability. The combination of these two principles allowed 
VOS and VOG activists to move the blind and deaf-mute out of the domain of charity and into 
the project of care and control that framed the Soviet approach to its marginalized populations. 
VOS and VOG adamantly rejected any form of beneficence based either on Christian 
compassion or secular humanism and expressed pronounced intolerance towards the disabled 
who asked for it. Disabled activists strove to define their institutionalized communities against 
beggars, street musicians, fortune-tellers, and postcard-sellers. While these were “invalids” living 
off alms, the active members of VOS and VOG were the worthy recipients of state assistance. 
Additionally, disabled activists claimed that the blind and the deaf-mute needed state care, but 
not tutelage: they would help themselves through labor and become productive members of 
society if the state provided support by guaranteeing their right to work and giving them jobs. 
According to this logic, the reception of state help was conceived as a right, which did not 
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contrast with notions of independence. Unlike charity, the provision of state assistance did not 
deny the disabled’s ability to work and be integral members of Soviet society. Rather, Soviet 
help was the necessary condition to fully realize one’s abilities and become integrated.  
Let us consider how the activists denied their constituencies’ helplessness and 
constructed their ability to overcome darkness. As we will see, these interrelated discourses 
constituted the fundamental basis in the initial period of Soviet disability advocacy for building a 
notion of the right to be helped as the right to work.       
The denial of helplessness and the overcoming of darkness   
After the October Revolution, Soviet activists focused most of their energies on rejecting 
philanthropy because, in their view, it cut off any right for the blind and deaf-mute and doomed 
them to a hopeless, inescapable idleness. Especially in their narratives of how help was 
dispensed to the disabled before 1917, the activists described the pre-revolutionary blind and 
deaf-mute as individuals living in a prison of darkness and miserly using begging as the only 
way to support their unhappy existence.
25
 In the opening speech at the First Congress of VOS in 
April 1925, an activist named Popov said:  
the old order isolated the blind, threw a piece of bread at him, and put him on church 
charity (paperti). Some were isolated, doomed by lack of education and people’s 
prejudices. Others were excluded from life by the imperialist and civil wars, which closed 
them up into hospitals and shelters.
26  
As the future Chairman of VOS, Vasilii Andreevich Medvedev, put it in a letter to the society for 
the blind of the German socialist party in Berlin,  
the old imperial Russia blocked all paths and ways to the blind, condemning them to 
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begging and a dark life…in front, to the right, and to the left stayed only enemies: the 
state, the Church, a reactionary ‘public opinion’, and unwanted patrons.27  
The image of the roadblocks surrounding the blind and leaving open for them only the path 
going backwards emphasized that the blind were not only the victims of disease and poverty, but 
also of a political system that deprived them of any possibility to be mobile and advance 
forwards. Under these circumstances, continued the activists’ argument, the common lot of the 
disabled could be nothing else than poverty, ignorance, and isolation from the other full-fledged 
members of society. VOS and VOG activists imagined the disabled of the past as desperately 
crying: “accept us as people.”28 In their opinion, the greatest need of the blind and deaf-mute was 
to feel a close spiritual link with those surrounding them.  
Since VOS and VOG aimed at achieving mutual awareness and acceptance between the 
world of the able-bodied and that of the disabled, they agitated against any form of help that 
would have excluded their constituencies from the Soviet collectivity and tore them apart from 
the healthy body social. This is the main reason why they rejected not only Christian 
compassion, but also the Enlightenment principle of humanism, namely, because the private 
initiatives of single individuals could have never turned into a substantial advocacy for the rights 
and duties of blind and deaf-mute people.  
In light of this desire for integration, it might seem paradoxical that VOS and VOG 
activists frequently related disability to lack of culture (nekul’turnost’). As a VOS member said 
in 1925, “blindness prevails in the uncultured layers of our society.”29 In fact, associating 
disability with nekul’turnost’ allowed these activists to re-imagine blindness and deafness as 
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forms of backwardness that could be surmounted.
30
 In the first phase of disability advocacy, 
VOS and VOG activists wanted first of all to move their lot out of the dead end in which it had 
been so far imagined to be. Their main aspiration was to integrate the blind and deaf-mute into 
the Soviet world of culture and knowledge. Agitating for education, they often qualified this 
service as a state’s duty towards “the dark ones,” a form of help that matched with the state’s 
project of re-educating its uncultured masses. As such, it was mandated by nothing else than the 
state’s communist and revolutionary political orientation.  
The letter that the activist Georgii Iosifovich Grinberg wrote to Vladimir Lenin in August 
1920 is a clear example of this type of discourse. Grinberg informed the leader of the new Soviet 
state about the “very dark and illiterate” conditions of the Russian deaf-mute population. 
Referring to Lenin’s campaign against analphabetism, Grinberg complained that “no one 
talks…about liquidating illiteracy among the deaf-mute.” He proposed to raise “the question of 
the deaf-mute” at Sovnarkom and TsIK meetings. His formulation – “the question of the deaf-
mute” – echoed other hot issues of the time, for instance the “woman question” or the “peasant 
question.” This construction emphasized the darkness of the Russian deaf-mute and made them 
into problems, i.e. the objects of a “question” whose resolution would ultimately benefit the 
larger collectivity. Presenting himself as “a communist,” Grinberg linked his political orientation 
to the duty to “dedicate all my energy and knowledge to the deaf-mute people.” He concluded 
the letter by arguing that “the Revolution” required him to take up activist responsibilities.31 
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Both the deaf-mute and the blind were portrayed as waiting for the light of knowledge 
and labor. For instance, appearing as ignorant, engaged in irrational activities, and fundamentally 
unable to express themselves because all their senses were somehow shut down, the visually 
impaired had only “a mute reproach in their blind eyes.”32 This reprimand was directed at the 
able-bodied, well-educated, and employed members of the collective. It was a reminder of their 
duty to help the disabled by offering them vocational training and a job. In a 1924 poem entitled 
“Rays of Light” (Luchi), a group of deaf-mute typography workers identified a certain “comrade 
Pavlov,” the manager of their workshop, as the provider of the help that they had long been 
seeking. Thanks to the work that comrade Pavlov had organized for them, “a ray of light” was 
starting to illuminate their “underground corner,” which until then had been “far away from 
enlightened life.” The authors of this poem represented themselves as living in a “forgotten” 
space: they recognized their ignorance and their distance from the rest of society, but they also 
insisted that they were “thirsty for light.”33 Indeed, VOS and VOG activists felt that they had to 
convince the able-bodied that the disabled, although dark and silent, greatly aspired to 
knowledge and could indeed have access to the life of culture and work that was supposedly led 
by the rest of the country. As Konstantin I. Baranov said at the Congress of the Deaf-Mute in the 
summer of 1917, “the mind of the deaf-mute, with the passion of fire, strives forward.”34 
Aspiring with all their energies to see the light and seeking it above of all in labor, the authors of 
the poem “Rays of Light” expressed optimism concerning their future emancipation from the 
oppression of inborn defects (defekty ot rozhden’a /ne budut tiagostny vpolne).35 As the activist 
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Popov said in his speech at the First Congress of VOS in April 1925, “there is no physical dawn 
for us, but there is another one – the light of labor, the light of communism.”36 
In 1928, the Narkompros inspector Pavel Pavlovich Pochapin (himself a man with speech 
impediments) lamented that those who did not know the deaf-mute looked at them as inferior, 
unfit, and essentially unable to perform professional or social functions. “Of course,” argued 
Pochapin,  
deafness is a hindering circumstance and it can indeed seem a defect in the performance 
of some functions…But in reality, deafness is not only a neutral circumstance, but even a 
positive quality. For instance….the deaf-mute have a greater talent for graphic arts…37 
In addition, continued Pochapin, the deaf-mute could better focus their attention. Although they 
“still need to work on themselves, they can achieve a high level of intellectual development.” In 
other words, the backwardness of the deaf-mute was not denied, but cast as surmountable. As 
Pochapin put it, “the deaf-mute are able to develop and reduce the distance between them and the 
normal people.”38 
Active members of VOS and VOG insisted on the real possibility to establish closer 
contacts between the disabled and the able-bodied. In a 1924 open letter to her “dear comrades,” 
an able-bodied woman-worker and VOG activist explained that speechlessness and deafness did 
not hinder “the ardent heart of a worker” from beating under the shirts of the deaf-mute laboring 
by her side on the shop floor. The disabled colleagues, averred this woman, “perform their work 
silently and do not react to what happens around them;” but, “if you look closer, then you see 
how life pulsates in them: a silent life, but nonetheless filled with social interests…” In this 
portrayal, the working ability of the deaf-mute is not lower than that of the able-bodied. It is true 
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that the deaf-mute’s introversion is an obstacle to closer contact between them and the able-
bodied, but this woman strongly criticizes the comrades who “work side by side with [the deaf-
mute] without knowing and understanding them.”39  
Disabled activists wanted to correct people’s misunderstandings about the working 
abilities of the physically handicapped and erase the false identification of blindness and 
deafness with weakness of intellect. Ultimately, however, this change in popular attitudes did not 
happen by intervening on the able-bodied and eradicating their prejudices, but rather by 
normalizing the disabled. It was never the able-bodied who came to share the life of the blind 
and deaf-mute, but the disabled who were “brought closer to the normal fellow citizens” through 
schooling and the acquisition of working skills.
40
 The pedagogue Fedor Andreevich Rau argued 
that education made the disabled “human in the full sense of this word and closer to the 
community” of able-bodied people.41 Two of the “Five Wishes” articulated by the chairman of 
VOG P.A. Savel’ev (writing under the pseudonym of Boris Volgin) were 
to give not only literacy, but also a professional qualification, and thus turn the deaf-mute 
into industrial workers…and to create conditions of work in which the labor of the deaf-
mute would be completely employed and there could be mutual understanding between 
the deaf-mute and the hearing workers.
42
 
Normalization (turning into industrial workers) and integration (equal employment 
opportunities) did not contradict each other in this discourse, but rather functioned in dynamic 
tension. As the activist Pochapin wrote in a leaflet opposing the isolation of the deaf-mute from 
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the rest of society, “we cannot tear off from normal life a great number of people who could 
enter the family of workers on common grounds.”43 Thus, the activists’ program included both 
an emancipatory integrative component and a disciplining normalizing side. Both were to happen 
through labor. 
Incongruous as it might sound, the Soviet disabled needed help, but were not helpless. 
While until the October Revolution, the press had portrayed the disabled as aggrieved and ill-
starred (obizhennye),
44
 after 1917 the main idea was that the disabled, although still in a state of 
darkness, in fact had the potential to contribute to the socialist state as much as the able-bodied. 
VOS and VOG activists realized that if the disabled were to appear as helpless, lingering behind, 
and lost vis-à-vis the fast pace of change, they would have evoked only feelings of pity or scorn 
for their wretchedness. The Soviet disabled were always already asked to “be in step with” (v 
nogu) and “in the same ranks as” (v riadu) the able-bodied. They had to “walk at a pace with the 
able-bodied along the path to reinforce the achievements of the October,”45 “return to the world 
(sreda) of the able-bodied,” “be on the same level with all the others,” “be on par” (naravne) and 
at times even “higher” than the able-bodied.46 Commenting on how the blind should appear in 
theatrical plays, an activist said: “The blind should not appear as helpless or improbable 
(nepravdopodobnyi). To the contrary he should fuse into the real reality surrounding him.”47  
In sum, between 1917 and 1928, Soviet activism on behalf of disabled people had an 
integrative and disciplinary thrust. The discourse of darkness generally portrayed the blind and 
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deaf-mute as below the norm of the able-bodied worker and thereby legitimized normalization 
(even humanization, in Fedor Rau’s words). In this respect, Daniel Beer correctly argues that 
“the discourse of social ozdorovlenie…was unavoidably and irreducibly disciplinary.”48 At the 
same time, the activists’ attempt to normalize also carried within itself an enabling, 
emancipating, and integrating thrust. This was the paradox of a form of help that was conceived 
both as discipline and integration.  
Help as trudoustroistvo 
By the mid-1920s, when both VOS and VOG had consolidated their administrative 
standing under the aegis of the Narkomsobes, most disabled activists articulated a 
conceptualization of help as job placement. This notion closely resembled the official 
pronouncements of their umbrella institution. As we have seen in chapter 1, the Narkomsobes 
considered the involvement of the disabled in the labor market as the best welfare policy for this 
specific category of pensionery. However, we should not assume that VOS and VOG simply 
internalized the officially sponsored culture of labor. Rather, in the years between 1917 and 
1928, help as trudoustroistvo emerged as a social construct forged through mutually constitutive 
interactions between the state social assistance agency and the activists of VOS and VOG. 
Already at the First Congress of the Deaf-Mute in July 1917, the activist Smirnova had 
introduced the term “work-oriented help” (trudovaia pomoshch’). According to this activist, 
labor occupied a “dominating position” because “every man has to worry about his daily bread” 
and because “work-oriented help is the ardent desire of the majority.” To have a profession – 
freely chosen, intellectually stimulating and creative, but also socially useful – was seen already 
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in the summer of 1917 as a significant component to satisfy the material and spiritual interests of 
the disabled.
49
  
The official statutes drafted by VOS and VOG in the mid-1920s echoed Smirnova’s 
words by indicating “material welfare through labor” (trudovaia material'naia obespechennost') 
as the primary goal of the two Societies.
50
 This phrase meant the improvement of the life of the 
disabled not by means of philanthropy, but through the acquisition of accessible trades and 
employment in productive activities.
51
 At the Second Plenum of VOS in August 1925, when the 
representatives of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (Rabkrin) suggested the blind activists 
to adopt the slogan “Not pity for the blind, but work,”52 the activist Afinogenov readily added: 
“Let’s advance the question of the blind along the tracks of labor.”53 The most radical activists 
went so far as to completely exclude any other form of assistance. For instance, one of the 
“theses” pronounced at the Meeting of the Deaf-Mute of 1926 read:  
Material help from the state to the deaf-mute can be directed only at their job placement 
and must take the form of assignments of credits and subsidies to the 
cooperatives...Taking into consideration the possibility of complete assistance through 
employment, there should not be any support in the form of pensions or placement in the 
facilities of social welfare. 
This activist further defined job placement as “the only rational form of assistance” to the 
disabled.
 54
 
Extreme as it might sound, this stance was in fact nothing else than the radicalization of a 
belief long held by the disabled activists – namely, that the blind and the deaf-mute should not be 
looked upon as invalids, subjects of charity, or passive recipients of the state’s payoffs, but as 
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active and integrated members of the Soviet collective. Disabled activists certainly became more 
aware of the importance that the state attributed to work-oriented welfare when their 
organizations were subsumed under the Narkomsobes. Yet, their definition of work as “the first 
means of struggle against begging” reveals a mutual complicity in the construction of help as 
trudoustroistvo.
55
 
One of the most coherent and thorough articulations of the relation between help and 
labor (as it was conceived by Soviet disabled activists in the mid-1920s) was given in 1924 by 
the activist and expert in ophthalmology Sergei Selivanovich Golovin. His book The 
Contemporary State of Social Help to the Blind emphasized the key role of labor in legitimizing 
and realizing the disabled’s right to be helped.56 Yet, this book praised labor not only for its 
“material outcomes,” but also for “the spiritual and moral achievements” that it made possible 
for the Soviet blind. As we will see in the next sections, the non-economic, moral dimension of 
the relationship between help and labor would get lost in the 1930s and re-emerge only after the 
Second World War.   
In line with the defectological approach that was widespread among Russian pedagogical 
and medical specialists of the 1920s, Golovin conceived adult blindness as a social disease 
treatable by science. He grounded help to the blind in defectology because this new pedagogical 
science permitted the study of both the psychology and the physical peculiarities of grown-up 
blind people. Furthermore, defectology facilitated the elaboration of a didactic program that 
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combined educational and practical goals. According to Golovin, schools and other facilities for 
the blind should perform a set of complex functions, which included the provision of university 
education as well as the teaching of trades and the involvement in industrial work. In addition to 
this standard defectological view of the time, Golovin argued that the state institutions for the 
blind should support the spiritual interests of this population, while also functioning as 
employers or job placement agency for them.
57
 
Golovin saw a model for this type of institution in the German facilities for the blind that 
he had visited during a research trip in the fall of 1923. Indeed, German schools for adult blind 
people not only offered an education of the same quality as that provided in regular state schools, 
but also taught a larger range of trades. For instance, in agrarian schools for the blind, practical 
and theoretical curricula had the goal to enable the students to run an autonomous agricultural 
enterprise of small dimensions and thereby “to lead a comfortable life.” Promoting the German 
model, Golovin argued that university education and the study of foreign languages should be 
made accessible to the Soviet blind because this type of education would provide them with 
additional professional skills.
58
 In sum, in Golovin’s discourse, education and appropriate forms 
of labor were the preferred methods to help the blind.   
Golovin devoted a relatively large section of his booklet to celebrating the initiative 
developed in Berlin by Paul H. Perls. The promoter of an approach to disability called 
Arbeitstherapie (or therapy through work), Perls had organized a special production department 
for the blind in the factories of the German industrial giant Siemens.
59
 Golovin was enthusiastic 
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about Perls’s experiment. Not coincidentally, all the illustrations in his book were pictures of 
Perls’s department for the blind in the facilities of Siemens. They showed blind men who, “like 
the healthy ones,” sat at industrial machines and performed “fruitful work.”60 
 
Figure 2: The blind man operating this threading machine had also an amputated hand. Source: Golovin, 
Sovremennaia postanovka sotsial’noi pomoshchi slepym, 19.   
 
 
Figure 3: The left hand of this blind man had been amputated at the wrist; on the right hand, four fingers were 
“deformed.” Despite all this, he was able to work at an automated threading machine. Source: Golovin, 
Sovremennaia postanovka sotsial’noi pomoshchi slepym, 22. 
After the necessary training and the installation of safety devices that would prevent 
accidents, access to the most complex industrial machines appeared as a real possibility for the 
blind and maimed workers of these photographs. Emphasizing the “agility, precision, and 
determination” with which the blind operated these “complex and even frightening machines,” 
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Golovin attributed to the blind the most important qualities of the modern industrial worker.
 61
  
This activist used industrial work as a criterion to equalize the blind with the able-bodied and 
even aggrandize them in comparison with all those who were frightened by the complexity of 
modern industrial technology. To put it simply, to master technology meant to overcome 
backwardness.
62
  
The experience of Paul Perls confirmed that work had an extremely positive influence on 
the blind from a material as well as from a moral point of view. Again, the captions to some 
illustrations drove home the classic message mens sana in corpore sano – when the muscles 
develop, both the physical and mental health of the person will improve. Through work the mood 
of the blind improved significantly; they felt more peaceful, more energetic, and even physically 
stronger than they felt when they did not work.
 63
 In addition, Golovin argued that work had to be 
industrial rather than artisanal. This expert subscribed to the prejudice that employmnet in artisan 
workshops did not give the blind any material security because it took up all their waking time 
but gave them only a miserable income. In contrast to artisanal work, industrial labor was 
“happier and healthier.” As Golovin put it, 
the blind feels that he reaches perfection in his work, that he acquires equal worth as the 
able-bodied, … that he will always be offered a job that will feed him and be useful to 
other people as well.
64
 
While “nothing demoralizes and discourages the blind more than the forced state of doing-
nothing,” having an industrial job made the blind confident that they were appreciated and gave 
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them energy.
65
 
Golovin was also careful to explain the material advantages that would come to the 
industries employing the blind: after having acquired the proper skills, the blind gave the same 
“impeccable output” as the able-bodied and their work did not cause any losses to the factory. To 
the contrary, the blind could produce even more than the able-bodied because their very 
disabilities shielded them from the visual distractions of the external world and allowed them to 
focus more intensively on their work.
66
  
Applying Bolshevik jargon to Siemens’s department for the blind, Golovin wrote that this 
was a place where “fairytales had come true” and “the impossible had turned into reality.”67 
Although Soviet discourse contended that only the socialist state could give the necessary 
supports to allow the disabled to escape from the grip of private charity, Perls’s initiative showed 
that help through work was a pan-European trend. Perls’s motto was “Work, not compassion” 
(Arbeit, nicht Mitleid). And Golovin echoed, “in a cultured state, the blind don’t need charity, but 
work.”68  
In the industrial fairytales told by Soviet disability activists in the 1920s, the feelings of 
the disabled still occupied an important place. Tellingly, Golovin’s text was imbued with an 
inner tension concerning the idea of compassion. On one hand, “compassion, which evokes only 
charity, has become an offense for cultured people.” On the other hand, “compassion and 
understanding are necessary as the impulse for active, resolute love.”69 Labor appeared as the 
instrument to cut the connection between compassion and charity without severing that between 
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compassion and love. For Golovin, this “ardent, resolute love to the human person” had to 
pervade both the idea and the practice of help to the disabled; it had to penetrate all the measures 
of labor safety and care for the blind.
70
 Not very differently from Kashchenko, who defined the 
Medico-Pedagogical Station as a “hardworking and loving family,” Golovin saw Perls’s factory 
as “a home of work and love,” a space where the disabled found a place in life.71 As we will see 
in the next section, the coexistence of work and love in the lives of the Soviet blind and deaf-
mute would undergo significant conceptual and practical changes with the onset of the Stalinist 
industrialization, when full working capacity ended up constituting the essential feature that 
made the disabled into integral members of the Soviet working family. 
3.2 Discursive and policy shifts in the disability advocacy of the 1930s  
In a 1935 article entitled “The deaf-mute are socially full-fledged people,” VOG activist 
G.A. Iusfin raised the following provocative question: “Just because a person has lost an organ 
like the sense of hearing or vision, is he less than a person?”72 In one form or the other, this 
problem had been raised and pondered by Soviet disabled activists since the Revolution. 
However, over the years, the activists’ response to this question had undergone a significant 
discursive shift. In the 1920s, disabled activists had lobbied for integration and respectability, 
arguing for the ability of their constituencies to develop intellectually and demanding general 
education together with access to remunerated work. By the late 1920s-early 1930s, we see an 
almost exclusive emphasis on vocational training and productive occupational skills. Integration 
came to mean above all the chance to perform one’s allotted duty as builder of socialism on 
equal footing with the able-bodied.  
                                                          
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Ibid., 19. 
72
 Dr. G.A. Iusfin, “Glukhonemye sotsial’no polnotsenny,” Beregi Slukh, 25 December 1935, 2. 
139 
 
These changes are clearly reflected in how Iusfin used the term polnotsennyi in the title 
and the text of his article. Polnotsennyi is the opposite of defektivnyi. While the latter adjective 
indicates a lack or defect, the former signifies a completeness of value or fitness. Polnotsennost’ 
was one of the key aspirations of disability advocacy throughout the early Soviet and Stalinist 
experience. After 1928, however, its semantic field definitely shrank from a broad sense of full-
fledged-ness and worthiness to the idea of usefulness for the construction of socialism. To have 
complete value (polno-tsennost’) was increasingly equated with having full working abilities 
(polnaia trudosposobnost’). In the productivist climate of the 1930s, these could be acquired 
only by fulfilling output quotas in the Soviet factories.
73
  
This discursive shift critically impacted the disabled activists’ self-image. However, it did 
not simply originate internally, but rather in dialogue with the ever changing conditions of Soviet 
ideology and everyday life. The years between 1929 and 1935 were the time when the Soviet 
state set the foundations of its socialist economy. This was the period of the so-called 
“construction of socialism,” which demanded the involvement of every social group, the blind 
and the deaf-mute included. In response to this Zeitgeist, the resolutions and directives officially 
approved at VOG’s Second and Third All-Russian Congress (in January 1929 and November 
1931) and at VOS’s Fourth and Fifth All-Russian Congress (in June 1930 and in September 
1932) explicitly articulated the Societies’ goal as the integration of the blind and deaf-mute into 
the task of socialist construction, their transformation into qualified personnel for the state 
industry, their organization into compact productive brigades, and their involvement in socialist 
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competition.
74
 This was the productive life that the rest of the country was allegedly living.  
The new productivist emphasis in the discourse of help through labor restructured the 
Societies’ advocacy and relief work in practical ways too. VOS and VOG had tried to organize 
separate workshops for their constituencies first independently (in 1926-1927) and then within 
the Industrial-Consumer Union of Invalids, or VIKO (in 1928-1930). Both attempts had been 
rather feeble and soon proved unsuccessful. In particular, the transfer of VOS and VOG 
workshops to VIKO had led to the bankruptcy and closure of many enterprises. Subsequently, in 
the early 1930s, the two organizations re-opened their own workshops, but this time they strove 
to give a more rigid and formal structure to the disabled’s vocational training and employment. 
The resulting so-called “educational-industrial” or “training and industrial” workshops (uchebno-
proizvodstvennye masterskie, or UPMs) were supposed to have a homogeneous cohort of 
students, implement specific curricular plans, respect deadlines, and offer adequate stipends. In 
these workshops, blind and deaf-mute adults were to receive enough training in performing 
technical work and operating special machines to eventually make the transition to state 
enterprises. 
In fact, the general scarcity of material resources of basic necessity, the objective lack of 
financial means at the disposal of local administrators, and the latters’ frequent unwillingness to 
implement official resolutions shattered the very foundations of the state’s ideology of work-
oriented welfare and the activists’ discourse of help through labor. When supervisory agencies 
such as Rabkrin audited the provincial technical schools and workshops for the disabled, they 
discovered a rather nasty reality.  
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The trade school for the blind in the village of Verkhnie Mulli in the Perm’ province is a 
telling example. If we have to believe the account written by a Rabkrin inspector who visited this 
trade school in 1933, the vocational education offered in this facility was “completely 
unsatisfactory.” Due to the lack of specialized housing, the school could not admit enough 
students. Instructors, teachers, and administrators mismanaged the school by stifling socialist 
competition and keeping the production output at inadmissibly low levels. In addition, they made 
illegal use of the school’s resources to obtain personal gains: the instructors appropriated and 
hoarded the material belonging to the school and used its machinery to produce items to sell to 
private clients; the teaching personnel increased their wages at will; and the director Beliakov, 
who was well known for his drinking problems, simply embezzled school money. Since the 
school accountant, the lishenets Bushkonets, did not keep any proper accounts, the school’s 
overblown production costs were unverifiable. More seriously, the students felt isolated from the 
social and political life of the country and from the most important issues of the day.
75
 The 
Verkhnie Mulli’s inspection report provides a rather representative picture of the chaotic 
conditions of VOS and VOG trade schools and UPMs.  
 In the mid-1930s, the recognition that VOS and VOG were unable to implement help to 
the disabled independently combined with a general change in the status of all Soviet 
organizations. As we saw in the case of the Medico-Pedagogical Station, this was a time when all 
semi-independent agencies were either forced to dissolve or asked to join the state apparatus in a 
relationship of clearer subordination.
76
 In line with this trend, around 1935 all the educational 
and productive enterprises of VOS and VOG were moved under the direct control of the 
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Narkomsobes, which managed them through a special department called Administration of 
Productive Enterprises (Upravlenie Proizvodstevnnymi Predpriiatiiami). Initially, this passage 
marked the beginning of renewed efforts to improve disabled adults’ education. Soon, however, 
a new jurisdictional move motivated by production exigencies at a time of labor shortage set the 
system of disabled’s workshops in shambles again. At the end of 1937, the Sovnarkom decided 
to move the disabled’s productive enterprises away from the Narkomsobes and into the 
Commissariats of Local and Light Industry.  
Following this transfer, several directives specified the quotas to be filled by five 
economic agencies in the hiring of disabled citizens. These were the People’s Commissariats of 
Local, Light, and Textile Industry, the All-Union Council of Producers’ Cooperatives, and the 
All-Russian Union of Disabled Persons’ Cooperative Association (Koopinsoiuz). However, the 
hiring of disabled workers in state industry did not always proceed on an equal basis with that of 
the able-bodied. For instance, contrary to the recommended quotas, in 1940 “no more than 25% 
of the employable blind” were actually employed.77 While the Koopinsoiuz did hire a certain 
number of disabled persons, the other economic organs systematically disregarded the 
employment plans. In spite of the directives’ encouragement to respect the occupational profiles 
and skills of the disabled in setting output quotas and levels of compensation, soon after the 1937 
transfer, disabled workers started to be replaced by physically unimpaired ones.  
Provincial VOS and VOG sections loudly complained about the wasted labor force of the 
disabled. The local administrators of the mentioned economic organs defended themselves by 
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claiming that it was impossible to hire disabled people due to the lack of specialized housing.
78
 
The Narkomsobes attempted to involve its local officers, reminding them of the duty to find jobs 
for the disabled in their region, but its circular letters did not have any impact either: most 
meetings of local Narkomosbes sections passed over in silence any issue related to the vocational 
education and employment of the disabled.
79
 
The story of the factory Zemes is a good illustration of the fate that befell many disabled 
enterprises in the 1930s. Zemes had been organized at the end of 1929 by the Leningrad section 
of VOS. It was a small workshop that produced electrical fans and employed around 20 blind 
individuals. The production was mechanized – which required the teaching of proper industrial 
skills and a minimal technical knowledge. Zemes worked so well that in 1934 a large three-floor 
building was built for it and the workshop turned into a factory for the production of electric 
engines. Resisting the general disenfranchisement of VOS’s workshops of the mid-1930s, Zemes 
was able to remain under the management of VOS. In 1937, the factory successfully employed 
around 350 blind workers who performed 75-85% of the work (the remaining percentage being 
carried out by a small cohort of able-bodied workers). Following the Sovnarkom’s decision at 
the end of 1937, the factory was moved to the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Local Industry 
and then to the Commissariat of Auto-Tractor Industry. From that moment onwards the blind 
stopped to be considered the main cohort of workers; production was no longer set up with their 
peculiarities in mind; and their number started to decrease very rapidly, going from 350 to 158 
by the end of 1939. The blind workers who continued to work for Zemes were employed in the 
delivery sector and, when this closed, the number of blind employees further decreased and 
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finally equaled zero.
80
 
Stories from other corners of the Russian Republic reveal that the state’s economic 
agencies often did not care to set up the proper technical and safety conditions for the hiring of 
the disabled. The Narkomsobes barely intervened and its few initiatives were ineffective. In the 
Saratov province, for instance, the managers of the local industries did not take any measure to 
hire the blind. To the contrary, they frequently fired them for no specific reason. In the city of 
Balakovo there were 37 employed blind in 1939, but only 11 in 1940; in Vol’sk, the number of 
employed blind went from 70 to 46; in Balashov, it decreased from 40 to 7. A high rate of firings 
occurred in 1939 also in the Krasnodarskii krai: 397 blind used to work in the enterprises of local 
industry, but their number decreased to 284 in 1940. The workshops for the blind of the 
Krasnodar province were in total disarray: one worked only 15 days a month; another completely 
stopped functioning and left its blind employees without any work.
81
 The knitwear factory of 
Tambov had 94 blind people working in its premises in January 1939, but by August of the same 
year only 70 blind were still employed there. Some representatives of the Narkomsobes and the 
Chairman of VOS V.A. Medvedev investigated the causes of the blind’s exodus from this 
factory. It turned out that 9 people had been fired for violating the enterprise’s labor discipline, 
while 15 blind had left “on their own will” because, as they told Medvedev, they had been 
moved to positions for which they had no training and their salaries had been significantly 
lowered. The factory director categorically refused to hire other blind individuals declaring that: 
“the blind are worthless workers…they don’t fulfill the norms.” The head of the oblast’ section 
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of light industry echoed: “We need quality of production; the blind cannot give it to us.”82 
How can we explain this “voluntary” exodus of disabled workers from productive units 
that had been set up especially for them? Besides the housing problem, penury of raw materials 
and adequate machines as well as frequent stoppages in the provision of power caused significant 
interruptions in the flow of work, forcing enterprise managers to lower the salaries of both 
healthy and handicapped workers.
83
 Abuses, squandering of public means, and embezzlement of 
state money were usual occurrences in many local enterprises and a feature of disabled 
workshops as well. Continuous wastage and stealing, untrained and unqualified cadres, a sharp 
turn-over among the personnel, organizational chaos, chronic problems with funding, and the 
constant shifting of jurisdiction led to the bankruptcy and closure of many UPMs.
84
 Blind and 
deaf-mute workers recognized the disabled enterprises’ limited ability to produce income and to 
guarantee a stable financial base for the cultural and social services that VOS and VOG were 
supposed to provide. It was the recognition that no real help was coming from the state in terms 
of fair employment that led many disabled to leave the UPMs “on their own will,” give up on the 
ideal of labor and integration, and often choose a life of begging, fortune-telling, singing, and 
postcard-selling in the marketplaces.   
But when they did not leave “voluntarily,” why were the blind and the deaf-mute so 
frequently laid off? Since data on the production quotas of handicapped and able-bodied workers 
are contradictory and unreliable, we cannot determine whether the profound motives behind the 
firing of disabled workers lay in the relative productivity of the two groups of workers, in the 
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managers’ prejudices, or in a combination of both. Available evidence shows that the 
administrators drafted production plans that did not consider the peculiarities of the disabled 
labor force and the engineers projected technologies that had the able-bodied in mind. The UPMs 
directors prioritized issues of production over issues of fair employment, forgetting that they 
managed not industrial enterprises but special didactic units. They preferred to hire the able-
bodied labor force, because they believed that this gave them an easier way to over-fulfill the 
plans.  
Contending that the crux of the problem was the refusal of invalid cooperatives and local 
industries to hire disabled individuals, Bernice Madison has explained that 
 
the leadership of the 
Soviet economic agencies “did not desire and did not care” to realize the disabled’s right to be 
helped through labor.
85
 Much of the blame for violating labor regulations, setting up unsuitable 
working conditions, and treating the disabled and the able-bodied unequally certainly lay on 
local enterprise directors. The latter shared responsibilities with policymakers that put too much 
emphasis on fulfilling the production plans and demanded an ever-increasing growth of the 
industrial out-put. Furthermore, in a period defined not only by breakneck industrialization but 
also by social fears and political stigmas, the managers’ social prejudices had ideological reasons 
too. Blindness was first of all physically incapacitating in terms of labor productivity, but it also 
represented a visible defect perturbing the image of the healthy body politics. Although neither 
visible and nor directly impinging on a worker’s productive abilities, the communicative 
isolation of deafness also caused problems when the deaf-mute attempted to enter the workplace. 
Indeed, deafness was assumed to impair mental competence and preclude full social 
participation. As Claire Shaw has explained, the parallels between deafness and political 
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fallibility were not less troubling than unfulfilled production quotas, since the inability to 
communicate with the collectivity was perceived as anti-Soviet.
86
 The otherness and isolation 
caused by blindness and deafness were sinister and suspicious behaviors in the late 1930s 
because they correlated to anti-Sovietness.  
While individual blind and deaf-mute people left the disabled productive units (largely 
because they recognized the UPMs’ inability to offer them the income and social services that 
they desired) and while managers were reluctant to hire disabled workers (because they doubted 
their productive abilities and feared their political reliability), disabled activists vehemently – but 
unsuccessfully – argued with both. On one hand, they reproached the resigning disabled for 
“loving easy incomes” and rejecting the “authentic employment” that the state did offer them.87 
On the other hand, to counter the managers’ prejudices, the activists insisted that the disabled 
could work better than the able-bodied. The blind were depicted as exemplary workers thanks to 
their ability to maximally focus; the deaf-mute were said to have a stronger sense of touch, 
which allowed them to fix very quickly any malfunctioning in the machines and to prevent 
breakdowns. In particular, VOG activists advertised the employment of the deaf-mute in noisy 
environments where the sound level would have damaged the hearing of able-bodied workers.
88
 
The social worker Bobrov claimed that the disabled could keep the same pace in production as 
the able-bodied and even become udarniki and stakhanovites.
89
  
Thus, in the conceptualization of the right to be helped that VOS and VOG activists had 
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elaborated in the 1920s and continued to advance throughout the 1930s, help to the blind and 
deaf-mute was intimately linked to the socialist right to work. However, the disabled activists’ 
ideal construction of help through labor contrasted with the indifference of the state and its 
impersonal economy to accommodate the aspirations and needs of blind and deaf-mute people. 
Even at the time when the Five-Year-Plan economy forcefully demanded to employ the labor of 
all individuals, economic institutions and various state agents still considered the blind and deaf-
mute as one of the most backward groups of Soviet society, intrinsically different from the able-
bodied workers and unable to partake in the common economic and political life of the country. 
Despite their imbrication with official productivist discourses, at the end of the 1930s, disabled 
activists’ aspirations for integration remained largely unfulfilled. Even when the disabled 
ostensibly worked side by side with the able-bodied, they still felt as strangers (chuzhie) among 
the latter and often complained about a “schism” (raskol) separating them from the collective of 
healthy workers.
90
 This tension between inclusion and exclusion on the shop floor crucially 
undermined the disabled’s right to be helped through labor and undercut their desire for 
integration in the Soviet social body.   
3.3 The new humanism of disability advocacy in the post-war years   
Did the Second World War change disabled activists’ approach to the issue of inclusion 
and exclusion? And what kind of impact did the war have on their understanding of the right to 
be helped through labor? The significance of WWII in transforming Soviet society and culture 
between 1941 and 1953 has been remarked by many scholars. In particular, social historians 
have studied how the war affected social cohesion, political values, and the relationship between 
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the government and the populace.
91
 Noting that the war veterans returned with a strong sense of 
entitlement to state welfare in return for military service, Mark Edele has contended that their 
material expectations were frustrated and their hopes for a better post-war life remained 
unfulfilled by a sluggish state welfare system. There were not enough resources and the state 
opted for a repressive rather than helpful role towards the veterans.
92
 In terms of the war’s 
impact on the around 2.5 million war veterans who were recognized as disabled,
93
 scholars have 
so far investigated issues such as the limited availability of housing facilities for them and the 
harsh demands of the post-war economy on their labor force. For instance, Elena Zubkova, Beate 
Fieseler, and Donald Filtzer have contended that the post-war policies ultimately neglected and 
even inflicted deprivation and repression upon the disabled veterans. As a result of poverty, 
exhaustion, and discrimination, the war disabled remained a tame and disillusioned group.
94
 
More recently, Claire Shaw has nuanced this argument by confirming “a certain passivity” in the 
deaf post-war community, but also showing a tension between this “passivity” and the “desire 
for autonomy and ‘normality’.”95  
Shaw’s observation applies to the blind post-war community as well. In the context of 
general grimness and poverty of the immediate post-war years, a new cohort of activists entered 
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the ranks of VOS and from within this organization struggled to create a discourse that 
challenged their status as physically disabled and therefore marginalized individuals. These new 
activists were blinded veterans who searched for ways to interpret the devastation wrought upon 
their physical abilities by the experience of the war. They turned their injury into a chance to 
reflect on their social alienation and an opportunity to create a new sphere of advocacy. Despair 
and bitterness were a response to disability that these men could not afford to maintain for long 
periods. Indeed, both material and ideological reasons compelled them – as they did with their 
predecessors – to reject invalidism, overcome disability, and kindle renewed hopes for 
integration and happiness through labor.
 96
  
The blinded and deafened veterans who chose to join VOS and VOG and engage in 
disability advocacy had a definite moral authority over the other members of the two societies 
because they had laid down their able-bodied-ness in acts of bravery during the wartime. This 
gave them an elevated status within the two organizations and made their views hard to 
undermine. From their positions of moral leadership, these disabled veterans changed the 
understanding of the right to be helped that existed in their communities.
97
 They no longer 
simply claimed the right to work for blind and deaf-mute people, but also stressed the importance 
of giving non-economic supports to the Soviet disabled. Their new emphasis on the emotional 
needs of the disabled combined with the long-standing discourse of help as trudoustroistvo and 
significantly reshaped the productivist obsession of the 1930s. The personal psychological 
balance of the disabled came to acquire new importance and now flanked labor, the denial of 
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invalidism, and the transcendence of disability in defining the right to be helped of blind and 
deaf-mute people. 
While Soviet deafened veterans and their struggles to come to terms with disability have 
been explored in some detail by Claire Shaw, in the following pages I will investigate the post-
war changes in the notion of the right to be helped that were brought about by the so-called 
“blind-of-war” (voennooslepshie). Apart from the fact that blinded veterans-activists have 
received less attention in historiography, I selected them for a number of other reasons. First, 
men who became visually impaired as a result of military injuries constituted a larger portion of 
the Soviet invalids of war than the acoustically impaired.
98
 Second, welfare policies to alleviate 
visual impairment caused by military conflict had a longer and stronger history than assistance to 
the soldiers deafened by war injuries. This was related both to the larger number of blinded 
versus deafened veterans and to the greater respectability that blindness enjoyed in terms of 
popular attitudes.
99
 Finally, since blindness (in comparison with deafness and some forms of 
dismemberment) precludes physical work in a more significant way, it provides a crucial testing 
ground to probe into the post-war activists’ discourse of enabling and transformative labor. 
The issue of help to the blind-of-war was first raised during the Russo-Finnish war of 
1939-1940, when the provision of assistance to this category of veterans was entrusted to the 
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Military-Medical Commission of the Leningrad Military District. In collaboration with the 
Department of Defectology of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute, this agency elaborated a 
detailed plan of welfare and rehabilitation activities. In the military hospitals, the blind-of-war 
were taught to read and write in Braille alphabet. However, in line with the understanding of help 
as job placement that had been promoted in the pre-war years by the Narkomsobes as well as by 
VOS activists, the plan of the Leningrad Military-Medical Commission and the Department of 
Defectology put a definite emphasis on the blinded veterans’ return to productive labor.   
At the very outbreak of WWII, the Narkomsobes, VOS, and the Central Military Organ 
of Health Care (Glavvoensanupr) issued a series of directives which were characterized by a 
definite urgency in assisting the blind-of-war, but did not propose anything substantially new in 
the articulation of relief policies for this population. In August-September 1941, several 
documents mandated immediate and maximal outreach to this category of blind. “All their needs, 
all their demands…we need to solve them before they ask for their resolution,” stated a 
representative of the Narkomsobes.
100
 Local VOS cells were required to get in touch with 
military hospitals and calculate how many blind soldiers were being treated in them. Every 
soldier who lost his sight in battle had to be informed about the relief work performed by VOS 
and promptly recruited in the Society’s ranks. VOS activists were instructed to teach Braille to 
the blinded soldiers, providing them with paper, writing devices, and literature in this alphabet. 
In addition, local VOS sections were asked to engage in the vocational training and job 
placement of the blind-of-war through their UPMs. Circular letters coming from the central 
organs of VOS recommended training in simple occupations based on concrete opportunities of 
future employment in the job market. They also repeated the mantra that employment had to be 
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guaranteed within state and cooperative enterprises.
101
  
However, in October 1943, a VOS Plenum stated that work with the invalids of war 
should be a new type of social assistance, different from the activities so far conducted with the 
Society’s members. One of the key novelties was in the “affection” with which to approach the 
“new comrades.” For instance, an activist ordered: “create for them such an atmosphere that 
would immediately turn them away from self-destruction…and toward a new style of life.”102 
The passage from able-bodied-ness to blindness was recognized as a complex psychological 
process during which the blinded person needed to be helped. Some participants of this Plenum 
knew very well this condition, since they were experiencing it. As one of them said, “I know it 
from my own experience. I suffered not one but many years. But, finally, thanks to the fact that I 
felt among comrades…I could go from a seeing style of life to a non-seeing one.”103 When the 
blind-of-war joined VOS, they brought with them their pre-war and wartime life experiences and 
created contents and forms of activity that significantly changed the disability advocacy of the 
mid-1940s.  
The logic articulated by the “new comrades” was in perfect agreement with what VOS 
activists had been preaching in the preceding decades. As the Chairman of the Moscow city 
section of VOS, Ivan Fedorovich Glazykin, argued at the 1943 Plenum, “because our comrades 
lost one organ which is fundamental for working…, because they need to acquire a trade, it is 
necessary to organize help for them.”104 As this quotation clearly reveals, the new activists did 
not dispute the old lore that help on behalf of the blind is motivated by the loss of working ability 
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and the need to restore it through a new occupation. Nor did they oppose close management and 
control from above. However, they strongly re-oriented the vector of help towards the blind 
themselves. While at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Deaf-Mute in 1931 the disabled 
were asked to “help the state build socialism at a Bolshevik pace,”105 at the VOS Plenum of 1943 
the activists lay the duty to help squarely on the state and its official welfare organs: “the 
provision of help to the invalids of war…is our duty because…we can be useful to them.”106 
Comparing the productive enterprises of VOS with the cooperatives run by other invalid groups, 
Glazyk wondered: “what about us, are we only step-children? Are we worse than these people? 
Don’t we also need encouraging measures? Don’t we also need those rights that are given to all 
citizens?”107 With this string of rhetorical questions Glazyk touched on three key points in the 
definition of the disabled’s right to be helped: 1) blind people are not worse than any other 
Soviet person; 2) they need help (here phrased as “encouraging measures”); and 3) they need and 
want the same rights that are granted to all the other Soviet citizens. This chain of thought is 
reminiscent of the advocacy championed by the disabled activists of the early 1920s.  
While an enabling conceptualization of the disabled’s work was not new, the claim about 
the blind’s working capacities acquired a different valence when applied to the blind-of-war as 
opposed to those handicapped at birth or maimed by peacetime accident. The blinded veterans 
were young men who had received education and professional training as able-bodied persons 
before the war. In addition, as they averred, the wartime experience had provided them with a 
special resourcefulness. As a result, the blind-of-war had the potential not only to turn into good 
workers, but even to be carriers of kul’turnost’ to the kolkhoz and the factories, real authority 
                                                          
105
 GARF, f. 511, o. 1, d. 18, l. 15. 
106
 This phrase was pronounced by I.G. Trutnev, a VOS activist from Kuibyshev. GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 347, l. 17. 
107
 Ibid. 
155 
 
figures for their villages and hometowns.
108
 As the activist Sysoev put it, the blind-of-war “are 
the best men in the factory…With weapons in their hands they defended our Country. In the 
same manner, they provide examples of labor enthusiasm.”109 In short, economic well-being and 
a full-fledged social life appeared more accessible to the blind-of-war than to the blind civilians. 
For the ex-servicemen, it was allegedly easier to transcend blindness and the exclusion that came 
with it. 
Another major difference with the disability advocacy of the decades before the war was 
a new attention to the theme of sexual relations as a source of happiness and love for young 
disabled men. While family life did not appear as a major concern in the discussions of the 
1930s, now VOS activists brought family issues to the fore and strove to convince the blind-of-
war that return to work would have also meant return to a happy private life. Indeed, married 
blind-of-war were profoundly worried by family issues, because experience was showing that the 
emergence of blindness caused many marriages to fall apart. Their concerns soon extended to the 
unmarried former soldiers as well as to the civilian blind. The blind-of-war Aleksandr Malyshev 
gave voice to a shared preoccupation: “many are ashamed of their injury and believe that it is 
impossible to meet a woman in these conditions.”110 An activist attempted to cheer up by saying, 
“many comrades got married. This, in reality, has nothing to do with our discussion. However, 
when a comrade builds a family, he does not care anymore about his blindness and becomes 
active.”111 This rather awkward comment reveals the priorities of the new cohort of activists: to 
stop being worried about their blindness, find a job, and get married. This set of aspirations was 
often captured by the phrase “feeling alive.” Help meant to return working abilities to the blind-
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of-war, but also “the ability to laugh, joke, enjoy…”112 The words zhit’ (to live) and trudit’sia (to 
work) were constantly paired in activists’ texts of the post-WWII years, revealing that job 
placement was more than ever understood as finding a place in life. Tellingly, the word 
trudoustroistvo was at times replaced by the term zhizneustroistvo, that is the idea of settling 
both in the professional and private spheres of one’s life.113  
The Return of the Blinded to Professional Life was the title of a 1946 best-seller written 
by the ophthalmologist Boris Kovalenko.
114
 In this work, Kovalenko (himself a blind man) 
argued that there was no reason to regard blind individuals as permanently excluded from the 
ranks of life. Being a doctor as well as an activist, he grounded his argumentation in modern 
science. He insisted that special pedagogical methods and technologies of blind rehabilitation 
replace both the superstitious fear and the compassion that able-bodied people feel towards the 
blind. Thanks to science, the blind can study and work on a par with the visually unimpaired, and 
this provides for a full-fledged life.
115
 Kovalenko did not celebrate labor per se or in view of any 
specific economic or political exigency, but rather because he believed it to be the means that 
made human life worth living. Although his discourse operated within the hegemonic socialist 
construction of labor, it also denied the exclusive focus on production of the 1930s and 
fundamentally re-humanized labor. 
The attention to the human component of labor is evident in the “conversations” that 
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doctors, specialized pedagogues, and VOS activists were asked to have with the blind-of-war.   
These conversations were to be conducted already in the military hospitals; they focused on the 
educational and professional opportunities that were available to blinded veterans and had the 
goal to dissuade them from seeking charity – a practice that would have led them to apathy and 
fatalism. Rather, these dialogues had to inspire courage and give moral support to men who had 
become suddenly blind. False hopes on the re-acquisition of vision were to be avoided: “the 
blind-of-war should know the truth in order to step on the right path,” wrote Kovalenko.116 And 
yet, the truth was not revealed immediately, but gradually: at each new meeting, the doctor 
talked about the loss of sight in a more definite manner, carefully selecting his words and 
employing the right intonation (“avoid hurried talk, and rather wait for the reactions and answers 
of the blind, pay attention to his face,” wrote Kovalenko117). Most importantly, this process was 
supposed to reveal to the blinded veterans that they still had many opportunities for a full-
fledged life.  
The communicative approach entailed in these conversations was directed at infusing 
courage in the depressed and more introverted among the blind-of-war. The pedagogues wanted 
to mobilize all the energies of these former soldiers to fight against the consequences of 
blindness. The discovery of truth should not lead to anxiety, a sense of desperation, and 
hopelessness. To the contrary, a properly conducted conversation was supposed to give a new 
life to the blind. The disability advocacy of the post-war years paid attention to the mood of the 
blind-of-war and to the issues that touched their intimate lives in a new way. Depression and 
loneliness, what worried and what brought joy to the blind, their painful desire to see, and all 
their emotions were given great consideration. While feelings such as “deep humiliation,” 
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“anxiety,” “the sense of self-commiseration,” and “shyness” were criticized as provoking 
“fruitless sad thoughts,” the activists’ discourse and practice of help encouraged confidence and 
awareness of one's usefulness for the collectivity. As an activist recommended, “Say it loud that 
you are not lost people, that you are the best people, useful to the country.”118  
After discharge from the military hospitals, the blind-of-war could go to boarding homes 
for the disabled, special residencies for the blind, or back to their families. Kovalenko contended 
that the invalid homes were a dangerous place for the blind-of-war and recommended that the 
local Narkomsobes organs place there only those rare individuals who could neither go back to 
their old jobs nor be professionally re-trained. Sanatoria for recovering blind-of-war were 
equally dangerous, since forced inaction was the number one enemy of every blind. Kovalenko 
argued that to put blind people in shelters in order to provide them with “rest” was in fact 
nefarious for the disabled themselves. Those who started with this “rest,” averred Kovalenko, 
frequently turned into “invalids” who would constantly need care and be painfully dissatisfied 
with their lives. “This happens,” wrote Kovalenko “because [the shelters] do not create the 
conditions for work, which they [i.e. the blind-of-war] need above all.”119 
Labor alleviated suffering by distracting the disabled’s thoughts from their sight.120 It 
helped the disabled “overcome all sorts of difficulties, believe in their strength, and earn the 
respect of those surrounding them.”121 Kovalenko considered it crucial that each disabled worked 
at his/her full potential, “otherwise people go to pieces, gradually become wrapped in the mold 
of ‘invalidism,’ lose faith in their strength, begin to expect and demand ‘concessions for their 
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blindness’….”122 Indeed, blind activists did not demand special indulgences or concessions, but 
rather wanted to occupy a place in the common social order. Their slogan “together with 
everybody and on par with everybody” (vmeste so vsemi i naravne so vsemi) aimed at integrating 
the disabled in the regular life led by the able-bodied.
123
 The blind-of-war had to be given a job 
because “in the Soviet state everybody…is a full-fledged person…with the right to have a place 
in life.”124 
In sum, disabled activists continued to tap into the socialist ethos of work throughout the 
early Soviet and Stalinist experience. However, while there is a definite continuity in their 
conceptualization of help as job placement from the early 1920s throughout the 1930s and 1940s, 
the Second World War contributed to shift attention from the fulfillment of production quotas 
back to the emotional state of the disabled as an important component of their right to be helped.  
3.4 Rejecting help as trudoustroistvo 
Some blind and deaf-mute individuals resisted the hegemonic discourse of enabling 
labor. They refused to become members of VOS and VOG because they were reluctant to 
believe the activists’ ephemeral promises of education and job placement. They rather opted for 
a life of begging, fortune-telling, public singing, and postcard-selling on trains and open-air 
markets.
125
 Narkomsobes administrators and disabled activists called them “loafers who love 
easy income” and “drunken hooligans.”126 Most of them did not leave any written record, but 
they sometimes poked their heads in the official documentation of various Soviet agencies. Their 
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attitudes to employment as a form of help are difficult to gauge, since their practices and 
narratives of help are almost always refracted through the words of the social activists. And yet 
they let us imagine a notion of the right to be helped that differed from that of Narkomsobes 
workers, VOS and VOG activists, and these societies’ conscientious members. 
In 1940, for instance, the Moscow city section of VOS reported to the police a number of 
blind men and women who had refused to register with VOS. Among them was Nikolai 
Alekseevich Timoshkin, a blind fortune teller in his late thirties who had tried to convince some 
VOS members to stop working and start making a living by fortune telling on the streets. His 
main argument was that, as blind men, they could make up to 100 rubles a day with this activity. 
Anna Ivanovna Kalinina (born in 1910) was a blind single mother, who made a living by “going 
around stores” and selling fabric. The blind woman Agrippina Shilkina was another Moscow 
fortune teller, while the blind man V.E. Golovanov lived outside of the city in his own dacha and 
made a living by begging on trains. According to the people who handled these cases, none of 
these men and women wanted to work and, even when offered several jobs, they rejected them, 
wishing only to live in poverty and engage in unproductive activities outside of the colective.
127
 
In all actuality, these statements tell us little about the desires of the individuals whom 
they maintained to describe. They rather speak to the motivations and aspirations of people who 
looked down at them from the self-righteous position of VOS and VOG activists. Descriptions of 
unemployed disabled men and women who refused to join VOS and VOG leave us with many 
open questions. Did these “loafers” and “drunken hooligans” really reject job offers? Or was this 
narrative an easy explanation that the activists concocted to cover up their own failure at 
providing help through employment? Perhaps they were offered jobs that no one would possibly 
                                                          
127
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 75, l. 4. 
161 
 
want to perform. Was their motivation for refusing a job really the desire to be poor? Did they 
rather engage in fortune telling because this activity carried with it a promise of mobility, 
adventure, and freedom from the constraints of regular employment? Or were “speculating in 
fabrics” and begging the only options left because in reality there was no better job for them out 
there?  
Blinded war veterans were not immune from the temptation to reject the notion of help as 
trudoustroistvo. In the courses that Boris Kovalenko organized in Perm’ between 1941 and 1946 
to prepare the blind-of-war for admission to institutes of higher education, disabled ex-
servicemen often violated the school discipline.
128
 They skipped classes, were late, did not do the 
homework, and did not participate in the class discussions.
129
 The activist Malyshev remembered 
some cases of “hooliganism and debauchery” among the blind students attending Kovalenko's 
course and admitted that “not all our comrades distinguished themselves by their loyalty.”130 
G.N. Vishnev was caught cheating several times; V.F. Omel’ianenko was expelled from the 
courses because of his systematic failures in the exams and because he skipped many classes 
without any reason; M.M. Trapitsyn, V.A. Lebedev, and I.N. Iurchenko had insufficient grades; 
I.E. Kozhushkin was often singled out for “clear infractions of the discipline,” as he liked to go 
to the bathhouse instead of attending classes.
131
 Simply put, some blinded veterans studied and 
worked only if forced.  
These violations of the work discipline threatened VOS and VOG activists’ aspiration to 
integrate the blind and deaf-mute into the imagined community of disciplined, hardworking 
Soviet people. Striving to counter what they perceived to be dark, irrational, and destructive 
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desires, VOS and VOG reported inveterate beggars to the Office of the Procurator, went to court 
against them, and demanded harsh punishments because – as an activist said at the VOG Plenum 
of September 1943 – their behavior “dishonors the name of Soviet citizen.”132  
Conclusion 
In chapter 1, we saw that the right to be helped of Soviet individuals who deviated from 
an imagined norm of physical and social fitness was often legitimized by the category of 
labor/contributions to the collective. Indeed, as we observed in chapter 2, the defectologists 
claimed that morally defective children should receive state help because they had the potential 
for future contributions (if transformed by the powers of science). In this chapter, I have shown 
that, for VOS and VOG activists, disabled people’s capacity to work was the key category 
legitimizing their right to be helped as integral member of Soviet society and job placement was 
the most important practical tool to realize this right. Deconstructing the century-long 
representation of the disabled as useless individuals weighing as a burden on the rest of society, 
VOS and VOG activists attempted to create opportunities for employing the Soviet disabled 
labor force. The emphasis of their disability advocacy was on the fact that the blind and the deaf-
mute could and should work together with the able-bodied and thereby participate in the 
construction of the communist society. In asking Soviet authorities to help them realize their 
right to work, VOS and VOG activists claimed recognition as willing and able hands at the 
service of the Soviet collectivity. In their view, even those who were perceived as the most 
backward could become fellow travelers on the road to socialism. From integration through labor 
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derived not only a sense of economic independence, but also a personal gratification that would 
have ultimately led the blind and deaf-mute to happiness. Even at the high peak of the Stalinist 
industrialization, when the mandate to fulfill production quotas seemed to completely obscure 
the right to work of blind and deaf-mute people, VOS and VOG activists presented the 
involvement of their constituencies in the country’s big industries as a way of integration into 
Soviet life.  
The conceptualization of the disabled’s right to be helped as right to work was an 
enabling discourse that met the desire for integration felt by VOS and VOG disabled activists. At 
the same time, this construction of the right to be helped ordered and channeled their desires by 
contending that integration and happiness could be realized only through discipline. While 
empowering, because it emphasized the abilities of blind and deaf-mute people, the emphasis on 
the transformative power of work fit well with the authorities’ disciplining project and the need 
to create subjects loyal to communism and its ethos of labor. 
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Chapter 4 
Gender: 
Ommlad’s Regime of Care for Single Mothers 
“Every woman has the right to go through a school of motherhood, where every mother – under 
the direction of a doctor – can learn to feed her baby and take care of him.”1 
 
“The most helpless” among the students attending Kovalenko’s rehabilitation courses for 
blinded veterans was a woman called Galina Vasil’evna. She had lost one eye before the war and 
then became completely blind during the wartime. Although she put a lot of effort in her 
rehabilitation, she was never able to be as independent and self-confident as her male fellow 
students and had a much harder time overcoming her fears. Indeed, Galia – as the woman was 
affectionately called – was afraid of walking in the city alone and demanded to be accompanied 
everywhere by Vasilii Shumilov, himself a blind student attending the courses.
2
 While Galia was 
in constant need of help, the able-bodied women of Perm’ were important sources of assistance 
for the blinded men undergoing rehabilitation in that city. As the blind memoirist Aleksandr 
Malyshev recalled, the female students of the Perm’ Pedagogical Institute helped the blinded ex-
servicemen do their laundry and fix their clothes. They also went to the movies and to theater 
performances with them. One day, for instance, Malyshev heard “a happy noisy crowd moving 
towards the theater wardrobe.” 
In the crowd were also my veteran friends. Many of them were there with their 
girlfriends. Without a word, the girls would run to the wardrobe first, take off the coats 
and help us, men…With the years, the girls’ gesture became for me something 
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conceptually bigger than a simple show of attention or care. It merged with the image of 
our faithful girlfriends, willingly taking upon themselves an uneasy burden and carrying 
it until the end of their lives.
3
  
Malyshev further explained that Soviet women’s help to the blinded veterans was motivated not 
by compassion, but by an all-female sense of loyalty and self-sacrifice.  
The two images of the helpless blind Galia and the helpful “girls” in the theater highlight 
a complex relationship between understandings of help, disability, and gender. They reveal that 
all single women – no matter whether disabled or able-bodied – were in a certain sense 
“defective” because they lacked a male breadwinner. The disabled Galia needed to be walked 
everywhere by Vasilii and the able-bodied female students could not go alone to the movies. 
Their position of need as women without men mandated the special solicitude of a male 
individual – such as a husband, a doctor, a pedagogue, a social worker – or a state agency. These 
images also show that Soviet women were intimately associated with the provision of help and 
often played the role of saviors of their fellow citizens. However, the help that came from 
women did not indicated the care of the strong for the weak, but rather symbolized loyalty, duty, 
self-sacrifice, kindheartedness, hard work, and subjection to discipline.
4
 Thus, in relation to 
Soviet societal models, single women embodied both need and labor. Both notions informed the 
socialist regime of care towards them and legitimized their right to be helped in often 
contradictory ways. Indeed, this combination of need and labor was undergirded by deep-rooted 
patriarchal views of gender which granted Soviet single women both strong entitlement and 
profound marginalization. 
                                                          
3
 Ibid., Vechernaia Perm’, 13 March 1981, 3. 
4
 Lynne Attwood has analyzed how hard work had to be interwoven with more traditionally feminine traits and roles 
by looking at representations of women-workers and women-mothers in the journals Rabotnitsa and Krest’ianka. 
See her “Rationality versus Romanticism: Representations of Women in the Stalinist Press,” in Gender in Russian 
History and Culture, Linda Edmondson, ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 158-176.   
166 
 
A model of womanhood that constructs women as particularly vulnerable, while also 
exalting their nurturing nature, caretaking proclivities, self-abnegation, and ability to make 
sacrifices for the collective is not unique to the Soviet Union. However, while Soviet conceptions 
and policies of women’s care echoed those of other world powers and individual reformers, the 
application of these ideas conformed to specifically Soviet concepts of citizens’ duties and state 
imperatives.
5
 What made the Soviet case different was the way in which the helpless female 
recipient of help and the good female helper related not simply to the male wage earner or the 
doctor, but ultimately to the Stalinist state as the key source of well-being. Single women 
represented the helpless subjects who could nonetheless overcome their defectiveness through 
loyalty to the state and self-sacrifice and hard work on behalf of the collectivity. This ambiguity 
of being both the rightful petitioner for state help and the dutiful supporter of the state in all its 
endeavors lay at the core of the Soviet right to be helped.  
Female celibacy and especially single motherhood tend to become the object of 
widespread concern at times of change, when traditional understandings of gender clash with 
shifts in social relations.
6
 In post-revolutionary Russia, unmarried mothers were indeed at the 
epicenter of a crisis of sexuality and gender that had multiple implications. The experiences of 
the Revolution, the civil war, and the transition to the NEP had caused a higher rate of female 
unemployment, the growth of prostitution, the increase of venereal disease, and momentous 
changes and great insecurity in the reproductive and sexual lives of Soviet women.
7
 To counter 
the economic effects of war, famine, disease, and malnutrition on its female population, but also 
to respond to the pervasive feelings of chaos, social upheaval, and instability in gender relations, 
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the Soviet state instituted a special Department for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy 
(Otdel Okhrany Materinstva i Mladenchestva or Ommlad). The activists and doctors working in 
it developed a program called “school of motherhood” (shkola materinstva), a body of health 
information, advice, and practical assistance providing a blueprint of socialist help to single 
mothers. Establishing a model of reproductive conduct and shaping motherly behavior, the 
school of motherhood was of great import to the Soviet project of re-educating the entire 
population and wholly remaking reality.
8
 It also nicely fit with the humanitarian motives 
informing the Soviet right to be helped. 
Analyzing Ommlad’s discourse and practice of help to single mothers between 1918 and 
1950, this chapter also offers a contribution to the periodization of Soviet gender history. 
Supporters of the so-called Great Retreat model have contended that Stalin’s consolidation of 
power in the late 1920s-early 1930s involved the assertion of what are understood to be 
traditional gender values, especially pro-natalism and a decidedly non-egalitarian family 
structure.
9
 In line with scholars who have called into question this paradigm,
10
 I argue that the 
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shift to traditional gender values was not a radical novelty of the Stalinist revolution because it 
had been facilitated by developments in the conceptualization of gender that characterized the 
previous decade. The case of single mothers reveals that many gender norms that are usually 
associated in historiography with the 1930s were in fact already advanced in the 1920s. In other 
words, I would suggest that a common legacy of attitudes towards lonely women and single 
mothers underlie the first three decades of Soviet rule, from the Revolution to the immediate 
post-WWII years. In addition, by remarking that reproductive and parental advice as well as 
practical help to single mothers had a rigid and proscriptive nature from its very inception in 
1918, I strive to nuance the standard assessment of the 1920s as an age of gender 
experimentation. Single motherhood was always already tinted by a range of assumptions 
originating in women’s supposed helplessness and in traditional gender concepts. This coloring 
underpinned single women’s right to be helped throughout the early Soviet and Stalinist 
experience. 
While the traditional gender ideas that promoted help to single mothers in the 1920s 
continued to encourage assistance to this social group in the 1930s and 1940s, the forms of care 
and control implemented by Ommlad did undergo some changes. Elizabeth Waters has argued 
that “relationships of mothering remained unchanged; it was their political context that 
underwent restructuring.”11 Initially, Ommlad-affiliated figures viewed single motherhood 
primarily as an issue of health closely related to the problem of child mortality and posited lonely 
women’s right to be helped as a gynecological question. In reality, medical images of the “single 
mother” provided doctors with an accessible way to discuss the social organization of gender. 
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Under the pretention of confining themselves to passing judgment on purely medical matters, 
doctors and activists were able to address moral, ethical, and social issues which structured both 
male and female gender roles.
12
 By the late 1920s, when health concerns became subordinated to 
the goals of production, the issue of help to single women stopped receiving a primarily medical 
response.
13
 Intrusive gynecological controls over women’s reproductive abilities began to be 
flanked by the equally invasive regulation of their productive skills. Productionist and medical 
discourses became interconnected and focused on both the productivity and re-productivity of 
single women. In light of the party’s ambitious plans for industrialization, single women’s labor 
had to intensify in both spheres.
14
 Only in the post-WWII years, the upheavals and diseases of 
wartime would prompt again Ommlad to broach single women’s right to be helped from a 
stronger medical – and often narrowly gynecological – standpoint.    
In the chain of help described in the writings of Ommlad activists, everybody had a clear 
role and occupied a well-defined hierarchical position: single women were the helpless receivers 
of aid; female social workers channeled state assistance to them and appeared as the “good 
helpers” of a doctor that was always discursively cast male; physicians, higher-up administrators, 
policymakers, and political leaders were at the head of this chain of help and stood for the state 
as the ultimate male breadwinner and provider of help. In the last section of this chapter, my 
analysis of the discursive representation of various female providers of help will reveal that the 
hierarchies of Soviet women’s activism reproduced the original dichotomy between the helpless 
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and the good helper upon which Soviet womanhood was premised. Women who did not score 
high on the patriarchal gender scale found their own others – ruder, darker, more backward, 
ignorant, and undisciplined. At the top of the hierarchy, Ommlad women-activists exemplified a 
new model of womanhood, which was intrinsically affiliated with the Soviet state.
15
 The 
discipline and loyalty implied by the connection with the state distinguished Ommlad female 
leaders from other models of womanhood and allowed them to overcome the status of helpless 
backward women.
16
  
4.1 The emergence of Ommlad and its conceptual framework 
The Russian post-revolutionary government did not wait long before elaborating the 
basic legal principles of social care for its female population. Among the most significant and 
long-lasting policies of this period was the Sovnarkom decree no. 117, dated June 1, 1919, which 
mandated the provision of monetary subsidies or help in nature to all pregnant female workers 
and women who had just delivered. Circulating the decree, the Narkomtrud accompanied it with 
a “List of rules for the provision of subsidies and pensions to workers” – an instructive document 
that proved to be widely used in the practice of local Narkomsobes offices. In Section 3, on 
assistance to pregnant women and new mothers, article 13 specified to whom the right to 
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maternity subsidies was to be granted: all women employed in state, nationalized, private, and 
public institutions and enterprises, independently from the nature of their work and from their 
working seniority; all women who were officially registered as unemployed at the labor 
exchange (birzha truda); and all women who were recognized as disabled. Art. 23 added insured 
workers’ wives to this list.17  
As this decree reveals, the social insurance law that was drafted immediately after the 
Revolution foresaw widespread assistance to women as mothers. In the difficult years of the civil 
war, a series of legislative acts re-affirmed priority in the provision of foodstuffs to all pregnant 
and breast-feeding women and established a special subsidy for the purchase of objects of care 
and food for newborn children. In addition, pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers were 
granted priority to medical help and protected from job layoffs.
18
  
To implement this legislation, various local Narkomsobes sections provided uninsured 
pregnant women and new mothers with a special food card that gave them priority access to a 
series of key products. Unfortunately, when women tried to use their special cards, the local 
organs of food distribution often denied them the products they had been entitled to by the 
Narkomsobes. Commenting on this situation, the Perm’ section of the People’s Commissariat of 
Control contended that pregnant women and new mothers were “unable to personally defend 
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themselves from the unjust actions [of local administrators] and to claim their rights.”19 Although 
endowed with the same rights as all the other citizens, Soviet women were not ready to rationally 
defend themselves and stand up for their rights precisely due to their pregnant condition, their 
female nature, and their lack of kul’turnost.  
To defend dark women and check on the correct implementation of Soviet laws for the 
protection of motherhood, the Bolshevik government established a number of state and party 
organizations. The most prominent – and most studied – among them was the Commission for 
the Improvement of the Work and Life of Women (hereafter Zhenotdel). Its main goals were to 
guarantee complete legal equality and independent productive labor to Soviet women. Women 
living in “backward” Soviet republics (especially in the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan) or belonging to ethnical minorities (such as Chinese and Korean women) were 
at the center of this organ’s legislative efforts. Economic support to unemployed women was not 
considered the primary competence of the Zhenotdel. Quite to the contrary, it was believed that 
so-called “socio-legal help” distracted activists from the fundamental tasks of political and 
cultural education of the non-Russian female population. Local Zhenotdel sections were often 
criticized for engaging in sotsbytovshchina, i.e. the mundane provision of material help that went 
to the detriment of the more important political work.
20
 In other words, the Zhenotdel had no 
official interest in questions of uninsured women’s rights to social assistance.21  
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Ommlad, instead, put issues of unemployed and lonely women’s everyday life at the 
center of its attention from the very beginning of its activities. The reason for this difference 
could have been in the fact that this agency operated within the administrative structure of the 
Narkomsobes.
22
 It officially started to work on January 1, 1918, and slowly took under its 
jurisdiction all former tsarist organizations that dealt with the protection of mothers and infants.
23
 
Ommlad’s main goal was formulated as providing Soviet women with an “all-inclusive” 
assistance that would have helped them perform their social functions – namely, delivering and 
raising children.
24
 To accomplish the “social protection of motherhood,” Ommlad chose to move 
into three main directions: 1) legislative work directed at defending pregnant women and breast-
feeding mothers; 2) education on issues of maternity and child care; and 3) organization of 
special facilities where mothers could be practically helped and “rational” baby-care concretely 
implemented.
25
  
The Narkomsobes Commissar A. Vinokurov described Ommlad’s responsibilities in a 
directive addressed to local social welfare sections. First of all, this department had to organize 
consultation points for pregnant women, milk-stations for newborn babies, Homes for Mother 
and Child, nurseries, shelters for abandoned newborn babies, free canteens for pregnant women 
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and breast-feeding mothers, and a system of patronage including home visitations. Second, it 
needed to train qualified social workers, assign them to all these facilities, and regularly check on 
their work. Ommlad was also supposed to help Soviet mothers by distributing foodstuffs and 
cash to buy objects of primary necessity for the care of newborn children. This agency was 
required to elaborate policies of labor protection and check on their implementation in 
collaboration with the Department of Labor Inspection. Finally, Ommlad had to conduct the 
usual “cultural-enlightenment work” among Soviet women.26 In the first two years of its 
existence Ommlad oriented its work mainly at the provision of material assistance to pregnant 
women and breast-feeding mothers in the form of monetary subsidies and help in nature.  
Then, in June 1920, Ommlad was moved from the Narkomsobes to the Narkomzdrav. 
The former organ was criticized for having framed the defense of motherhood simply as 
economic aid to needy women. Soviet administrators now contended that the provision of 
subsidies was a “dispersion of means, which does not give any help to mothers, because the 
money goes in the general family budget.”27 Narkomzdrav instead could have given Ommlad “a 
correct medical organization.” Doctors – it was argued – could determine monetary subsidies 
better than simple social workers, because they could calculate the due date of a pregnancy and 
therefore better understand when financial help was indeed needed.
28
 At Ommlad’s All-Russian 
Meeting on December 1, 1920, the Department’s chair Vera Pavlovna Lebedeva proposed that 
all Ommlad facilities be headed by a doctor and include an expert midwife or a nurse familiar 
with the technique of breast-feeding.
29
 Indeed, leadership positions in the various provincial, 
district, city, and neighborhood sections of Ommlad began to be assigned almost exclusively to 
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medical professionals. Only the nuts-and-bolts administration and daily economic management 
of single facilities were entrusted to individuals with non-medical background, such as 
pedagogues, Narkomsobes employees, and Zhenotdel members. This change in institutional 
jurisdiction and personnel modified the content of Ommlad’s work by introducing a heightened 
attention to medical issues.
30
   
Their professional qualifications notwithstanding, most Ommlad activists were convinced 
that the best form of help to Soviet women – especially the unmarried ones – was assistance in 
the field of motherhood. In their view, Ommlad had to cover all aspects of “lived motherhood” 
and “function as a defender (zashchitnik) when the interests of a mother were infringed.”31 
Indeed, the image of women as mothers pervaded Soviet law, policy, and culture. It found 
dominant expression in the political iconography, legislation, policy-making, and socialization 
efforts of the 1920s, which reinforced the notion that child care was an exclusively female 
domain.
32
 In line with this, Ommlad was imagined as helping single women by solving their 
medical and housing problems as mothers. At the same time, Ommlad activists emphasized that 
single motherhood was a social, rather than a private domestic matter. They looked at the single 
woman-mother (odinokaia zhenshchina-mat’) as a “social unit” and as “part of a class” which 
was entitled to participate in productive labor and “the construction of the new Soviet life” 
without renouncing motherhood.
33
 As a 1923 slogan proclaimed, “by protecting the woman-
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mother we give her the opportunity to reconcile motherhood and socially useful work.”34 Thus, 
while Ommlad activists perpetuated the image of woman as mother and their discourse 
constructed single women’s problems through a narrow lens focused on reproduction, they also 
strove to define a new relationship between wage labor and motherhood as non-mutually 
exclusive fields of female activity.  
Ommlad’s special investment in helping needy single mothers is not surprising. The 1918 
Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship had legalized divorce and made it easily 
obtainable. As a result, the divorce rate had increased markedly. Historian Wendy Goldman has 
explained that the socialist vision of free union embodied in the Code ended up having negative 
consequences for many women who were abandoned by their husbands without any means of 
support. The weakness of the marital tie, the ease of divorce, and the freedom of marital relations 
worked to women’s disadvantage in creating a mass of single women who carried the burden of 
child care alone, without support from their husbands. Many women were in such a dire 
economic position that they could find material relief only by prostituting themselves.
35
 Ommlad 
activists were well aware that these developments were producing a mass of isolated and – in 
their view – helpless mothers.  
In the discourse that Ommlad developed in the early 1920s and continued to promote 
until the late 1940s, single mothers were often called besprizornye. Commonly used for 
orphaned and abandoned minors, when applied to adult women this term functioned as a 
synonym for loneliness and lack of male protection. As much as a besprizornyi rebenok was a 
child deprived of parental care and educational discipline, so a besprizornaia mat’ was a woman 
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without a male breadwinner to care for (and control) her. Single fathers – who in truth 
constituted a much smaller group than the mass of single mothers and were mostly widowed men 
– were never presented as a problem and never called besprizornye, that is they were never 
qualified as lacking protection. Echoes of these gendered representations resounded in the very 
petitions for help written by single mothers and fathers. While the former often evoked 
“orphanhood” (besprizornost’) and “helplessness” (bespomoshchnost’) as categories legitimizing 
their right to be helped, the latter almost never did. Single fathers strongly preferred to indicate 
objective conditions of poverty and to employ the larger moral notion of desperation 
(besvykhodnost’).  
The condition of female orphanhood and neglect was initially seen as “a typical 
phenomenon” of the Russian urban population. The “typical” orphaned mother was a woman 
who had been abandoned by her husband and found herself in a state of need.
36
 Although the 
image of the orphaned mother could equally refer to Russians and non-Russians, urban and rural 
women, it tended to take up different nuances when applied to non-ethnic Russians or to peasant 
women. For instance, the “single Oriental woman” (odinokaia zhenshchina-vostochnitsa) who 
had left her patriarchal household, was considered unable to find a job on her own and 
particularly vulnerable to prostitution: “they don’t hire her anywhere; she is not a member of the 
union; the only income left to her is prostitution.”37 The single peasant woman, especially the 
bedniak woman and the batrachka, was often represented not only as helpless, but also as a 
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fundamentally irresponsible mother who, during the high season of agricultural work, would 
“leave her offspring to the whim of fate.”38   
Grounded in female backwardness and abjection, help to orphaned mothers was 
ultimately a means to protect the future generation of Soviet workers. A series of labor 
regulations formalized the link between single mother’s rights and the campaign against child 
mortality by explicitly defining care during pregnancy as the first step to lower children’s death 
rates at birth. Popular slogans in the mid-1920s ordered: “Attentiveness and care to pregnant 
women! They carry the future generation inside them.” Another slogan solemnly defined “the 
woman-mother” as “a social asset” and “the joy of a working people.”39 Doctors’ and social 
activists’ writings further popularized these ideas.   
In a brochure programmatically entitled The protection of motherhood and how it must be 
realized, a certain Doctor G.L. Grauerman wrote:  
During pregnancy, childbirth, the days after delivery, and the period of breast-feeding, 
the mother and her child…need protection…All mothers…have the right to protection 
(pravo na okhranu), which should be granted to them by the social collective for the 
service that they perform.
40
  
These words point to two interconnected key principles of the Soviet right to be helped. First, 
help was not a form of philanthropy, but a state duty. Second, the right to be helped was also a 
civic duty. In the case of single mothers, this right was granted in exchange for their reproductive 
labor. This meant that they were entitled to free and readily available healthcare, but were also 
responsible before the collective for their sexual and reproductive health as the carriers of the 
next generation of workers. In emphasizing women’s social obligations as mothers, Soviet 
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activists placed upon the state the duty to defend their interests and health, but also compelled 
women to put the needs of the collective before their individual ones. Soviet single women had 
the right and the obligation to contribute to the population growth: depending on their 
reproductive contributions, they were granted the right to receive social assistance and to put 
their children in orphanages; their reproductive performances were also subject to social controls 
and sometimes to outright punishments. 
Like the defectologists and the disability medical experts that we encountered in the 
previous chapters, doctor Grauerman grounded his “rational view of the defense of motherhood” 
and “its economic and social importance”41 in scientific research. Indeed, many doctors-activists 
of the 1920s invoked science to combine pregnancy hygiene with discussions of sexual hygiene 
and, most importantly, to prove that both sexual and reproductive activities made women 
physiologically weaker and more prone to suffering than men. Ommlad advocates often depicted 
the fecund female body as diseased and dangerous. Reproductive health was rare and always 
defined negatively as the absence of a series of sexual diseases.
42
 In their writings and in the 
practical help that Ommlad activists offered to single mothers, there was an implied highly 
gendered connection between sexuality and sickness, whereby promiscuous men actively spread 
disease and helpless women passively suffered from it.  
Historians studying other countries have remarked that medical diagnosis of poor 
women’s ill health defined their deserving status, but also reinforced female dependency and 
undermined women’s efforts at self-sufficiency.43 In Soviet Russia, reproduction gave women 
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the right to be helped, but also turned them into vulnerable creatures. In a letter to the Perm’ 
Narkomsobes section, a certain Doctor K. Zviagin compiled a list of diseases of the female 
sexual apparatus which should excuse women from working duties. He wrote:  
It is rare the woman who has a totally healthy sexual apparatus. The main reasons for this 
are the following: 1) delivery and miscarriages are very often the causes of various 
diseases; 2) the huge spread of gonorrhea among men…is a cause of infection for many 
women and for this reason their whole sexual apparatus is brought to total destruction 
…In addition, if we take into consideration the generally weaker physiology of the 
female organism in comparison to the male one as well as the periodical losses of blood 
(menstruation), which are physiological, but nonetheless are often accompanied by all 
sorts of pain – all this gives grounds to assign women significantly easier demands in the 
area of physical work than those assigned to men. Thus, no heavy physical work…should 
be assigned to women. This should be granted for the sake of saving the health of the 
mothers of the future generation.
44
  
The woman-doctor and activist Evgeniia Anatolevna Balakshina echoed Zviagin by arguing that 
“the ‘normal’ development of a girl’s sexual apparatus, her pregnancy and maternity can happen 
only under the correct conditions of work.”45 And Grauerman added, “poor women who live out 
of their labor should be given the chance to recover their strength after delivery...It is necessary 
to let them rest as much as possible.”46 Again, the level of care provided to single mothers and 
the rate of children’s mortality were seen in a relationship of proportional dependency: rested 
mothers produced healthier babies, while worn out women gave birth to a weak generation. The 
interests of both mother and child were the domain of the doctor.  
In March 1923, a certain Dr. Iakhlakov, the head of a local Narkomzdrav section in the 
Perm’ province, compiled a “plan of work” to tackle “the almost complete ignorance of women 
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concerning issues that closely concern them, such as the defense of children’s and mothers’ 
health, hereditary and acquired diseases, and the problem of infectious diseases that can affect 
the whole family.” Iakhlakov conceived the mother’s body as a habitat for the life and the 
development of the child. Taking women under its tutelage from the very act of conception, 
Ommlad was supposed to “simultaneously observe the life of the pregnant woman and that of the 
fetus, the changes in the organism of the woman together with the development and the growth 
of the fetus.” Additionally, Ommlad had to “show pregnant women a correct way of life for the 
correct development of the fetus.” Eventual diseases in the child (such as rachitic syndrome and 
idiotism) were conceived as consequences of the mother’s incorrect way of feeding. The logical 
conclusion was that Ommlad had to control the life of the mother during pregnancy, after 
delivery, and until the end of the breast-feeding period.
47
 
Similarly, Grauerman insisted that during pregnancy women regularly go to the doctor 
and closely follow his (sic) suggestions and orders. Not only did he define as “ignorant” those 
women who did not go to the doctor for the whole nine months of pregnancy, but also 
threateningly warned them that they would “pay” for their carelessness with their own lives and 
those of their children.
48
 Balakshina agreed that the inability of single mothers to take care of and 
feed their children in the correct way was one of the main causes of the “colossal” death rate of 
children under one year of age.
49
 A report from the mid-1920s linked kul’turnost’ to lower 
mortality rates among newborn children and, as a final result, to the improvement of the national 
economy: “the more cultured the nation, the less mortality in it…and the lower the mortality, the 
more able-bodied workers we will have and more possibilities to achieve the material well-being 
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of the nation.”50 A popular 1923 slogan put it more bluntly: “Ignorance on how to correctly 
breastfeed kills 1.5 million newborns every year. Down with darkness! More knowledge to 
women!”51 Grauerman emphasized that single mothers’ behavior immediately after delivery 
could be very “irrational” and thus necessitated “the unwavering control of the midwife.”52  
In sum, doctors wished to seize child care from women’s hands because they deemed 
single mothers incompetent. To their darkness, ignorance, irrationality, and sometimes outright 
hysteria, they opposed a “rational therapy” and “rational help” that corresponded to “the 
contemporary requirements of science” and that only medical professionals could offer.53 
Following the medical profession’s self-presentation as the guardian and practitioner of rational 
knowledge, Soviet authorities rejected women’s own experience as inadequate vis-à-vis the new 
medical information. This endorsement of rational medical care to single mothers was made 
urgent by the panic for the increasing rate of mothers’ and newborns’ deaths. In addition, it 
nicely fit with the wider health campaign that ridiculed the belief in folk medicine and vilified 
the networks to which women had traditionally gone for advice.
54
 As Tricia Starks has argued, 
the maternal health campaigns “hoped to rob women of authority in matters of child rearing and 
replace mothers and fathers with the male doctor and his new, scientific, Soviet lifestyle.”55 This 
discourse reduced dependent women’s welfare rights to a rather narrow form of gynecological 
help. It conflated single women with single mothers and assumed that women would stop 
abandoning their children if given the time and space to rest before delivery and to bond with 
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their offspring in the post-partum period. As I will discuss in the following section, this 
assumption tended to overlook many profound and long-term legal and economic needs of single 
women or to treat these needs as unrelated to their obstetrical ones.    
4.2 Sites and forms of help to single mothers 
The Soviet state was explicitly and stably committed to help its female population, 
especially that part of it which for various reasons lacked male protection. This commitment to 
supposedly isolated single women was grounded in their perceived status as misinformed, needy, 
and helpless individuals. It often resulted in intrusive forms of control over their sexuality and 
their everyday lives. In the years between the emergence of Ommlad in 1918 and the welfare 
reforms of 1949, this organ’s various sites of help to single mothers (its consultation points, 
Homes for Mother and Child, working dorms, and socio-legal cabinets) tended to focus on 
different forms of care and control. Until 1927, Ommlad emphasized medical and educational 
help to single women, then it gave preference to providing the economic and legal conditions for 
single mothers to perform their productive and reproductive labor. Finally, in the post-war years, 
it re-directed its attention on almost exclusively gynecological matters. However, conceptually 
underpinning help to single women was always already a conception of them as needy, ignorant, 
and helpless. 
The emphasis on medical and educational help (1918-1926)  
To fight the darkness of Soviet single mothers and thereby reduce the occurrence of 
various diseases during pregnancy, Ommlad established so-called women’s consultations 
(zhenskie konsul’tatsii). These facilities were supposed to be an ongoing school of motherhood 
educating Soviet single women throughout their sexual life, from puberty to menopause. As 
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educational institutions, the women’s consultations countered all sorts of gynecological incorrect 
views and taught women hygiene and infant care. As centers of prophylactic medicine, the 
consultations not only provided qualified obstetrical emergency help, but also performed 
preventive medical checks on pregnant women and their children until the age of two.
56
  
One of the consultations’ key educational and prophylactic goals was to prevent single 
women from falling victims to the village healing-woman (the so-called znakharka) and her 
abortion practices. In the mid-1920s, when abortion was still legal,
57
 Soviet district doctors 
indicated that aborting individuals included mainly two types of women: peasant “unmarried 
girls” who were ashamed and afraid of their parents; and mature women who were not in an 
officially registered union or who had been abandoned by their husbands. In both cases, single 
women were believed to worry about the material means by which they could raise their children 
and this preoccupation was interpreted as a sign of their ignorance about Soviet alimony laws.
58
  
Since the main reason pushing women to perform abortions was thought to be their 
“absolute economic, social, and legal helplessness,” the consultation points emerged as sites of 
both relief and propaganda. Indeed, in the campaign against abortion of the 1920s, the saving and 
disciplining aspects of help to single women easily merged into one: Ommlad’s medical 
personnel strove to save women from the risk of death by agitating about the damage that 
abortion caused to the female organism and by advertising contraceptive measures.
59
 Some 
Ommlad activists recommended directing the propaganda effort also at fathers by launching a 
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campaign for their involvement in the support of children.
60
 However, this sort of agitation never 
convincingly took off as the state did not make any serious attempt to change men’s roles in the 
household.  
Breast-feeding is a telling example of how Ommlad’s consultation points framed single 
mothers’ right to be helped in medical and educational terms. As Balakshina wrote, “under the 
direction of a doctor, every mother can learn to feed her baby and take care of him.”61 That this 
learning process was a crucial component of women’s right to be helped is revealed by a specific 
condition for the reception of help: to receive a subsidy and a maternity leave, single women had 
to go twice a month to the consultation centers and let Ommlad’s medical personnel check on the 
progress of their breast-feeding. In the absence of consultation points, special commissions of 
trusted women workers were asked to verify that subsidized single mothers were indeed breast-
feeding their babies.
62
 Breast-feeding was defined as natural, but portrayed as a skill (“umenie 
vskarmlivat’” or “umeloe vskarmlivanie”). As such, it was subject to inspection and eventual 
correction at the hands of the doctor and the midwife. By giving suggestions and orders, by 
showing pictures, and by demonstrating how to use various objects of baby care, Soviet doctors 
and midwives could teach breast-feeding and skilled care even to illiterate single mothers. 
Women who, after all this agitation, still decided not to breast-feed, were defined as “irrational 
mothers” incorrigibly harming their children.63  
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Breast-feeding played a big role in the discourse and practice of assistance to single 
women because it related to one of the biggest dilemmas of the Soviet social and health system – 
how to liberate women from the burden of exclusive care of their babies, while also preserving 
the physiological bond between the mother and child (which Soviet doctors considered 
fundamental for the latter’s survival). Having the pretention to know what the feeling of maternal 
attachment meant, doctors prescribed the act of breast-feeding and the constant proximity 
between the mother and the child as “powerful factors in kindling the feeling of motherhood 
there where this feeling for one reason or another is silent.”64 In the case of single mothers, who 
were believed to “hate” their children at the time of birth, the bond with the child was 
particularly encouraged to avoid abandonment. Ommlad activists insisted that “lonely dumped 
women” would have been able to keep their children and develop an attachment to them only if 
they received educational support from the doctors and material help from the state.
65
 
Around 1926, in connection with the ratification of a new Marriage and Family Code, 
women’s consultations began to be officially called “expanded consultations” (razdvernutye 
konsul’tatsii). The name change was meant to indicate that these institutions offered multiple 
forms of welfare without compartmentalizing between gynecological, educational, economic, 
and legal help to Soviet single women. Through a special “juridical section,” the expanded 
consultation was supposed to assist all women by offering legal defense and advice on questions 
concerning their legal rights. Although the establishment of juridical consulting offices alongside 
the medically-oriented ones seemed a step towards a stronger practice of legal protection, many 
Ommlad social workers were skeptical. They contended that female legal ignorance and 
helplessness prevented homeless and husbandless orphan-mothers from taking advantage of the 
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rights granted them by Soviet laws and autonomously defending their interests as mothers. 
Because they lacked “legal awareness,” women put themselves in difficult positions.66 As the 
Supreme Court explained, “sometimes the woman plaintiff absolutely does not know the name of 
the father, who left her and the child to the whim of fate. And sometimes, due to illiteracy, she 
indicates the address of the defendant too vaguely…”67  
The Soviet legislative framework itself entailed the idea that women were weak, naïve, 
and by nature defenseless. Investigating discrimination and sexual harassment against women-
workers, Lisa Granik has written that “gender myths were so embedded in Soviet legislation and 
legal practice that the notion of formal equality itself was a myth, supported only by official 
rhetoric and propaganda. Soviet legislation was so engendered that it institutionalized, rather 
than eradicated, gender inequality.”68 Soviet law identified unmarried women’s legal issues as 
questions related to abortion, child abandonment, sexual infection, rape, alimony, and the 
establishment of paternity. Underpinning this list was a patriarchal view of women which in turn 
let help to them revolve almost exclusively around the medical campaign against child mortality 
and sickness. While men remained unmarked as ordinary workers, essentialist notions of 
women’s nature as mothers were institutionalized through a legislation that protected them 
mainly as mothers. 
Given this view, it is not surprising that even after the promulgation of the new Marriage 
and Family Code and the establishment of the “expanded consultations,” the main emphasis of 
Ommlad’s consultations remained on medical and educational work. As an Ommlad activist in 
                                                          
66
 “Instruktsiia o rabote iuridicheskikh konsul’tatsii po voprosam okhrany materinstva i mladenchestva,” Biulleten’ 
Narodnogo Komissariata Zdravookhraneniia, no.5, 1925, 6.  
67
 GARF, f. 6983, o. 1, d. 222, l. 3. 
68
 Lisa Granik, “The Trials of the Proletarka: Sexual Harassment Claims in the 1920s,” in Reforming Justice in 
Russia, 1864-1996. Power, Culture, and the Limits of the Legal Order, ed. by Peter H. Solomon (Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 131-167, at 133. 
188 
 
Perm’ explained discussing the consultations’ work in 1926, these centers’ key goals were “to 
improve the gynecological condition of pregnant women, raise their cultural level…, prepare 
their homes for the delivery or for the return from the hospital, and teach women how to care for 
the baby to come.” In addition, this activist asked to focus energy on “cultural-enlightenment 
work,” which was to include “individual conversations” between the doctor and the woman 
visiting the consultation and “group conversations” on female hygiene, deliveries, menopause, 
sexual life, abortions, baby care, and breast-feeding. In this activist’s view, “cultural 
enlightenment” happened every time that a single woman looked at the wall-papers, pictures, 
posters, and educational exhibits that decorated the premises of the consultation. It took place 
also through the organization of show trials against mothers abandoning their children.
69
 This 
description of functions reveals that the number one task of the “new” expanded consultations 
remained to serve as a site of surveillance and a school of motherhood.  
Reports from Ommlad’s local sections indicate that few women actually made the 
fulfillment of these functions possible since they did not visit the consultations on a regular basis. 
In March 1927, for instance, the Perm’ Ommlad office attempted to organize a consultation in 
the Ocherskii industrial settlement, but this enterprise turned out to be rather unsuccessful: the 
consultation was not popular at all, since “the women still prefer to turn for advice to the village 
midwives (babki-povitukhi).”70 In the Cherdyn’ district (Perm’ province), “only occasionally do 
women come for advice on how to feed their babies and take care of them. In the majority of 
cases they bring sick babies, who need not advice but medical help.” Local activists condemned 
women’s behavior since, in their opinion, the main purpose of the consultation should have been 
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prophylactic (“to check on healthy babies” – as one activist put it).71 Women’s defection and 
misusage of the consultations was explained once again by reference to the lack of culture 
(nekul’turnost’) of the Soviet female population.72 It seems plausible, however, that many 
women simply looked at the consultation as a sort of medical ambulatory, where they could go to 
receive specific medical assistance or new prescriptions for their medicines. 
Another site where single mothers could receive the state’s material support together with 
its disciplining regime was the so-called Home for Mother and Child. Grauerman defined the 
purpose of this facility as  
providing the abandoned lonely woman…with the possibility to rest from her usual heavy 
work and her worries about the future so that she could gather energy for the upcoming 
important act – the delivery of a new citizen.73  
Women without men were entitled to physical and spiritual care as the producers of a new 
generation of citizens. In all effects, the Homes for Mother and Child were a “school of 
motherhood,” in which the final beneficiaries of help were the children, while the new mothers 
mainly received lessons on how to care for them. 
The Homes for Mother and Child were based on women’s right to rest immediately 
before and after delivery. Initially, all poor (neimushchie) and single (odinokie) pregnant women 
could be admitted to the Homes for Mother and Child two months before delivery and remain 
there for two-three more months after childbirth. This vague condition for admission into the 
Home for Mother and Child – that is to be needy and alone – was qualified more narrowly in the 
mid-1920s, when Ommlad attempted to limit access to single women without housing 
(bespriutnye). When the rate of female unemployment peaked, the ever larger cohort of 
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unemployed single mothers was encouraged to put their children in state nurseries without 
seeking admission in the Homes for Mother and Child.
74
 As it often happened in Soviet 
socialism, a progressive sounding right was restricted by the state’s objective penury of 
resources.  
Each Home for Mother and Child was designed to host around 20 single women, their 
children, and Ommlad’s personnel. This institution was supposed to be a model community that 
combined moral improvement (cleanliness, order, thrift, and sobriety) with reproductive and 
mothering success. The everyday life in the facility clearly reflected this understanding. While 
parasitism (tuneiadstvo) was inadmissible, the principles of mandatory collective work and self-
help regulated the daily regimen. All the women took care of themselves and their children, did 
the laundry, cleaned the locales of the home, and took turns in cooking. Only in the six weeks 
immediately before and after delivery were women dispensed from physical work in the home. 
While the heaviest chores were performed by a janitor (preferably of the female sex), all the 
residents were required to fulfill their everyday cleaning and mothering duties following the 
instructions of the home’s medical personnel. Mothers fed the babies, changed their diapers, and 
gave them baths under the surveillance of experienced nurses. Some homes had a workshop for 
those women who wished to work in it and a library with literature on the defense of motherhood 
and infancy.
75
 No woman residing in the home could receive external visitors.
76
 Single mothers 
were not supposed to feel like the wards of the old shelters, but rather like citizens performing a 
socially useful labor in the field of motherhood.  
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Indeed, single mothers living in these homes were not only required to care for their own 
children, but also assigned the “state responsibility” to breast-feed a certain number of baby 
orphans which were regularly placed into the Homes for Mother and Child.
77
 These were the 
wetnurses (kormil’tsy) and their life and labor in the homes were regulated by “Instructions” 
similar to those that articulated the duties of the nannies regularly employed in these facilities. 
These documents reveal both what the kormil’tsy were instructed to do and what they did in 
reality. For instance, while Ommlad activists strove to discipline the kormil’tsy into having their 
meals at fixed times, these women wandered to the common kitchen whenever they wanted. The 
extra-detailed and pedantic character of these “Instructions” indicates also a basic lack of trust 
towards single mothers, especially in regard to their health and cleanliness.
78
 The wetnurses were 
constantly reminded of a series of hygienic norms: to wash their hands and breasts before and 
after the breast-feeding session; to let few drops of milk fall before giving the breast to the baby; 
to keep their hair and their clothes clean. Another sign of the activists’ profound mistrust towards 
these women emerges in the regulation of their free time: the kormil’tsy could leave the home 
every afternoon to take care of personal business, but they had to be back by 6 pm; after dusk 
they were allowed to leave the home only in groups and under the vigilance of a staff member; 
they were supposed to be in their beds from midnight to 6 in the morning. Lonely women were 
often seen as inclined to practice prostitution and this schedule was clearly oriented at preventing 
women’s free use of their sexuality. Finally, since “the feeding of children is a job,” upon 
admission in the home the kormil’tsy was tested for two weeks: they would have remained only 
if they turned out to be fit for the position. In addition, while these women were allowed into the 
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home as single mothers and together with their children, they were also asked to leave their 
children in the nursery and visit them only during the breast-feeding sessions.
79
  
The investigation of the body was a reality of the Homes for Mother and Child that 
applied not only to the kormil’tsy, but to all its female residents. Not unlike the defective children 
that we saw in chapter 1, single mothers were the object of constant “observations” and “medical 
controls.” Upon admission in the home and during their entire stay, women were “accurately 
visited” and “subjected to detailed general and gynecological inspections.” Their genital areas 
were shaved and disinfected; their entire bodies were cleaned with soap and warm water; they 
were dressed in sterile clothes and provided with sterile sheets. While gynecological visits were 
supposed to be rare, the investigation of the external surface of single mothers’ bodies was 
recommended as frequently as possible. If the institution’s personnel had even the slightest doubt 
that the pregnant woman was sick, they placed her in isolation.
80
 Indeed, single mothers 
suffering from any infectious disease were not welcome in the homes. Syphilitic women were 
isolated for therapeutic purposes and returned to their mothering and breast-feeding duties only 
after having been cured. Mothers with tuberculosis were allowed to feed their babies, but not to 
care for them.
81
 Women who were receiving medical care in psychiatric hospitals were admitted 
to the Homes for Mother and Child as long as they proved “calm, conscious, and with a lot of 
milk in their breasts.”82  
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The reports written by various Ommlad inspectors in the 1920s reveal that the Homes for 
Mother and Child did not effectively accomplish their tasks. Most archival documents depict a 
picture of disastrous sanitary and economic conditions, in which the homes could offer neither 
real rest nor significant education. The directors of these facilities strove to exploit women as 
providers of milk in exchange for a miserable shelter and women dragged their feet and made all 
possible efforts to offset the social controls envisioned by Ommlad.  
A case in point is the Home for Mother and Child in Perm’. Located on the second floor 
of a two-story stone building in the center of the city, this facility could theoretically host up to 
20 women and their children. However, there were not enough bed sheets and the available 
underwear for both women and children was very limited: there were only 18 shirts, most of 
which were torn; there were no bras, panties, socks, scarves, or shoes; there were very few 
diapers. The oven did not work properly and filled the rooms with smoke. The walls needed to 
be repainted and the leaking roof needed to be fixed. Women hung wet diapers on a rope in a 
poorly furnished kitchen. For their physiological needs, the women had to go out of the building. 
Heavily pregnant women and mothers who had just delivered would walk through a yard filled 
with trash (since there was no garbage dump and the trash was spread all over the yard) and 
reach a cold and dark cabinet that functioned as toilet.
83
 Given these conditions, it was not 
surprising that many women “bring their babies, leave them there to be raised, and go away. 
They prefer to attend some kind of courses or classes.”84 Those who remained in the home 
attempted to take its management as much as possible in their hands. In 1927, a disappointed and 
frustrated Ommlad activist wrote that the Perm’ Home for Mother and Child was in “a state of 
anarchy”: no medical personnel controlled the resident single mothers and no educational work 
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was conducted among them. As an “undisciplined element lacking both skill and will to work,” 
orphan-mothers had turned Ommlad’s facility from a school of motherhood into a “home of 
squabble and parasitism” (dom sklok i tuneiadstva) with a “corrupting” influence on Soviet 
women.
85
 The story of the Perm’ Home for Mother and Child indicates that Soviet single women 
could have definite desires for upward mobility and, when they stayed in Ommlad’s institutions, 
they did not wish to be pinned down to the mothering labor that this uncomfortable facilities 
forced upon them. 
The focus on productive and reproductive labor (1927-1943)  
Historian Wendy Goldman has remarked that, instead of expanding state services for 
homeless and orphaned mothers, in the late 1920s some policymakers proposed to train this 
group of marginalized women and put them to work at the least expense to the state.
86
 Ommlad 
activists too began to identify the best form of help to single mothers as their engagement in 
independent productive labor. Ommlad began to strongly promote labor as an effective solution 
both to the condition of female orphanhood and to the problem of child abandonment which 
supposedly resulted from women’s loneliness. For instance, the director of Ommlad in Perm’, 
Klavdiia Vasil’evna Grebneva, claimed that single pregnant women needed above all to be 
“taken away from the street” and put into institutions that would teach them professional skills.87 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the path from “the street” – with its associations of 
begging and labor desertion – to various sites of industrial production was being advocated in the 
same years also by VOS and VOG activists. This was the direction that Soviet help took in the 
late 1920s and throughout the 1930s in relation to marginalized social groups.  
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In 1927 a directive of the Sovnarkom and the VTsIK mandated to strengthen help to 
needy single mothers through work-oriented help. Ommlad followed suit and set up special 
working dorms (trudovye obshchezhitiia), craftwork cooperatives (kustarnye arteli), and other 
collective enterprises for orphan mothers. These facilities were asked to promote women’s labor 
qualifications in order to fight a long list of enemies: prostitution, child abandonment, parasitism, 
and – of course – single mothers’ darkness and ignorance.88 As we read in a joint circular letter 
drafted by the Narkomsobes and the Narkomzdrav on December 29, 1930, work was made 
available to “poor, orphan adult women, and women who engage in prostitution” as a “means for 
re-educating them and inculcating in them labor habits.”89 
The workshop for homeless mothers that the Perm' section of Ommlad opened in 1928 is 
a good example of the new orientation of social help to single mothers. This facility’s goals were 
thus articulated: “to inculcate working habits in the mothers, teach them a skill, give them a 
qualification, find them a job, and along with this prevent them from abandoning their 
children.”90 The workshop admitted 15 single mothers with children between 3 and 12 months 
old and let them reside in its dorm for a period of 3-6 months. Besides offering them shelter, the 
workshop compensated women’s work with a 10-ruble monthly salary.  In line with the principle 
that the dorm’s residents should cover their own outlay, the income made from the sale of the 
artifacts produced in the workshop did not go directly to the women, but was used to maintain 
the dorm itself and to provide women with some cash upon dismissal from the facility. If women 
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produced an income higher than the set norm, the surplus money was given them as incentive to 
production. Here, as in the Home for Mother and Child, the principle of self-help determined the 
workshop’s everyday life: each mother performed chores in the communal areas, such as 
cleaning the rooms, caring for the children (under the control of a sister), washing the laundry, 
heating the stove, carrying the milk from the milk station, etc. However, to avoid the “anarchy” 
that had emerged in the Home for Mother and Child, Ommlad established more rigid controls on 
women’s labor: if women proved unfit for the jobs taught in the workshop, abandoned their 
children, found a source of permanent income outside the workshop, failed to respect the rules of 
this facility, or proved guilty of wrong-doings of any kind, they would have been immediately 
expelled.
91
 Thus grounded in self-discipline, financial self-sufficiency, and engagement in 
productive labor, the working dorm that emerged in the late 1920s would remain one of the 
preferred sites of help to single women for the following decades of Soviet history.  
Unlike other marginalized groups’ labor, however, unmarried women’s contributions to 
the collective were imagined not only as productive, but also as reproductive. To eliminate the 
family and everyday conditions which could have prevented husbandless women to perform their 
allotted reproductive duties, in 1933 Ommlad set up the so-called “socio-legal cabinets” 
(sotsial’no-pravovye kabinety). These were supposed to provide legal and material assistance to 
economically weak and emotionally unstable women who were suspected of desiring to escape 
their reproductive labor.  
The activist Sofiia Kopelianskaia (whom we already saw advocating for state help to 
defective children) expressed this vision of single mothers as both “suffering” 
(neblagopoluchnye) and “suspicious” (podozritel’nye) in a brochure that described the work of 
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the socio-legal cabinets.
 92
 Writing in 1936, in the context of the re-criminalization of abortion 
and at a time of heated discussions concerning the new abortion law, Kopelianskaia defined the 
category of “single woman” as comprising a large spectrum of helpless women: wives 
abandoned by their husbands while pregnant, divorced women, underage pregnant girls who 
came from the countryside with the specific goal to terminate their pregnancies or get rid of their 
babies, women without permanent residence and stable jobs (particularly female domestic 
servants), all pregnant women who had unhappy family relations and who experienced negative 
conditions of everyday life (especially women-alcoholics), and – last but not least – all women 
suffering from sexually transmitted infectious diseases and the victims of sexual violence.
93
 They 
all demanded the watchful attention of the socio-legal cabinets, whose task was to provide timely 
help and thus dissuade women from performing abortions or abandoning their children. As 
Kopelianskaia wrote, 
when the lonely woman who has become a mother, holds in her hands…a small living 
creature, is overwhelmed by mixed feelings (motherly joy and pride, fear for the future of 
a child without father and for her own fate) and is insecure about how to attain her rights 
(if these rights are at all familiar to her…)94 
The feelings, triggered in a single woman by the birth of her child, often compelled her to rid 
herself of the newborn baby. The presence of Ommlad socio-legal workers at the very bedside of 
the delivering woman had the goal to prevent child abandonment and convince single women to 
undertake their mothering labor. 
 The fundamental method of work of the socio-legal cabinets was the so-called “social 
patronage,” which entailed the performance of inspections in the women’s homes and 
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workplaces. Social patronage visitations were carried out in all cases concerning housing and 
family issues, such as conjugal disagreements over children, issues of alimony, and any kind of 
family conflict. They had the purpose to gather an “unmediated, holistic, and profound 
knowledge” concerning the family relations as well as the economic and housing conditions in 
which single women lived.  Yet, these investigations were not limited to the collection of 
information and the verification of women’s everyday conditions of life. They also had the 
pragmatic purpose to resolve conflicts and initiate negotiations on the spot, providing help “in an 
unmediated way.” Indeed, one of the fundamental aims of these investigations was to eliminate 
the sources of family conflict without starting judicial cases.
95
  
 Besides performing patronage inspections, the socio-legal cabinets could summon single 
individuals to their facilities. These special calls were often practiced to establish a child’s 
paternity: when the woman was still pregnant or had just delivered the child, the suspected father 
was summoned by the socio-legal cabinets and compelled to sign documents that recognized his 
paternity. Activists recurred to summonses also to regulate the payment of children’s alimony 
and spouses’ support. Like the patronage inspection, the summons was considered indispensable 
to solve disagreements concerning children and other family conflicts in an amicable way. In 
Kopelianskaia’s words, the summons was “a most precious means to promptly solve a problem 
outside of the courts and conclude peaceful agreements.”96 Underlying both patronage 
inspections and summonses was the activists’ desire not to pass over women’s cases to the 
courts. This could have been motivated by the fact that the courts were already overloaded with 
work or by the activists’ attempt to harness more power for themselves.  
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When the new mother was still in the birth clinic, socio-legal workers conducted 
negotiations with potential breadwinners to “settle the life of the lonely new mother.” Activists 
thought that single mothers had a hard time obtaining the necessary documents. Both literate and 
illiterate women “easily get confused in the labyrinth of institutions, administrations, divisions, 
and sections (where they often come across the defendant’s friends).”97 In other words, red tape 
and corruption – here clearly gendered male – got in the way of single women’s legal requests; 
bureaucracy and gender solidarity among men in powerful positions demanded that the socio-
legal cabinets take upon themselves all the paperwork, search for insolvent men, and force them 
to pay alimony.     
Ultimately, the assistance provided by the socio-legal cabinets was another prophylactic 
(although not medical) measure in the campaign against child abandonment. It reveals once more 
that care and control equally constituted the Soviet right to be helped. It also shows that this right 
was not simply granted to single women as needy individuals, but in a sense also imposed on 
them as the carriers of the next generation and the performers of a service to the collectivity. 
The renewed relevance of medical help in the post-war period (1944-1949) 
In 1944, a new Family Law abolished the right for unmarried mothers to appeal to the 
courts for the purpose of establishing paternity and obtaining maintenance. The loss of support 
from biological fathers was made up by an ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Council “On 
the strengthening of state help to pregnant women, mothers of many children and single 
mothers.” Ratified in the midst of the war (on July 8, 1944) and confirmed by an endless series 
of additional ordinances and circular letters, this decree redefined Soviet single women’s right to 
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be helped in the immediate post-WWII years.
98
 Its key stances were extensively discussed in 
party and soviet meetings, but also widely publicized through radio broadcasts and the press. 
The nature and scope of the assistance to single women officially articulated in this 
decree were quite broad. The 1944 ukaz mandated to revitalize medical services on behalf of 
single women, but also confirmed the significance of “socio-legal help” as a form of assistance 
that combined the material and legal sides of help. The Commissariat of Trade was required to 
provide food cards to all pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers, while the Commissariat of 
Finance was supposed to assign state subsidies to single mothers through its provincial and city 
sections. Ommlad activists had to help needy single women finding a job, encourage them to ask 
for benefits at local executive committees, write petitions on their behalf to the courts, and assist 
them in obtaining access to the Homes for Mother and Child. Although the decree mandated the 
provision of economic and legal services as well as the expansion of the net of non-medical 
facilities for single women, it above all emphasized prophylactic gynecological and obstetrical 
help. At least this was the way in which it was interpreted by Narkomzdrav administrators. For 
instance, the Tatar Commissar of Health issued an ordinance on December 30, 1945, which thus 
instructed: “Under all circumstances provide the population with a sufficient number of beds for 
delivering women…absolutely don’t allow any rejection when delivering women ask for 
ambulatory help.”99 Two years later, in December 1947, a letter of the Deputy Minister of 
Health, Mariia Dmitrevna Kovrigina, argued that the main tasks in the field of assistance to 
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single women was to offer obstetrical and gynecological help of better quality, to lower mothers’ 
and children’s mortality at childbirth, and to thwart abortions.100 
Did the 1944 decree signal a change in single mothers’ right to be helped and the gender 
conception underpinning it? Historians Chris Burton and Mie Nakachie have remarked that, after 
having gone through an unprecedented demographic crisis, in the post-WWII period the Soviet 
state put a lot of effort to encourage an increase of the birthrate. As Nakachie writes, “in order to 
revive and expand a healthy population, viewed as essential to postwar economic and social 
reconstruction, Soviet leaders adopted a new pronatalist policy which promoted births among 
both married and unmarried mothers.” From this standpoint, continues Nakachie, “reestablishing 
regular prophylactic measures was a fundamental task for Soviet obstetricians and 
gynecologists.”101 Certainly, the Soviet state desired to radically improve the quality of medical 
services for single women in the wake of the devastating effects of the war on both female and 
male reproductive health. However, I reject Nakachie’s contention that single motherhood was 
created as a new legitimate site of reproduction only after 1944. As we have seen, single 
motherhood was de-facto legitimized through pronatalist reproductive policies already in the 
immediate post-revolutionary years. All women – including unmarried ones – were expected to 
become mothers and their obligatory participation in reproducing the Soviet nation was not a 
novelty of the post-WWII period. In other words, a “motherist language” (in Nakachie’s 
                                                          
100
 GARF, f. 8009, o. 22, d. 106, l. 1. 
101
 Chris Burton, “Minzdrav, Soviet Doctors, and the Policing of reproduction in the late Stalinist Years,” Russian 
History, 27: 2 (Summer 2000), 197-221. Mie Nakachie, “‘Abortion is killing us.’ Women’s Medicine and the 
Dilemma for Postwar Doctors in the Soviet Union, 1944-48,” in Soviet Medicine, Culture, Practice, and Science, 
Frances L. Bernstein, Christopher Burton, and Dan Healy, eds. (Northern Illinois University Press: Dekalb, 2010), 
195-213, at 196. See also her articles “N.S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, 
and Language,” East European Politics and Societies, 20:1 (2006), 40-68; and “Population, politics and 
reproduction: Late Stalinism and its legacy,” in Late Stalinist Russia, 23-36. 
202 
 
terms
102
) and the set of gender relations implied by it had been part and parcel of the Soviet 
pronatalist logic since the foundation of Ommlad in 1918. Help to single women as mothers 
remained a priority task of the Soviet state throughout the period under consideration and 
reproduction as a civic responsibility of both married and single women continued to 
fundamentally mediate the relationship between the regime and its female population.  
What changed in the post-1944 period was not so much the content of the state’s regime 
of care to single women as the forms of control coming with it. Strict medical surveillance 
intensified every time that the panic over women’s anti-reproductive behaviors grew.103 
Similarly to what had happened in the years following WWI, the revolution, and the civil war, 
Soviet physicians of the immediate post-WWII period devoted considerable energy to the battle 
against venereal diseases in single women. Most consultation visits turned into gynecological 
appointments where single women’s sexual apparatus was “accurately investigated” and the 
conditions of their everyday life “exposed” to the medical gaze. Women’s internal organs and 
their external lives were searched for pathologies: “gynecologically sick women” underwent 
hospitalization and patronage visits were set up when the activists found the conditions of single 
women’s byt to be “negative” (neblagtovoritel’nye).104 In addition, between 1946 and 1949 
Ommlad’s consultations conducted various systematic mass prophylactic visits. These were 
gynecological check-ups that all Soviet women with active sexual life were required to undergo 
once a year; they had the clear purpose to identify gynecological ailments in the Soviet female 
population.
105
 Activists contributed to avert the “threat of abortions,” by conducting “sanitary 
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enlightenment work” through exhibitions, posters, brochures, and textbooks that preached 
pregnancy hygiene and explained the damaging effects of abortion and venereal diseases on 
women’s sexual health. When, notwithstanding all this help, women still contracted venereal 
disease and underwent criminal abortions, their cases were passed over to the office of the 
procurator.
106
  
In the context of this intensified medical control, some activists proposed to affiliate 
Ommlad’s consultations more closely with birth clinics and hospital obstetrical wards. For 
instance, in 1948, the head of the Narkomzdrav’s Department for Obstetrical and Gynecological 
Help, O.D. Matspanova, criticized Ommlad’s consultations for being “the most backward ring in 
the system of institutions for the defense of motherhood,” and suggested to merge consultation 
points and birth clinics in a single institution providing exclusively medical help to single 
women.
107
 On May 7, 1948, the Minister of Health E.I. Smirnov issued an ordinance mandating 
the merger. In the work of the new unified institution, priority was given to helping 
“gynecologically sick” women.108 Ommlad’s consultations returned to be the original therapeutic 
and prophylactic institutions of the early 1920s, in which the medical content of single women’s 
right to be helped definitely prevailed over the legal and economic one.  
In comparison with the massive offer of medical relief of the immediate post-WWII 
years, the socio-legal cabinets described by Kopelianskaia in the 1930s ended up offering a 
rather vague and undefined form of help. Since Ommlad’s socio-legal workers were now closely 
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involved in the abortion commissions, their activism was increasingly directed at countering 
extra-hospital abortions. Although they kept giving legal clarifications on the 1944 decree and 
explaining to pregnant women what were their “rights and privileges,” socio-legal workers now 
focused their “conversations” on depicting the evils of abortion.109 As stated in a document on 
the activities of the socio-legal cabinets of the city of Moscow in 1948, “real help” consisted in 
“any effective means” to prevent certain groups of women (the poor, those with already many 
children, those who just had a baby, and the unmarried ones) from performing abortions. 
Material help was believed to be operative only insofar as it convinced women “under the threat 
of abortion” to continue their pregnancy.110 As the chairman of the Alma-Ata city executive 
committee cogently put it commenting on the poor state of economic help to single women in 
1949: “The decree is very good, but it’s impossible to implement it.”111 Although the state tried 
to reach out to as many women as possible, subsidies to single mothers were given out very 
slowly and erratically.
112
 Part of the problem was that the cabinets of socio-legal help did not 
have their own monetary funds to provide fast relief in the most urgent cases. Another reason 
was the usual problem of lack of qualified personnel. More importantly, socio-legal help 
increasingly turned into an auxiliary tool in the medical campaign against illegal abortions.  
In short, at the end of the 1940s, Ommlad’s consultations continued to be a site of help 
and surveillance over Soviet single women, but care and control over them now meant the almost 
exclusive provision of gynecological help and the systematic medical investigation of their 
reproductive practices. Single women’s right to be helped was explicitly glorified in the 1944 
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ukaz, but while single motherhood was now officially and loudly legitimized, it was also 
medically monitored more intensively than it had ever been. 
4.3 The agents of help to single women    
As in many parts of the world, in the Soviet Union too women were considered 
particularly fit for becoming social workers and nurses.
113
 For instance, in the summer of 1921, a 
circular letter addressed to the Zhenotdel invited all the women’s sections to nominate candidates 
from among their female ranks for positions of leadership in the organs of the Narkomsobes. The 
letter also strongly encouraged women to apply for jobs as nannies in the facilities managed by 
this Commissariat.
114
 The construction of the provider of help as female happened to different 
extents in all the sectors of Soviet social welfare. However, the gendering of the agents of help 
was both more prominent and more problematic in the case of Ommlad.  
In the field of assistance to women without a male wage earner, the ultimate source of 
help was always discursively cast male and often rested with the doctor, while the dispensers of 
this help were fashioned as female. In practice, matters were more complicated: despite the 
discursive construction of help as originating in a male figure and being channeled to single 
women through “his good female helpers” (ego khoroshie pomoshchnitsy), the overwhelming 
majority among the leaders of Ommlad were women (and often women-doctors).
115
 These 
female activists’ perspective on single women’s right to be helped did not differ from that of 
their male colleagues, nor did they provide an alternative educational program of help to single 
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mothers. In other words, the content of their advice and their practice of help did not vary from 
that of male activists. Ommlad women activists were not feminists contesting an official line that 
represented single women as helpless and reduced their right to assistance to a duty of 
motherhood. To the contrary, they closely followed state directives and frequently accused their 
male colleagues of being too lax and inefficient. Ommlad’s women activists made all possible 
efforts to be more competent and energetic, more stubborn and persistent than their male 
colleagues. For instance, the activist Klavdiia Afanas’evna Putina tirelessly campaigned to 
transform the Perm’ provincial section of Ommlad in an organ that could “foresee all 
eventualities and act more solidly and independently than the departments led by my male 
colleagues.”116  
As emancipated women-doctors and agents of the Soviet system, most Ommlad activists 
assumed public roles that were associated with masculine abilities both in the country’s historical 
past and in contemporary discursive practice. In occupying leadership positions that were 
imagined for men, Ommlad women-activists took up male personalities as the only means to 
receive some credit, autonomy, and recognition. In Susan Reid’s words, women’s “narrative and 
compositional devices reproduced their subjection to patriarchal authority.”117 Their incursions 
into professional positions associated with masculinity were not free of ambiguity: while 
activism offered great potential for realizing one’s aspiration for respect and autonomy, it also 
compelled women to perform an intense scrutiny of their personal behavior.
118
 Being an 
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embodiment of the state’s welfare system entailed participation in a structure that reaffirmed 
traditional gender hierarchies.
119
 
The Soviet conceptualization of social activism on behalf of single women was not only 
determined by stable traditional gender roles, but also strongly seeped through with deep-rooted 
patriarchal values. For instance, in Grauerman’s normative booklet The protection of 
motherhood and how it must be realized, the Home for Mother and Child – as the ideal site of 
help to single women – had to include the following staff: 1 doctor, 1 midwife, 1 or 2 sister-
instructors (or sister-educators), 5 medical sisters (nurses), 4 nannies, 1 cook, 3 laundry-ladies, 1 
janitor or factotum person. The doctor and the midwife appeared as the ideal Soviet conjugal 
couple, ready to “give all their love and all their labor” to the defense of helpless single mothers. 
The midwife resembled an obedient wife – submitted to the doctor-husband, but rigid and 
disciplinary when in charge of their daughters.
120
 Discursively cast as a true pater familias 
(although in reality often a mater), the doctor managed the home both in medical and 
administrative terms, regulated the chores and schedules of the all-female personnel, and was 
responsible for the so-called “sanitary enlightenment” of both staff and residents. As in a large 
patriarchal family, the female members of the household stood in a sort of hierarchy of worth. 
The nanny definitely occupied the lower level (below her stood the cook and the laundress – also 
part of the all-female personnel of Ommlad’s facilities, but never represented as “helpers”); then 
came a cohort of “red sisters,” that is nurses, instructors, pedagogues, and social workers of 
various kind. While these female practitioners of help fulfilled the duties of daily care, ultimate 
authority always rested with the doctor. 
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Local Ommlad administrators often lamented the lack of expert and responsible nannies 
who truly loved their job and knew how to perform it. In the writings of most social workers, the 
nanny was represented as the most uncultured among the female providers of help. Her illiteracy, 
ignorance, “lack of maternal qualities,”121 and “hysterical personality”122 (as much as the 
nekul’turnost’, the irrationality, and the lack of collective habits of the single mother) caused the 
suffering of the children. Some doctors and facility directors contended that the only way to have 
“cultured nannies” was to search for them among “the ladies of the intelligentsia.”123 This 
perspective framed the status of the nanny in class terms, but also dangerously reversed Marxist 
logic by associating kul’turnost’ not with the class that won the revolution, but with a 
characteristically pre-revolutionary class. This position, however, was held only by a few. Most 
activists put their efforts in the education of the new Soviet nanny by teaching a sanitized and 
medicalized way of child care to all the women that lived and worked in Ommlad’s facilities.   
Numerous “Instructions to the nannies” strove to control a professional category that was 
perceived as undisciplined and unskilled. Revealing a definite lack of trust towards the nannies, 
these instructions fastidiously listed the most elementary rules of child care and gave ridiculously 
detailed directions. “Every time the baby cries,” mandated one of them, “the nanny should go to 
his bed, check if the baby is wet, if the clothes are irritating him, if he is tired of lying.” Feeding 
was to happen under the vigilant gaze of the sister-educator. It “should happen patiently and in 
conformity with the specific needs of the child.” Always worried about the cleanliness and 
sanitary conditions of their facilities as well as suspicious of the state of health of uncultured 
nannies, Ommlad activists reminded them not to blow on the baby food to cool it down, because 
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their saliva could fall on it and infect the baby. Similarly, “the nannies should not kiss the baby 
on the mouth or on the face; they should not allow the child to put in his mount dirty toys or any 
other object.”124 Underpaid and overworked nannies were expected to have an affectionate and 
patient approach towards the children, but also to submit completely to the sister-educator, 
without showing any initiative or autonomy.   
In fact, most nannies did not comply with these Instructions. The directors of Ommlad’s 
facilities frequently complained about “lazy” nannies who worked “unwillingly and passively,” 
replied with rude words to the disciplinary observations of their superiors, and simply refused to 
perform their duties.
125
 Their working day amounted to the infringement of one rule after the 
other: the nannies arrived late at work and left before the new shift had arrived; sometimes they 
simply did not show up or left without any warning; they often fell asleep during their shift; they 
forgot to change diapers and feed the children according to the directions of the sister-educator; 
they did not keep the children’s toilets and the bathroom facilities clean; they forgot to wash their 
hands and did not change their robes when they went out in the courtyard to fetch wood or water; 
they were rough with the babies and many of them took care only of their own children.
126
 
Receiving a miserable pay for their labor and sometimes going on for months without a salary, 
the nannies of Ommlad’s facilities frequently hoarded resources and grabbed any chance to leave 
their jobs and move on to better positions.
127
   
Frustrated at the nannies’ carelessness towards their duties, an activist once admitted that 
“the Home for Mother and Child cannot be the school of motherhood which it is supposed to 
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be.”128 Once again, women’s everyday behavior practically undermined all educational and 
disciplining efforts of doctors and activists. More importantly, it disrupted gendered hierarchies 
of power.  
According to the patriarchal logic and structure that was to be implemented in the Homes 
for Mother and Child, the doctor and the midwife could count on the help of many daughters. 
They were all called “red sisters” and characterized as the doctor’s “good female helpers,” but 
they were assigned different roles within the common household. Some were “medical sisters,” 
others were “sister-instructors,” “sister-educators,” “sisters of charity,” and “sisters of 
patronage.” The relations among these sisters were determined by hierarchies of subordination, 
whereby some women had larger responsibilities and more controlling power than others. For 
instance, the nurse or “medical sister” was in charge of the practical execution of the doctor’s 
orders concerning the cleanliness, the proper temperature, the good ventilation of the rooms, and 
the quantity and quality of the food provided to both mothers and children.
129
 However, the more 
important task of verifying that the doctor’s orders were properly carried out in all medical, 
educational, and economic matters was entrusted to the sister-educator or sister-instructor. As the 
doctor’s “closest helper,” she stood at the top of this inner hierarchy and from her position of 
relative stronger power controlled all the other sisters. “Armed with knowledge and experience,” 
“inspired by the bright idea of help,” and “aware of the importance of her work,” she entered “a 
battle against the centuries-old prejudices existing in the city, the factory, and, especially, the 
village.” When she worked in the remotest corners of the country, she became a veritable 
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“pioneer and carrier of the idea of help.” The sister-instructor could even replace the doctor when 
he was not available – a condition that was in fact very frequent.130   
Among Ommlad red sisters, great responsibilities were assigned to the so-called “sister of 
patronage” (patronazhnaia sestra). She functioned as a “transmission belt” (provodnik) between 
doctors and Soviet single mothers because her primary task was to practically convey the idea of 
the defense of infancy to all Soviet families. In fact, while the consultations were supposed to 
give Soviet mothers “a mass of both theoretical and practical indications,” doctors remained 
unaware of how these “indications” were employed by women in their everyday life. Patronage 
was conceived as “an apparatus of transmission and control” that would have solved this 
problem.
131
  
The sister of patronage was supposed to visit women in their homes and educate them by 
practical example. This included performing even the “dirtiest” household chores without shame: 
the sister of patronage swept and washed the floors, dusted the household objects, re-arranged 
the furniture in the rooms, and let fresh air come in. She practically demonstrated techniques for 
breast-feeding, bathing, and diapering the baby, warming up the milk, cleaning the pacifier, 
cooking baby-food, and providing basic medical care. In case of need, the sister of patronage was 
allowed to provide single mothers with free objects of baby care, such as small bathtubs, 
bassinets, thermometers, pacifiers, and medicaments. The purpose of this material help was to 
give mothers the real possibility to execute all the indications of the doctors. In addition, the 
sister had to improve the conditions of women’s family life by directing them to state welfare 
institutions. In short, the sisters of patronage countered “all harmful customs and superstitions 
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and thus help[ed] the reduction of children’s disease and death.”132 While single mothers were 
perceived as the carriers of damaging habits and superstitions, the sisters of patronage were the 
makers of cleanliness and comfort.  
The sister of patronage was also seen as the closest person to the mother and the child. 
Her “very difficult” tasks required love for her work and, more importantly, great tact and 
patience in approaching Soviet mothers and convincing them to listen to her advice. As 
Lebedeva explained,  
the sister who visits a family at the wrong time and demands that the family pays 
attention to her and her recommendations can only push away the family and all her 
advice would be useless...It is possible that the first visits do not produce the wished 
results.
133
 
According to Lebedeva, “complete trust” was to govern the relationship between the mother and 
the sister: 
…the sister visiting a Soviet family in its home…should not give orders or reproach the 
mothers when they made mistakes in the care of their children…the questions that the 
sister asks to the mother about the care and the feeding of the child should not sound like 
a police interrogation.
134
 
Thus, official instructions emphasized that the sister should win over the confidence and trust of 
the family “consistently, but gently and tactfully,” since success was guaranteed “only when the 
family meets the sister with a happy smile, looking at her as a good helper.”135 
At the same time, the sister of patronage was not the philanthropist of old times. She was 
a definitely Soviet figure, whose role was not only to investigate into the homes of Soviet single 
women, but also to agitate for the socialist gender order. This is clearly revealed by the range of 
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her responsibilities. First, she needed to have a precise idea of the conditions in which mothers 
and children lived: she checked out the baby, the crib, clothes, and food; wrote down all her 
observations on an “investigation form” (obsledovatel’nyi list); and passed her notes over to the 
doctor. Second, the sister of patronage had to acquaint the mother with the most elementary 
norms of hygiene and baby care. Finally, she directed the mother to the consultation points. In 
later visitations, the patronage sister checked whether the mother was implementing the doctor’s 
recommendations in the right way. The sister’s investigations were to be even more accurate and 
frequent for the children of sick mothers, children raised by non-biological mothers, sick 
children, and all children living in “bad, anti-hygienic conditions.”136 According to this narrative, 
Soviet women did not know what was cleanliness and comfort; they were so dark that they 
needed to see how things should be done. As doctor A.N. Rakhmanov said in a speech entitled 
“Deliveries and the work of [Ommlad] sections,” the sister of patronage “infuse[d] health, life, 
and light in the darkest settings.”137 Thus, besides normalizing, standardizing, and gendering the 
sister of patronage, this conceptualization of her functions also included a poorly veiled subtext 
that, time and again, represented the single mother as the fundamentally helpless recipient of aid 
and the giver of insufficient and improper care to the future generation.  
Like other intermediary figures that we saw mediating help between the Soviet state and 
its marginalized populations, the sister of patronage refracted the light coming from higher 
sources of authority and directed it at dark single mothers. Because of her gender, she was 
believed to have the ability to win over the trust of the latter. Despite her gender, she could be 
trusted because she had been enlightened through special qualification courses. And yet, the 
sister was complementary and auxiliary to doctors who were cast male. She was a “transmission 
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belt” that moved back and forth between mothers and doctors: she delivered the state’s 
educational program of model sexual and parental behavior and, after having observed what 
happened in women’s houses, reported back to the doctors. When the child fell sick, the sister 
was not supposed to intervene, but to report the disease immediately to the doctor. Caught in the 
middle, the sister was not supposed to have any autonomy and even her agency as “good helper” 
was rather limited and subordinated to the more passive role of observer, conduit for the 
knowledge of the doctor, and vehicle of the state’s will. In the end, the sister of patronage 
functioned as an extension of the doctor’s authority and an emissary of the state, bringing with 
her not just medical knowledge but also political messages.
138
  
This was on paper. What actually happened on the ground was not so neat. Doctors and 
administrators tended to take residence in the capital of the province to which they were 
assigned. The towns, villages, and rural settlements in which worked most sisters of patronage, 
sisters-educators, and nurses could be very isolated from the provincial urban centers. This 
condition largely left the red sisters to their own devices in the provision of help to single 
mothers. For instance, in 1919-1921 the Home for Mother and Child of the Cherdyn’ district 
(Perm’ province) did not have its own stable medical personnel and the mothers residing there 
were left to the care of a “sister of charity” and five nannies. Only occasionally were they visited 
by the doctor of the local hospital.
139
 When inspector Ozernaia visited the Cherdyn’ Home for 
Mother and Child in October-November 1921 and discovered this state of things, she penned a 
very critical report. Ozernaia denounced the care that the mothers provided to their children in 
this home as fundamentally “incorrect” because feedings happened at the wrong times and not in 
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agreement with the norms. The “total chaos” reigning in this home caused “a high percentage of 
infections among children.”140 
Given the geographical set up and the lack of qualified personnel and resources, it is not 
surprising that the planned, efficient, and coordinated work foreseen in the official documents 
could rarely occur in the reality of the Soviet periphery. The bureaucrats sitting in the provincial 
centers constantly asked the activists in the peripheral areas to provide data in a timely manner – 
a sign that the passage of information did not happen so quickly and efficiently. The 
administrators of the provincial sections of social welfare complained that they did not know 
how many unmarried pregnant and breast-feeding mothers lived in each district. Doctors 
lamented that they did not have precise data on childbirth in the localities. All this indicates that 
social workers did not always fill out the forms that would have counted and categorized the 
Soviet female population as the state would have wanted. The instructions coming from the 
center largely fell on deaf ears and the leaders of Ommlad provincial sections had no way to 
know whether and how the sisters in the localities were performing their work.
141
 
Discursive representation and reality on the ground diverged also in regard to the 
relationship between the sisters of patronage and their assisted. This was not the patient, 
trustworthy, and affectionate rapport mandated by the official instructions, and the outcome of 
patronage visitations was rarely the much desired re-education of backward single mothers. To 
the contrary, the sisters’ inspections sometimes turned into drastic interventions that destroyed 
single women’s households. This is what happened to a certain Iranda D’iakova, a poor single 
mother living in the Perm’ province. Iranda, her child, and her elderly mother occupied a room in 
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a humid, cold, and dirty basement. Their only source of income was the money made by the old 
woman by begging on the streets. The sister of patronage who visited them could see only 
violence, disease, and insanity in this household: the old woman “awfully beats the child,” while 
the daughter beats the old woman because she beats the child… The child's mother 
appears healthy, but in reality she is covered with wounds...Judging from how she talks, 
we can conclude that the mother of the child is not completely normal and the old woman 
too is not normal.  
A neighbor confirmed this assessment and added the usual accusation of rudeness: young 
D'iakova “speaks horribly, like a cab driver, and the old mother is not less rude.” The activist’s 
conclusion was clear: “In one word: we must take away the child.”142  
On their end, single mothers rarely looked at the red sisters as agents of culture. To the 
contrary, most of the time they did not accept being schooled into becoming good mothers or to 
acquire any practical knowledge. As a sister complained in 1926, “mothers demand too much 
and look at me as a dimwit (tupogolovuiu).”143 Many mothers did not trust the sisters of 
patronage with the care of their sick children and even accused them of “ruining the children.”144 
Thus, reversing the hierarchies built by the activists’ discourse of help, some mothers considered 
the sisters of patronage rude towards the children, deeply distrusted them, and approached the 
assistance offered through patronage in merely utilitarian terms.  
Like many patriarchal households, Ommlad was ridden by tensions and conflicts. So-
called “personal misunderstandings” happened on a daily basis between the doctors and the 
midwives, the red sisters and their subordinates, the nannies and the laundresses. These petty 
conflicts too reflected gendered hierarchies of backwardness, whereby the person occupying the 
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more subordinate position was also identified as the more rude and uncultured. In fact, the 
charge of rudeness – which stood for carelessness and indiscipline – was freely exchanged 
among the personnel of Ommlad’s facilities as well as between them and their assisted. 
Ultimately, it was a weapon to either confirm or reverse these hierarchies of subordination and 
the mechanisms of power that they entailed. 
Single mothers actively participated in these conflicts, making use of the charge of 
rudeness every time they wanted to re-establish some power. They frequently asked “rude 
nannies” to “chat less, care more about the babies,” and – more importantly – submit to the will 
of the doctor or facility director.
145
 Defending herself from the accusation of being rude, a certain 
Mal'gina replied that, if she was rude, it was “in a just way, to be an example.” For instance, 
Mal’gina related the following episode:  
Ovechkina brought in a child with a temperature of 38.5 C. I don't take him and she 
screams 'I will leave him and go.' I say that we don't have an isolation room and I cannot 
take him. She says 'you don’t understand anything.' This is my rudeness: that out of 
justice I don't make compromises with the mothers.
146
  
The allegation of rudeness and carelessness percolated the chain of relations, going down 
the ladder of power from the doctor/director to the illiterate nanny and, at times, climbing it back 
up in the subordinates’ attempts to disrupt these hierarchies. For instance, in a petition to the 
Perm’ district section of the Union of Medical Employees dated February 10, 1928, the midwife 
Nadezhda Dmitrievna Iakimova argued that Doctor V.L. Blagoveshchenskii was rude in 
addressing the personnel of the Chermozskii hospital and thereby created “an impossible 
working environment.” This doctor’s rudeness had a negative influence on the mood of the 
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employees, made it difficult for them to keep working in the hospital, and induced many to leave 
their jobs. Iakimova further accused Doctor Blagoveshchenskii of “unlimited egoism and 
revengefulness”: he forced his employees to demonstrate absolute loyalty to him and to take the 
blame for his mistakes. As evidence for this charge, Iakimova related the case of a single mother 
who had suffocated her new born child immediately after delivery. Doctor Blagoveshchenskii 
had attributed responsibility for the child’s death to the midwife and the hospital orderly 
(sanitarka) who had left the child alone with the mother despite his instructions. When asked to 
testify that the doctor had indeed mandated strict surveillance over mother and child, Iakimova 
refused to give a “loyal but false testimony,” that would have protected the doctor but led to the 
firing of the hospital’s employees. Reversing the logic of rudeness, Iakimova presented the 
doctor’s “rude and inhuman approach” towards his female subordinates as a sign of male 
arbitrariness in demanding loyalty and shifting blame.
147
 
When the doctor (as the head of the patriarchal household) was too despotic and 
arbitrary, independence seeking sisters desperately battled for some autonomy. Indeed, the more 
senior and experienced employees of Ommlad’s facilities often complained that skilled workers 
were reduced “to the role of blind performers of the doctors’ will.”148 In the effort to defend their 
interests, midwives, red sisters, and nannies accused the doctors of “taking away all [their] rights 
and initiative”149 and putting them in a “right-less humiliating position.”150 On their end, 
attempting to maintain as much control as possible, doctors portrayed their rebellious “helpers” 
as undisciplined and unable to work properly. As various doctors lamented, sisters and nannies 
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“do not desire to be taught,” “are terribly stubborn”, and “do not perform what they are told to 
do.”151   
We can see these petty conflicts as struggles for the representation of the self and the 
other. As such, they highlight what were believed to be the distinguishing features turning a 
helpless backward woman into the good and valuable helper of a doctor that was constructed as 
male. Impeccable physical health, literacy and special training, honesty and conscientiousness, 
devotion to work, disciplined behavior, and loyalty to male power (embodied by the doctor but 
in fact emanating from the state) allowed women to overcome their helplessness and become 
exemplary Soviet female subjects. 
Conclusion  
Soviet ideology maintained that women without a male wage earner needed the 
protection of the state. Help to this category of needy citizens was conceptualized around three 
key principles. First, the protection of single women was equated with the defense of the health 
of the future generation and as such it constituted part and parcel of the state’s engagement 
against abortion and children’s mortality. Second, help to single mothers was conceived as a 
“school of motherhood”: it belonged to the state’s program of “cultural enlightenment” in the 
realms of sexuality and parenthood. Third, while policies and laws concerning issues of labor 
and maternity had the proclaimed goal to emancipate women, Ommlad activists seemed to lack 
any emancipatory agenda for their charges. Doctors and social workers sought to treat the 
medical, legal, and economic ills that plagued single women, but at the same time wanted to 
keep them dependent on their male breadwinner. Ommlad activists assigned Soviet men and 
                                                          
151
 GAPK, f. 132, o. 1, d. 115, l. 79. 
220 
 
women the opposing roles of male breadwinner (kormilets) and female dependent (izhdivenka); 
their discourses and practices incorporated assumptions about female dependence and male 
breadwinning abilities that fit with normative notions of gendered obligations. Conventional 
heterosexual family bonds remained the primary form of security for Soviet women. No real 
attempt was made to effectively restructure traditional gender relations and to free women from 
their dependence on marriage and the family.  
In the case studied in this chapter, access to state assistance was clearly articulated as a 
legal right. Official decrees unwaveringly established the legal protection of female labor and 
many laws granted unequivocal rights to abandoned women. In their efforts to implement this 
legislation, Ommlad activists constantly reminded their higher-ups in the hierarchy of welfare 
that single women had the right to maternity leave and material help on the grounds of the codes 
of law and the directives of various commissariats. However, by investigating how single 
women’s right to be helped was realized in practice, I have shown that the main task of Ommlad 
boiled down to the battle against abortions and children’s mortality, while women’s 
emancipation became a secondary goal. In the case of single women, a right to assistance that 
was clearly legally defined, also blatantly merged with a disciplining agenda that aimed at 
controlling women in the most intimate of realms.  
According to Soviet conceptualization of social help, socialist assistance to single 
mothers should have not turned into a provision of charity that viewed women as unequal and 
inferior to men. In fact, undergirding Ommlad’s activism was a far from revolutionary 
conception of women-alone as fundamentally helpless. Russian history and culture worked 
together with the Soviet state’s policies and ideology to reinforce old images of women. Already 
in the 1918 Family Code and the directives issued to implement it, an enduring myth system of 
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women as mothers became embedded in the new Soviet legislation. Ommlad’s work further 
naturalized the association between women and reproduction. Following the development of this 
conceptual framework and its concrete embodiments in Ommlad’s sites of help to single 
mothers, I showed that strong gender boundaries, women’s subordinate status as men’s helpers, 
and their duties as mothers were part of Bolshevik ideology from the immediate post-
revolutionary years and remained pivotal in defining single women’s right to be helped 
throughout the early Soviet and Stalinist experience. To be reduced to subservient and 
subordinate mothers was a mixed blessing for Soviet women. It did make it easier for them to 
claim help. And yet, it placed them outside of the workers’ movement, which in Soviet ideology 
was the only possible forum for class as well as gender liberation. Paradoxically, while 
unemployed single mothers were able to receive relatively greater state assistance than other 
marginalized social groups, their egalitarian integration into society remained an unresolved 
issue.       
Traditional gender notions were so strong and pervasive that they kept animating Soviet 
men’s and women’s ways of demanding help even when the other legitimizing categories of the 
right to be helped became unavailable to them. In the next chapter, we will see how the interplay 
between a gendered conceptualization of help, relations of patronage, understandings of socialist 
morality, and reliance on official laws shaped activists’ and individual petitioners’ strategies to 
prod the regime to deliver help to political prisoners and their families. 
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Chapter 5 
Socialist Morality: 
The Political Red Cross’s Defense of Prisoners’ Rights 
“Each individual has the opportunity to defend his rights. Each individual can protect himself 
against violations of the law”1 
 
“The law is a taiga and the procurator is a bear”2 
 
“The state donated money for the very people, whom it had put in jail – isn’t that intriguing?”3 
 
Memoir literature has popularized the image of the Soviet prison as a place of 
arbitrariness and abuse of authority, where the state could heavy-handedly interfere in the lives 
of its subjects and individuals arrested for political crimes were ipso facto deprived of all rights. 
Legal historiography has proposed a similar understanding of the Soviet prison system as a 
mechanism of repression that completely disregarded prisoners’ rights.4 In fact, a number of 
Soviet central agencies aimed at identifying breaches of socialist legality and curbing illegal 
                                                          
Portions of this chapter were published in my article “Defending the Rights of Gulag Prisoners: The Story of the 
Political Red Cross, 1918-39,” The Russian Review, 71:1 (January 2012), 6-29. 
1
 S. Z-tsev, “III sessiia VTsIK,” Ezhenedel’nik sovetskoi iustitsii, no. 18, 20 May 1922, 8. 
2
 Prison saying popular among the chekists. Quoted in K.N. Morozov, Sudebnyi protsess sotsialistov-
revoliutsionerov i tiuremnoe protivostoianie (1922-1926): etika i taktika protivoborstva (Moscow: Rosspen, 2005), 
512-513. 
3
 These words were pronounced by the activist E.I. Murav’eva in a private conversation with her grand-daughter 
T.A. Ugrimova. They are quoted in T.A. Ugrimova “Stoi v zavete svoem…” Nikolai Konstantinovich Murav’ev. 
Advokat i obshchestvennyi deiatel’. Vospominaniia, dokumenty,materialy (Moscow, OOO “AMA-Press”, 2004), 
307. 
4
John N. Hazard and Morris L. Weisberg, Cases and Readings on Soviet Law (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1950); Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society; Eugene Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State. 
The Origins and Development of the Soviet Bar, 1917-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Arch 
Getty, “State and Society under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s,” Slavic Review, 50: 1 (Spring 
1991), 18-35; Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin. Russian historiography on the Soviet state’s repressive 
policies is very vast. Among the most significant contributions are D.B. Pavlov, Bol’shevitstskaia diktatura protiv 
sotsialistov i anarkhistov 1917-seredina 1950-kh godov (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999) and Morozov, Sudebnyi protsess 
sotsialistov-revoliutsioneov.   
223 
 
practices in the administration of prison justice. The VTsIK, the Rabkrin’s Legal Department, the 
Sovnarkom, the Commissariat of Justice (Narkomiust), the Office of the Procurator 
(Prokuratura), and the NKVD were all in part responsible for guaranteeing the respect of laws 
and directives regulating imprisonment. The Political Red Cross (Politicheskii Krasnyi Krest) 
was another supervisory institution which, like the above organs, exerted control over the places 
of imprisonment. And yet, it was unique and special, because it was the only Soviet agency that 
made help to political prisoners its raison d’être, its primary and explicit goal.5   
While the state was imprisoning real and imagined political criminals by the hundreds 
and thousands, it also permitted the existence of an organization whose job was to help them. As 
a non-governmental society legally operating in the Soviet Union from 1918 to 1938, the 
Political Red Cross (or simply the Cross, as its members called it throughout its existence and 
later in their memoirs) fulfilled a necessary function. Prisons were a costly institution to maintain 
and there was no other state agency that could adequately engage the human needs of the 
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prisoners and their families. As the official site of help to prisoners as well as of control over 
legality in the Gulag, the Cross had an impact on the investigation and police organs.
6
 The very 
existence of an organization able to secure some leniency for political prisoners raises important 
questions about the measures of social control and the policies of care implemented by the 
socialist state towards its deviant populations. In addition, the case of political prisoners 
constitutes a test ground to gauge into the expectations of activists and single Soviet individuals 
concerning help to the marginalized members of that society. Within my study of the right to be 
helped, the Cross dramatizes an ambiguity of the repressive and welfare mechanisms that 
mutually constituted each other in the early Soviet and Stalinist experience, namely, the 
paradoxical coexistence of hatred for people who deviated from the norm and notions of morality 
and rights expressed through assistance to them as suffering individuals.  
This chapter explores how the Political Red Cross claimed prisoners’ rights to legal help, 
a better treatment during imprisonment, and material assistance for them and their families. With 
this investigation I pursue two interrelated goals. First, I analyze how the Cross’s members (the 
krasnokrestovtsy) articulated the concept of help as protection against the abuses of state 
officials. Second, I show the incongruities inherent in this notion of help, in the help movement 
embodied by the institution of the Cross, and in the very individuals working in it. Sometimes 
the Cross was able to alleviate the fate of political prisoners on legal grounds; other times – by 
reference to socialist morality; and finally, when all the rest failed, through networks of 
patronage. Prisoners’ right to be helped depended on the authorities’ whim and the 
krasnokrestovtsy’s good relations with them. Ultimately, this right took shape in the dialogues 
between alternative and continually competing understandings of socialism in Soviet culture and 
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 The police organ responsible for arresting political opponents and managing political prisoners was first called 
Cheka, then OGPU, and later NKVD. For sake of brevity, in this chapter I will always use the acronym Cheka 
notwithstanding the name changes that this organ underwent over the years.  
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society – past and present socialist values; legal, socio-political, and moral conceptions of 
socialism.  
In its politics of advocacy, the Cross always alluded to prisoners’ poverty, old age, 
loneliness, helplessness, defenselessness, material and moral wretchedness, and outright 
desperation. As we have seen in the previous chapters, these were all invocation of the 
legitimizing category of need and suffering. They were also calls to judge the politically deviant 
through morality, rather than exclusively through laws and juridical norms. Indeed, the legal 
arguments initially advanced by the krasnokrestovtsy soon appeared to be insufficient to 
legitimize prisoners’ right to be helped. Increasingly, the Cross activists began to invoke moral 
feelings by reference to the prisoners’ miserable lives. In the end, the Cross appealed to a more 
humane understanding of rights, whereby a formal and literal application of the law neglected 
the living content of human suffering, and effective justice was achieved by keeping both with 
laws and the dictates of one’s conscience.  
Justice (spravedlivost’) almost never appeared as a legitimizing category in the 
discourses and practices of the Cross. It is therefore difficult to understand how this help-
oriented institution related the concept of justice to its understanding of legality. On one hand, 
the krasnokrestovtsy wrote narratives of help that were based in the rule of law and that did not 
exonerate their clients’ actions, but instead challenged the lax procedure of the notoriously 
corrupt Soviet police. Thus, they mounted a moral challenge not to an unjust political order, but 
to the illegality that could exist within that order. On the other hand, however, one could suggest 
that they insisted on legality because they were aware of the absence of justice in their political 
system.  
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This ambiguous relationship between legality and justice is an indication that the Cross’s 
help to political prisoners should not be interpreted as a narrow story of political opposition or 
dissent. Indeed, by combining legal and political history with a more broadly social perspective, 
some historians have problematizes traditional simplifications of the notion of resistance. For 
instance, Lynne Viola has conceptualized resistance as “part of a wide continuum” and 
recommended scholars to engage the wide range of social and cultural complexities that inform 
it.
7
 Similarly, Peter Fritzsche has warned historians not to assume that resistance is “more true to 
the identity of the subject than accommodation or collaboration,”8 and Anna Krylova has 
questioned historians’ conceptual views leading to the construction of stable and unitary subjects 
with “features of internal coherence.”9  
In line with this historiography, in this chapter I propose “liminality” as a more useful 
conceptual and analytical tool for understanding why and how an organization such as the Cross 
could emerge in 1918 and – more or less effectively – keep providing help to Soviet prisoners 
until 1938. As a hermeneutical concept, liminality is the state of being both insider and 
outsider.
10
 As a method of analysis, liminality helps scholars of Soviet history avoid the classic 
opposition between believers and dissidents, and rather shows the continuum between loyalty 
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8
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9
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Communitas,” in Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors. Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1974), 231-271.  
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and resistance.
11
 As postcolonial literary scholar Homi Bhabha has argued, “the temporal 
movement and passage” of a liminal space “prevents identities…from settling into primordial 
polarities.”12 While liminality allows historians of the Soviet Union not to heroicize, romanticize, 
and thus reify the krasnokrestovtsy as resisting subjects, it also prevents representing them 
simply as accommodators or adaptors. Rather, these activists were untidy, contradictory, and 
unsettled actors, individuals who were variously mobilized and transformed by a revolution that 
created for them political and personal possibilities. They were not so much resisting the 
encroachments of the state, but rather being entangled in its relationships of power. Applying 
liminality, we can interpret the krasnokrestovtsy as social activists who operated as liaisons 
between the state and its needy Gulag population, advocating for the prisoners’ rights and 
reminding the state of its duties towards them.  
The institution of the Cross, its activists, and its practice of help to political prisoners 
were liminal also in a temporal sense because they stood on a chronological boundary of 
historical traditions and conceptions of socialism. The Cross occupied a hybrid position in the 
passage from earlier movements and competing visions of socialism to the more monolithic 
stance of high Stalinism. While the krasnokrestovtsy inherited the ethos of their immediate 
predecessors (the revolutionaries of the 1880s who helped fellow party members agonizing in the 
tsarist prisons),
13
 these activists did not relate socialist help to dissent, but rather combined civil 
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engagement and the moral obligation to social service with loyalty to the state. The 
krasnokrestovtsy linked themselves closely to the letter of the Soviet law and learned how to use 
legal provisions to protect the interests of (allegedly) harmful and dangerous elements. At the 
same time, the Cross’s activists spoke against illegality without openly criticizing Soviet policies 
or otherwise waging wars with the state. In this, the activists of the 1920s-1930s differed not 
only from the pre-1917 revolutionaries, but also from the democratic dissidents of the post-Stalin 
period. While the latter also spurred practices of assistance to political prisoners basing their 
claims in law and “regard[ing] the right to defend every oppressed individual as a moral 
obligation,” they distinguished themselves from the krasnokrestovtsy, because they took their 
ideas into the public sphere of the samizdat and thereby prompted social change.
14
 Indeed, the 
dissidents of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras preferred to associate themselves with the 
culture and the ethics of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia than with those of the 
krasnokrestovtsy.
15
 
In the following pages I will employ liminality first to trace the institutional history of 
this organization, then to examine the diverging life experiences and convictions of three 
krasnokrestovtsy, and finally to reconstruct the dialogues between the activists, the state, and the 
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prisoners. And yet, seen through liminality, not only the defense of political prisoners but also 
the broader idea and the practice of the right to be helped emerge as a reality of early Soviet and 
Stalinist life which did not spell resistance. In one way or the other, all the communities of 
activists analyzed in this dissertation aimed at disrupting the marginalizing impulses of the 
Soviet state vis-à-vis its deviant populations, but also largely sustained the all-pervasive power of 
that state. This peculiar combination of activism and loyalty to the existing government was the 
sine qua non condition of the Soviet right to be helped. However, it also infused this right with 
many tensions and contradictions. Ultimately, the humanitarian concern for the personal 
suffering of marginalized individuals and the defensive desire to maintain socio-political order 
placed the help movement and the very concept of the right to be helped both inside and outside 
of Soviet socialism and its moral order.    
5.1 The institution 
Foundation, goals, and philosophical platform of the Political Red Cross 
On January 30, 1918, the Commissar of Justice Isaak Z. Shteinberg wrote a note to the 
“comrades” in the Commissariat for Judicial Cases asking them to “pay attention to Vinaver's 
proposal to establish a Political Red Cross in Moscow.” He added that a similar institution 
already existed in Petrograd where “it work[ed] wonderfully.”16 Written at the time of the 
coalition government between the socialist revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, Shteinberg's letter 
offered ground to establish official relations between an organization providing help to political 
prisoners and the judicial authorities. Following this letter, first the Commissar of Justice of the 
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 GARF, f. 8419. o. 1, d. 1, l. 1. The Petrograd PRC was organized already in 1917. One of its first appeals for 
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city and province of Moscow, Aleksandr Shreider, and then the head of the Cheka, Felix 
Dzerzhinskii, gave the members of the Committee of the Moscow Red Cross permission to visit 
places of imprisonment and meet with the prisoners’ representatives to enquire about their needs. 
As a member of the Moscow group said, “at a time when it [was] so difficult to feed the 
prisoners and the judicial apparatus [was] only taking shape, [this activity was] very essential 
both for the prisoners and the state.”17 “The practical usefulness of our efforts” echoed the 
krasnokrestovets Nikolai Murav’ev in the first annual report to the general assembly of members, 
“reconciled the state’s representatives with our activities.”18   
Like all the other non-governmental societies of the time, the Moscow Committee of the 
Political Red Cross needed to have a statute. The Cross activists elaborated a draft statutory 
document which carried the signatures of the old revolutionaries Vera Nikolaevna Figner, Vera 
Ivanovna Zasulich, and German Aleksandrovich Lopatin. The officially approved “Statute of the 
Russian Society of the Red Cross for Help to Political Prisoners (Political Red Cross)” was 
printed in Moscow in 1919 and signed by Mikhail L’vovich Vinaver as Chairman of the Moscow 
Committee.
19
 The documents differed only in two points: the printed statute limited the activities 
of the Cross to the Moscow territory and – probably to prevent any doubt concerning its loyalty – 
did not mention “moral support” to political prisoners as one of the Society’s stated goals. In all 
other respects the two statutes were identical. They explained that the Society was established 
“with the goal to provide help to individuals deprived of freedom for political reasons without 
distinction of party membership and professed convictions.” Both documents emphasized that all 
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actions undertaken by the Cross were within the limits of legality. Both writings identified the 
distinguishing trait of Soviet help to individuals accused of political crimes as the regular 
provision of assistance by a state-recognized organ. This feature clearly distanced Soviet help to 
political prisoners from the pre-revolutionary relief, which was irregularly administered by an 
illegal underground organization.
20
 In order to turn the defense of political prisoners into a state-
approved practice, the krasnokretovtsy loudly proclaimed the principle of non-participation in 
politics not only in the Society’s statute, but also in a note that appeared in some Moscow 
newspapers in May 1918.
21
 At a time when the civil war was at its climax all over the territory of 
the new Soviet state, this principle was the only guarantee to preserve the newly organized 
institution and hope to achieve any results in its activities.  
Thus, from its very inception, the Cross took upon itself the role of a-political, non-party, 
legal defender (pravozashchitnik) or rights’ advocate (pravozastupnik).22 It defined political 
defense as the provision of a professional service to any individual accused of political crimes. 
Although this claim represented a political move by itself, the Cross insisted that its advocacy 
was neither a political activity nor an ideologically grounded defense of prisoners’ rights. Rather 
this organization attempted to establish humanitarian and legal criteria for determining prisoners’ 
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entitlements. In the Cross’s view, humanity and necessity impelled the prisoners’ right to 
material relief, while a legal (not political) line needed to be followed in assigning juridical help. 
However, this a-political argument was in fact political and thereby sustained a very ambiguous 
project. As we will see by analyzing the disputes that in the following years would dominate the 
relations between the Cross and the police organs, the issues of who and how should oversee the 
prisoners’ welfare and perform supervisionary functions in the Soviet prisons were much more 
than simple a-political questions. In the way of the protection of prisoners’ right was nothing less 
than state security. The profoundly political character of prisoners’ care and control would 
become explicit every time that the Cross activists competed with the representatives of the 
police in defining the right to be helped within the Gulag. 
In the conceptualization of the activists who founded the Cross,
23
 the advocacy for 
political prisoners had to be not only a-political, but also essentially non-party. This meant that 
help was provided to anyone deprived of freedom for reasons of political and/or religious nature. 
This included all kinds of persons. Indeed, political sentencing was a very blurred and elastic 
concept in the Soviet Union. The political section of the Criminal Code of 1922 provided a long 
list of political offenses dubbed as “counterrevolutionary” and defined in the broadest possible 
terms. The Cheka issued general allegations and sometimes did not formulate any accusation at 
all. The majority of “politicals” were individuals who neither belonged to a party nor could be 
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accused of specific political crimes. Especially in the high-pitched atmosphere of the 
collectivization, many “political offenders” were in fact peasants for whom charges had 
escalated from ordinary to political. Indeed, after 1928, acts once treated as banal hooliganism, 
cases of negligence on the work, and common offenses such as arson, assault, and murder were 
re-qualified as political crimes and the peasants who committed them were sentenced to terms of 
8-10 years or even to death.
24
 
Since the authorities could politicize almost any crime, the Cross’s advocates could take 
on almost any case without going beyond the limits of their jurisdiction. The Cross adapted its 
working definition of political prisoner to the practices of the police organs, but also to the 
pressure of petitioning citizens, who relied on the imprecise content of political crimes to draft 
extraordinarily diverse requests, complaints, and petitions. Although in its makeup the Cross 
consisted mostly of former socialist-revolutionaries (and perhaps it was initially created for the 
sake of this political group), it soon accepted as clients “ideological political prisoners” from all 
backgrounds (socialists and anarchists of all possible colors) as well as a mass of ordinary 
persons.
25
 In addition, the Cross decided not to limit itself to helping the inmates, but to extend 
assistance to individuals recently released from prison and to the prisoners' relatives.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the Soviet state’s official discourse of help mandated social 
assistance to all individuals who were in dire need but unable to work and without responsible 
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relatives. In line with this official discourse, the Cross took upon itself the defense of those 
prisoners who were not economically self-sufficient and did not benefit from the care of close 
relatives. According to its statute, to accomplish this goal the Society arranged frequent visits to 
the places of imprisonment “with the permission of the authorities.” It regularly offered meals to 
political prisoners and provided them with foodstuffs, clothes, and medical help.
26
 It interceded 
for the improvement of the conditions of imprisonment, for amnesty, and for reductions in the 
sentences of condemned politicals. It facilitated – “through all possible legal means” – visitation 
and written communication between the prisoners and their relatives and friends. It gave the 
prisoners books, journals, and newspapers. It organized lectures, performances, concerts, and 
literary evenings to collect donations. It had the permission to publish books, brochures, journals, 
and newspapers “with humanitarian content.” The latter point of the statute opened up space for 
the propaganda of humanitarian ideas and the elaboration of theoretical issues related to political 
imprisonment. In practice, to the best of my knowledge, the Cross never published anything.
27
 
The Society enjoyed the property rights of an autonomous juridical person and had its 
own official seal. There was no limit on the number of its members: new members were admitted 
upon written recommendation by two older members and anybody could be a krasnokrestovets 
as long as he/she paid the yearly membership fee, had reached majority, and had not be 
condemned for major crimes. The Society’s central administrative organs were located at the 
address Kuznetskii Most n. 16 (at walking distance from the offices of the police organs on 
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Lubianka Square). They included a general assembly of members, a council with a presidium 
(consisting of a chairman, a vice-chairman, and a secretary), and a central revision commission. 
But the pulsating heart of the Cross was the central committee and its four executive 
commissions: for the visitation of prisoners, financial and economic, medical, and juridical. The 
economic commission took care of satisfying the prisoners' needs for foodstuffs and clothes as 
well as improving the conditions of their frequent transfers between places of detention. The 
medical commission organized health care for the prisoners and checked on the sanitary and 
hygienic conditions of the places of imprisonment. The juridical commission carried out the 
court defense of the prisoners, drafted their legal requests and petitions, and strove to solve all 
theoretical and practical issues concerning the legal status of political criminals.
28
 All the work 
on the ground was performed by the commission for prison visitation. Its members visited 
detainees in prison, inquired about their needs and wishes, and facilitated communication with 
relatives and friends.
29
 
The central committee had also the task to keep in touch with all national and 
international organizations dealing with political prisoners. The Cross was founded and operated 
independently from the Russian national section of the International Red Cross – the so-called 
“Russian Society of the Red Cross for Help to Sick and Wounded Soldiers,” which had been 
opened in 1867. The Cross never advanced pretensions to become a national society and 
recognized that only the Russian Society of the Red Cross “ha[d] the right to operate as the 
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exclusive national society for help to sick and wounded soldiers.”30 The Cross did not participate 
in any international conference of Red Cross organizations. However, as a note in the statute 
explained, it “operate[d] in harmony with the principles of the International Red Cross and in 
solidarity with it and its national sections.”31 In a letter to one of their donors, the 
krasnokrestovtsy further explained that their Society operated “on the grounds of the Geneva 
Convention of 1864” which – in the krasnokrestotsy’s interpretation – mandated to offer “non-
party help to all who suffer for their political convictions.”32 Furthermore, while the International 
Red Cross never officially recognized the Political Red Cross, the Polish section of the Red 
Cross hired the krasnokrestovtsy Ekaterina Peshkova and Mikhail Vinaver as its official 
representatives in Russia. Polish citizens detained in Russian prisons sent them their petitions for 
release and repatriation and asked them to intercede with the higher organs of the Soviet state. 
The krasnokrestovets Nikolai Murav’ev was also involved in providing legal assistance to Polish 
citizens detained in Russian prisons.
33
 
At the beginning of 1921, when Murav’ev was holding the position of Chairman of the 
Moscow Committee, he charged the revision commission member Aleksandr S. Tager to 
investigate whether their Society could legally use the name and the icon of the red cross. The 
question was not trivial, since the name and logo of any organization are public symbols that 
stand for an identity. The statute printed in 1919 had a complex logo which combined the red 
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cross and the chains, the latter being the international icon of fin-de-siècle relief committees for 
political prisoners.
34
  
 
Figure 4: Detail from the cover of the Statute of the Moscow Society of the Red Cross for Help to Political Prisoners 
(Political Red Cross). Source: Dolzhanskaia,”Nash spor s Vami reshit zhizn’.”  
Later documents had only the cross. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Detail from a letter to the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet. Source: GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 1, l. 41. 
 
The denomination and the emblem of the red cross symbolized activities performed in the 
name of humanitarianism with the purpose to help people suffering in various tragedies. Tager 
argued that help to political prisoners in Russia was congruent with the general principles of red 
cross work, which, in his view, had an international nature and a binding force for all Western 
states. The Cross thus strove to operate by the rules adopted “in all civilized countries” and “in 
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the other states of the cultured world.” Tager listed two necessary conditions for his organization 
to work legally under the red cross icon: 1) that its endeavors neither violate nor contradict 
Soviet legislation; 2) that its legal work corresponded in theory and in practical content to the 
general principles of international red cross relief. The Moscow Political Red Cross satisfied 
both requirements. As Tager wrote,  
before the revolution of 1917 the Political Red Cross existed illegally. At that time, not 
only the name and the icon of the red cross, but its very activities...were against the law. 
…This situation immediately changed after the revolution.35 
For the first time in its history, after October 1917 the Cross legally provided help to all sorts of 
political prisoners. Tager insisted that  
the activities of our Society in providing various forms of help to political prisoners 
happen in a completely open manner, legally, with the permission of the organs of the 
state and with their collaboration in those cases when this collaboration is necessary.
36
  
In this light, it is not a coincidence that the chain symbol disappeared. The new Soviet 
organization needed collaboration from the most diverse organs and the icon of the pre-
revolutionary underground Political Red Cross might have induced them to refuse it. Instead, the 
principle of humanitarian help and the non-party make-up could continue to be articulated 
through the traditional icon of the red cross.  
As I have mentioned, visits to the places of imprisonment were one of key components of 
the Cross’s work and reflected the relationship of the Cross with various state agencies. Already 
in August 1918, the Punitive Section of the Narkomiust had issued a circular letter regulating 
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prison visitation by the representatives of the Cross.
37
 The Society’s “right of prison visitation” 
was later confirmed by a resolution of the Presidium of the All-Russian Cheka issued in 
February 1919. A telegram written by the head of the Cheka Council, Samsonov, on May 16, 
1921, informed the provincial chekists that the representatives of the Cross should be given 
permission to meet with the prisoners’ elders. The Cross had a copy of this telegram and its 
delegates showed it to the provincial chekists every time they wanted to access a prison.
38
 
Despite all this, to obtain access to prisons and camps, the krasnokrestovtsy still had to overcome 
a series of hindrances coming from the lower agents of state power. According to Murav’ev, the 
latter 
considered the activity of our Society as ‘counter-revolutionary’ and were unable to 
comprehend the high idea of service to the human person which we adopted as our 
leading principle…They set up cavils and wrecked the nerves of our collaborators…39 
In December 1921, the chekist Rozenblium cancelled the universal permission to access all 
camps that had been granted to some activists and instead promised that he would give the 
krasnokrestovtsy L.E. Elliner and I.S. Kal’meer permission to visit any camp anytime they called 
him by telephone.
40
 Thus, three-four years since the inception of their activities, the source of the 
activists’ “right to prison visitation” moved from a piece of paper to a telephone call. The 
passage from bureaucracy to personal connections made the ground on which the Cross was 
standing much shakier. The relevance of personal connections became even more pronounced in 
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1922 when permission to visit places of imprisonment was granted only personally to Peshkova 
and Vinaver.  
Indeed, 1922 was an important year of change for the Cross. In the month of June, a 
resolution of the Presidium of the VTsIK had established that all Soviet societies and 
associations (excluding the trade unions) had to be registered with the NKVD and that new 
societies could not be opened without proper registration and approval of their statutes. All 
organizations which did not register within two weeks from the date of this resolution would 
have to be closed. This legislation encouraged the development of associations working in close 
contact with state and party organs – and finding themselves under their immediate control.41 
The Cross sent a series of letters to the Moscow Soviet asking to be officially registered. To 
make their case, the krasnokrestovtsy reminded the state authorities that their Society had 
emerged in 1918 with the collaboration of the then Commissar of Justice Isaak Shteinberg. 
Although founded by individuals who had been close to the socialist-revolutionary party (which 
in 1922 was under trail), the Cross claimed to have always existed as “a-political organization” 
recognized by the Presidium of the VTsIK, the Cheka, and personally by the Chairman of the 
Moscow Soviet L.V. Kamenev. These letters argued that the forms of help offered by the Cross 
were in accordance with Soviet understandings of social assistance: help to prisoners could be 
material (through the provision of foodstuffs, clothes, soap, and other basic goods), medical 
(through the distribution of medicines), cultural-enlightening (through the supply of books to the 
prisons' libraries), and juridical (through the submission of official petitions to the Cheka and the 
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drafting of papers on behalf of the prisoners).
42
 When asked to make a choice between official 
registration and liquidation as a legally operating society, the Cross readily adopted the Soviet 
culture of help.  
Despite all explanations and argumentations, the Cross was officially closed down on 
August 25, 1922, and forced to interrupt its work for a few months. While the Society ceased 
existing as such, on November 11, 1922, the krasnokrestovka Ekaterina Peshkova was given a 
special written permission to resume relief work on behalf of political prisoners. Not only could 
she receive petitions, but she could also organize collections of money and accept private 
donations on behalf of any individual imprisoned for political crimes. Among her “rights” was 
also the permission to conduct official correspondence with the state organs. Peshkova’s status as 
activist was completely formalized: she had stationary paper and a seal with the engraving “E.P. 
Peshkova. Help to Political Prisoners” (Pompolit, as the krasnokrestovtsy used to say). 
 
Figure 6: the new logo and seal put the word “help” in evidence. Source: GARF, f. 8409, o. 1, d. 1, l. 30.  
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The “new” institution could hire its own employees and consultants, but, in practice, its 
membership was drawn from previous krasnokrestovtsy. The Pompolit was officially made up of 
Peshkova and her aid Vinaver; its additional 10-15 members figured on the Cross’s register of 
employees as “technical personnel.”43 The Pompolit inherited the property of the old 
organization and kept operating in its facilities. And yet, there were some substantial differences 
between the Political Red Cross and the Pompolit. The latter did not preserve the official 
denomination of “society” (obshchestvo) or “civil organization” (obshchestvennaia 
organizatsiia) with a printed statute, but turned into a loose “charitable institution, working with 
the permission of the GPU [Cheka].” Like its predecessor, it provided material help to the 
prisoners and their families, but it no longer offered systematic legal defense to its clients. Since 
its “rights” were granted by administrative organs without being confirmed by legal ones, they 
looked more like special permissions than legal rights. Most importantly, the Pompolit as an 
organization could not visit prisoners in the Gulag. Peshkova and Vinaver – who were not 
elected by their peers, but nominated in their positions by the Cheka – remained the only two 
persons with the permission to visit places of imprisonment.
44
 
What was the Pompolit able to achieve in the midst of these restrictions? Until 1938 it 
effectively performed the important function of information bureau able to locate prisoners and 
communicate crucial information to their relatives. It also kept sending money and goods to 
prisons and camps all over the Soviet Union. In general, the potential for providing some forms 
of material help was greater than the odds of changing one’s sentence. In some cases, however, 
the Pompolit was able to successfully vindicate prisoners’ complaints. For instance, it called off 
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some death sentences issued for political reasons.
45
 To obtain the suspension of executions, the 
krasnokrestovtsy used to refer to socialist morality understood as a shared conception of justice, 
a common sense of what is true or false, good or evil. As an activist put it, “the death penalty 
should be abolished...for reasons of high humanity and for a principled negation of it.”46  
Another form of help that the Pompolit successfully provided was assistance in leaving 
the Soviet Union. This activity was not much advertised, because it was not part of the official 
Soviet understanding of help, and after 1931 became more and more difficult to accomplish. 
However, the Pompolit managed to obtain legal permissions to exit the country for health 
purposes when a medical commission certified that the applicant could not be cured in the Soviet 
Union. In addition, Peshkova and Vinaver could “personally” receive permissions for elderly 
people and children. The Pompolit did not organize illegal escapes from the Soviet Union, but 
rather helped those who wanted to emigrate to obtain legal permissions to exit the country.
47
 
By 1930, the krasnokrestovtsy’s power to bargain was definitely decreasing. However, 
their pushing and pulling still led to the revision of some sentences. For instance, Vinaver, 
Peshkova, and Murav’ev devoted much energy to the defense of Pavel Nikolaevich 
Maliantovich, a member of the Moscow City College of Defenders who was accused of 
belonging to the Central Bureau of the Menshevik Party and condemned to ten years of forced 
labor. “Talking” with the authorities and applying all possible legal norms, they obtained a 
change of sentence from camp imprisonment to exile. This was considered a good outcome 
because Maliantovich’s case was a difficult one and, as Vinaver admitted in his private 
                                                          
45
 See for instance GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 5, ll. 2-16 and ll. 22-23; and d. 8, l. 5 and ll. 8-10. 
46
 GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 8, l. 128 dated 17 Jan. 1920 and addressed to the Sovnarkom. Copies of this letter were 
sent also to the Cassation Tribunal of the VTsIK and the Cheka (GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 8, l. 129).   
47
 Vinaver’s letter to Kuskova dated 15 January 1931 preserved in GARF, f. 5865, o. 1, d. 101, ll. 99-104, quoted in 
Dolzhanskaia, “Nash spor s Vami reshit zhizn’,” 133-134.  
244 
 
correspondence with Kuskova, “the external proofs were against him.”48 A few years down the 
road, the krasnokrestovtsy’s intercessions would lose much of their effectiveness. Indeed, in 
1938 Maliantovich’s sons, Vladimir and Georgii – who were also members of the Moscow 
College of Defenders – would be shot within one year from their arrest and despite the 
Pompolit’s advocacy on their behalf. 
Finances  
Contrary to Murav’eva’s words quoted in the epigraph, the Cross never enjoyed formal 
financial support from the state. It started off with a 3,000 ruble loan from the Office of Resort 
Help to Political Prisoners (Biuro Kurortnoi pomoshchi politicheskim zakliuchennym, an 
ephemeral organization that gathered around itself some old revolutionaries during the 
Provisional Government phase of 1917) and ended its first year of work with a positive balance 
of 500,000 rubles.
49
 Its stable material base consisted in mandatory membership fees, voluntary 
donations from various institutions and single individuals, and the income from the Society's 
properties and capital management. The Cross was allowed to “buy” performances in the city’s 
theaters and use the money made from the sale of tickets to help political prisoners.
50
 Rafail 
Fridlender's factory – until its nationalization in 1927 – was a big source of income, covering the 
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rent of the office on Kuznetskii Most and the salary of four employees.
51
 Peshkova and Vinaver, 
who until 1937 freely moved through the Soviet border on Polish visas, brought back to Moscow 
donations from foreign friends. There were few occasions when money and help in nature was 
sent through Jewish charitable organizations in visit to Russia.
52
 But, most importantly, the Cross 
received parcels and a significant amount of cash from Russian political émigrés in Berlin, 
Prague, and Paris.
53
 In June 1926, one of the founders of the Cross and by then political émigré, 
E.D. Kuskova, informed A.A. Vinogradov, the secretary of a Russian émigré organization based 
in Prague, that “it is extremely easy to send money to Ek. Pav. [You can send] a check through 
the bank – better not from an institution, but from a private person. She always sends back a 
receipt.”54 Money went into a bank account opened in the name of Peshkova, but the inspectors 
of finance recognized that the money belonged to the Pompolit and did not tax Peshkova for it.
55
 
The flow of money into the Pompolit and its taxability status reveal once more the liminality of 
this institution and its members. 
With the onset of the NEP, the Cross lost the possibility to receive foodstuffs and goods 
of basic consumption from state institutions. Without broad public support from non-
governmental organizations and private individuals, argued the krasnokresovtsy, they would 
have soon been unable to fulfill their humanitarian duties. Indeed, the Cross contacted several 
potential non-state sponsors with the plea to make periodical donations either in cash, foodstuffs, 
or other consumer goods. Letters to donors invoked the category of sochuvstvie, that is 
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compassion for the prisoners and sympathy for the ideas and work of the Cross. Political 
prisoners, who did not receive any assistance from outside sources, found themselves in the most 
arduous conditions. The general penury of foodstuffs that characterized many places of 
imprisonment was one of the most acutely felt problems, because it led to diets low in calories, 
to an insufficient intake of fats, and to under-nutrition. This in turn caused extreme bodily 
emaciation and the spreading of serious diseases such as typhus and scurvy among the already 
sickish Gulag population. Describing political prisoners’ “scandalous poverty” to potential 
donors was a risky move because, while it induced compassion for the prisoners, it might also 
have aroused public resentment towards the state. To achieve empathy but at the same time avoid 
a sense of indignation, the krasnokrestovtsy wrote carefully crafted letters that positively 
emphasized the humanitarian and civic meaning of help to political prisoners.
56
 And yet, this was 
an ambiguous project: monetary contributions to political prisoners could be a means to identify 
with them and indicate political attitudes.
57
   
After the organization was re-opened as Pompolit, Peshkova made all possible efforts to 
maintain its sources of funding. In a letter to the Administration of the Cooperative of the 
Employees of the Moscow Consumers’ Society, she explained that the Pompolit had received 
permission to provide help to political prisoners in place of the previous organization and asked 
them to “assign to us the foodstuffs that the Administration had deliberated to assign every 
month to the Moscow Political Red Cross.”58 In a similar letter to the Narkomsobes, Peshkova 
wrote:  
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I have received permission to provide help to political prisoners…Therefore, I ask to 
grant me the permission, which was enjoyed by the former Moscow Political Red Cross, 
to place the politicals released from Moscow prisons in the dorm on Trifonovskaia street 
n. 18 in case they don't have relatives here or financial means and would need a 
temporary shelter until they could return to their place of permanent residence.
59
 
Although after November 1922 the legal permission to continue relief activities was granted to 
Peshkova personally, she still tried to position the Pompolit and its work in the Soviet 
institutional network of help. 
The organization’s financial situation, however, became increasingly more difficult. If in 
1924 it could give to prisoners around 45,000 rubles (including cash and help in nature), in 1926 
its yearly budget was around 30-40,000 rubles.
60
 In the summer of 1926 Vinaver wrote to 
Kuskova that “although we are always broke and the help that we receive is small, we somehow 
manage to survive.”61 But, by the end of that year, he already defined the Pompolit’s material 
situation as “nasty.”62 The Petersburg office closed business in 1928 because it did not have 
money to pay for the rent and Vinaver was worried that the Moscow committee too might soon 
follow suit.
63
 In November 1929 Peshkova wrote: “we are broke at Kuznetskii most.”64 The 
existence of the Pompolit after 1931 resembled more and more a struggle to find the financial 
means to survive. In January 1935, Vinaver predicted that “the Cross will materially survive for 
the next one-and-half year. I don’t now what will happen after that. The usual sources [of 
money] are drying up; I don’t see new ones coming.”65 This financial downslope definitely 
contributed to the Pompolit’s final closing in 1938. However, that lack of money was not the key 
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reason for it. In the end, financial problems made many Soviet institutions ineffective, but they 
did not determine their closure. The profound motivations for the Pompolit’s end lie elsewhere.  
5.2 The people 
Although the Cross spoke to the prisoners and the authorities in a unitary voice (rarely a 
signature appeared on the Cross’s correspondence with both), in fact it was the host of multiple 
and sometimes conflicting forces. Help to political prisoners was a common cause that bound the 
few activists undertaking it in lasting webs of personal friendship; shared interests served to 
paper over the divisions that ran through the Cross and shared duress rendered the disagreements 
weaker. However, the differences remain visible to the historian’s eye. The activists’ diverging 
life experiences and convictions engendered different approaches to prisoners’ right to be helped. 
They also contributed to making the offices at Kuznetskii Most a liminal space. 
Nikolai Murav’ev, Mikhail Vinaver, and Ekaterina Peshkova took turns as chairmen of 
the Cross’s Central Committee and were its most active members throughout the years between 
1918 and 1938. However, the acquaintance between them went back to the pre-Soviet time, 
when they had been involved in the revolutionary movement and had actively participated in the 
legal defense of political prisoners and other less legal activities pursued by the underground red 
cross.
66
 After 1917, all three of them decided to engage in help to Soviet prisoners, but they 
differently reflected on their loyalties and duties as activists in a socialist political system. One of 
the key differences was in the extent to which they combined national sentiment and attachment 
to the Soviet regime. Murav’ev was always very careful not to fuse national and political 
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allegiances. The category of civic duty was the ruling concept behind his conceptualization and 
practice of help. This standpoint led him to be more prone to judge Bolshevik morality. Vinaver, 
on the contrary, definitely supported the Bolshevik path of national renovation and shared in the 
Bolshevik sense of morality. However, even for the “believer” Vinaver, patriotic duty never 
represented a complete fusion of the Soviet and national ideas. He opposed bureaucracy and 
cruelty, while maintaining a strong overall faith in the revolutionary project and the potential for 
correcting the system. Perhaps because of her gender or because she ended up representing the 
Cross for the longest time, Peshkova appeared as a very ambiguous activist, who did not leave an 
extensive written record and whose assessments can be gauged only through her actions. 
Murav’ev, Vinaver, and Peshkova were variously caught between their pre-revolutionary 
identity as intelligenty and their new personas as Soviet social activists. Of course, both 
constructions are ideals, which were probably never fully inhabited by any Russian man or 
woman. And yet, they are conceptually useful to mark the end points of a continuum. Murav’ev 
stood closer to the ideal image of the old activists, embodying the pre-revolutionary sense of 
socialist morality, keeping it alive throughout the 1920s-1930s, and painfully disappointed with 
the revolution. Instead, Vinaver and Peshkova – the first with his vocal optimism and the second 
with her silent compromises – chose to assume the identity of Soviet social activists and to 
embrace the notion of Soviet help that came with it.    
Nikolai Murav’ev: “the humble Russian activist of a great global idea” 
Nikolai Konstantinovich Murav’ev (1870-1936)67 had been one of the pillars of political 
defense in pre-revolutionary Russia. Socialist by inclination, but formally never affiliated with 
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any political party,
68
 Murav’ev was a convinced enemy of autocracy and spent most of his life 
advocating for the arrested opponents of the tsarist regime. By 1917 he was already a well-
known lawyer, who had defended in court hundreds of striking workers, rebelling peasants, 
members of ethnic minorities, and religious dissenters such as the sectarians and Tolstoyans-
pacifists. Many of the individuals that he helped would occupy high positions of leadership in the 
Soviet state. Indeed, the list of Murav’ev’s “interlocutors and addressees,” whom he would 
“flood with telephone calls” during his tenure as krasnokrestovets, is rather impressive: among 
his most famous and influential patrons were L.B. Kamenev, N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, A.A. 
Solts, N.I. Muralov, N.N. Krestinskii, L.B. Krasin, D.I. Kurskii, A.M. Lezhava, and P.G. 
Smidovich.
69
 Even more important was, perhaps, the fact that in 1914 Murav’ev had provided 
help to a group of Polish revolutionaries arrested and evacuated from Warsaw to Moscow. 
Among them was the future chairman of the All-Russian Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinskii.
70
  
Murav’ev was involved with the Cross from its foundation in 1918 and until its closure in 
1938, but the nature of his affiliation changed with the evolution of the Cross itself. For the first 
four-five years of the Cross’s life, Murav’ev was an official member and rotated with other 
krasnokrestovtsy as Chairman of the Moscow Committee. In March 1922, Murav’ev was not re-
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elected in the Committee. In an “Autobiographical Note” that Murav’ev wrote in 1930, he briefly 
qualified this change in status as the “result of inner frictions” and claimed that, after that 
episode, he “abandoned forever this organization.” In fact, we know that he kept collaborating 
with the Cross by providing legal and material help to political prisoners. However, he operated 
no longer as an officially affiliated member, but informally as an occasional consultant.
71
  
Throughout his life as political defender and activists, Murav’ev remained faithful to the 
deep-rooted tradition of service that characterized the legally-oriented Russian intelligentsia. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, Russian pre-revolutionary legal theorists and intellectuals such as 
Kistiakovskii, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Gershenzon, Izgoev, Struve, and Frank had expressed the 
desire to change the existing social order into a system based on morality, law, and justice. Like 
them, Murav’ev was convinced that all accused, and especially the poor, were entitled to 
political defense.
72
 Unlike them, however, he believed that the methods and forms of political 
defense “went hand in hand with the revolutionary movement.”73  
Murav’ev (“with whom you cannot keep up [since] he does not walk but flies,” as the 
poet Aleksandr Blok once wrote
74
) was also a forward-looking and strikingly modern human 
rights advocate. Faced with “the total disavowal of the rights of the human person,” Murav’ev 
asked Russian civil society to “raise…the banner of respect for Man and care for the human 
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person (chelovecheskaia lichnost').”75 Being committed to the sanctity of human life and the 
integrity of the self, Murav’ev used the category of lichnost’ to challenge those conditions of 
Soviet prison life that violated the dignity and natural rights of Man. He portrayed the 
krasnokrestovtsy as the best up-keepers of Russian social thought who felt “the aspiration to ease 
the horrifying inhuman suffering experienced by the citizens of our country.”76 He also liked to 
present himself and his fellow activists as “patriots,” caring for the life of their country and 
worried about the political and social chaos through which it was going.  
The tradition and heritage of the old Russian civil society and, in particular, of the pre-
revolutionary Political Red Cross of the 1880s were key in Murav’ev’s self-identity – a trait that 
we will not see in Vinaver’s and Peshova’s personality. In Murav’ev’s view, the repressions of 
the Cheka were comparable to those of the tsarist police. However, he remarked an important 
difference: the reactionary rule of Aleksandr III and Stolypin did not have pity even for a 
“humble, essentially a-political institution.” The Bolshevik state, instead, allowed the Cross to 
“exist and operate completely openly.” As Murav'ev wrote, “the current state, after some 
wavering, in the end had to recognize the need for the existence of a legal society with goals 
such as those pursued by the Political Red Cross.”77  
Murav'ev contended that the platform of the Cross and the ideas that inspired its members 
were “the same ideas of protection of the rights of the human person and reduction of human 
suffering that are pursued by the International Red Cross.” Murav’ev believed that this difficult 
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work was a duty of social service which had a particular importance “in the current global 
moment.”78 As he wrote: 
 …the ideas of non-political involvement, non-party makeup, service to the cause of 
humanity, protection of the rights and dignity of the human person…must be applicable 
not only in foreign wars, but also in all those cases, when inside a state events break 
out…such as class or civil wars or popular catastrophes…79    
In several occasions, Murav’ev attempted to argue for the globalization of help to 
political prisoners, contending that the specific characteristic of his time was the international 
scope of the affairs of single states. Murav’ev was writing at the end of a war that had enveloped 
the whole world. He was also witness to the first attempts to establish an international organ of 
peace such as the League of Nations. Murav’ev was fascinated by the idea of a union of states 
(“a grandiose International of powerful authority”80), whose resolutions could have global 
resonance and meaning. Furthermore, broad organizational forms would have prevented the 
Cross from remaining isolated, alone in its service to the ideals of humanity. As he wrote: “the 
ardently expected response from the far away West...will multiply the efforts of the humble 
Russian activists of a great global idea.”81 Murav’ev hoped that international societies, such as 
the Red Cross in Geneva, the League for the Defense of the Rights of Man and Citizen in Paris, 
and the Workers’ International, would have responded to his appeals and united in relief work 
across national borders. Even more ambitiously, Murav’ev had toyed with the idea of building an 
“International of Culture.” As he imagined it, this was supposed to be an international 
organization with the goal to protect the rights of the human person as well as human happiness, 
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which, Murav’ev insisted, “should be put as the basis for every social and political 
achievement.”82  
Murav’ev shared the Bolshevik ideal of cultivating the masses, but he was also firmly 
convinced that kul’turnost’ could not be achieved through violence and coercion.  
We must not infuse this culture by violence. The human soul would not accept it 
and…remain in its primitive wildness… a violently introduced culture empties and wipes 
off all colors from the living human soul, raises a scheme instead of the living human 
personality…and kills in it both the freedom and all the richness of the colors of nature.83         
Murav’ev was appalled by any brusque transformation which, in his opinion, would give only 
temporary and unstable achievements – what he called “a phony victory.” 
We don’t need abrupt breaks. What purpose do they serve? They are damaging and 
unnecessary, when so much can be done by ably using the natural energies and nature of 
Man, in order to…create an improved nature and a better Man.84 
Murav’ev saw his time as a “bloody and dark” epoch and explicitly criticized the “unrestrained” 
and “horrifying” violence and the “wildness” characterizing it.85 He always defended the pre-
eminence of human rights and legality over Bolshevik ideology and unrelentingly aspired to civil 
autonomy and independence.  
On March 14, 1919, Murav’ev drafted the annual report to the general assembly of 
members. Drawing a balance of the Cross’s first year of work, he distinguished civil interests 
from political aims and argued that the former did not entail per force following a political line. 
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“Our Society” started off Murav’ev, “does not pursue political goals, but this does not prevent 
it…to have a large civil meaning…” At a time of exacerbated political struggles, “when the 
dictatorship of one class determines the whole political and social life of the country,” the 
krasnokretovtsy represented a group of social activists who distanced themselves from the 
political squabbles. According to Murav’ev, to implement the idea of a Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Dictatorship implied the use of violence in all realms of social and political life. It was for the 
sake of the culture and achievements of Russian society as well as for the defense of the dignity 
and rights of the human person that the krasnokrestovtsy had decided to protect political 
prisoners. The banner of non-party belonging and non-involvement in politics was the 
indispensable condition of the Cross’s activities.86  
Murav’ev further portrayed the Cross as the conscience of the Revolution, which should 
remind the Bolshevik leaders of their revolutionary aspirations: 
 At a time of extreme political transformations and deep upheavals in the national social 
order, it is natural for the main actors of the revolution to forget…that the political 
achievements and the social reforms are only a means, while the goal must be the 
happiness of the people, the growth of the human person…87     
Thus, the krasnokrestovtsy were the living voice of this revolutionary conscience, those who 
“found in themselves enough firmness and courage…to loudly proclaim the notion of the value 
of the human person.” Indeed, in Murav’ev’s view, the krasnokrestovtsy needed to focus all their 
efforts to limit as much as possible the damage that was being inflicted upon human rights.  
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…to remain passive in the grand battle exploding in front of us and refuse help to the 
violated human person (notwithstanding class, political party, social order, or religious 
confession) would testify to the big cultural poverty of Russian society…88 
 Murav’ev believed that even in times of intense political confrontation the right to legal 
defense had to remain beyond any possible doubt. He also claimed that the state’s approach to 
this issue, its respect for the rules of judicial procedure, and its implementation of court defense 
as a social service were measures of its level of civilization which did not contradict the task of 
revolutionary re-construction of the country’s political and social order.89  
Nikolai Murav’ev considered himself “an authentic person” living in “a time of falseness, 
fakeness, lies, falsification, posing, and cheating.”90 Memoir literature largely romanticizes 
Murav’ev by emphasizing his extraordinary responsiveness to the needs of political prisoners, 
his heroic unselfishness, and his ethos of sacrifice. In the footnotes to Murav’ev’s unpublished 
writings, his granddaughter T.A. Ugrimova writes that Murav’ev was  
a well-read, very experienced, well paid, and…privileged lawyer with ‘merits towards the 
revolution.’…However, behind this façade of success he never gave up his endless 
interventions on behalf of those who were persecuted…91  
His daughter, T.N. Volkova, has emphasized that 
he was always extraordinarily faithful to his principles…in his whole life he never 
stepped back from his principles. Never. Never. Not even under the most difficult 
circumstances.
92
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Vera A. Kovtun, who was taken in Murav’ev’s family as housekeeper after her husband was 
arrested, wrote:  
His appearance was dry, but what a soul hid behind this look! How much good and help 
he gave people in all sorts of suffering and tragedies! …nobody left him without advice 
and often the promise of intercession: he turned for help to all institutions and people. 
And this not for money as a lawyer, not for a compensation, but out of love for 
humanity…and not for religious convictions, but because he had a good soul.93 
His “self-sacrificing work,” added N.N. Polianskii, “required much work and nervous energy, 
was sometimes dangerous, and did not bring any profit at all.”94 The piano player Aleksandr B. 
Gol’denveizer remembered Murav’ev as a “highly cultured, deeply principled, and charming 
nature.”95  
Reading Murav’ev’s letters and notes, the drafts of his speeches, and his autobiography, 
one cannot deny the high ideals and morality, the intact professional ethics, the noble nature, and 
the sincere motivations of a man who did so much for protecting the dignity and human rights of 
Soviet political prisoners. At the same time, we should neither mythologize this krasnokrestovets 
nor reify his humanitarianism. Moving beyond redemptive and martyred vocabularies, I would 
rather see Murav’ev as a liminal person, who never closed his eyes to the fact that the Cross 
could be useful to political prisoner only by “staying in constant touch” with the Soviet state and 
operating within its penal system. Murav’ev struggled for the correct observance of the 
procedures laid down in Soviet legislation rather than for the overthrow of the regime. Indicating 
to the state its own mistakes, turning the authorities’ attention to the forgotten Gulag inmates, 
insisting on the necessity to mitigate the repressions, and adopting all available policies to 
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alleviate the punishments given to political prisoner were the methods that Murav’ev used as 
krasnokrestovets.
96
  
Murav’ev was a liminal figure because he recognized the new political and legal order, 
but at the same time he refused to abandon the morality of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. 
As the proponent of civil liberties and international legal norms in Russia, Murav’ev was also the 
krasnokrestovets who came closer to our contemporary understanding of a human rights 
advocate. His thinking was permeated by the Enlightenment values of the French and American 
revolutions and other ideas that would constitute the key principles of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The very category of human rights and happiness informed much 
of Murav’ev’s argumentation and inspired his practical relief work on behalf of Soviet prisoners. 
He conceived this work as the responsibility – “the heavy duty” as he like to repeat – of serving 
the idea of humanity and easing its suffering, torment, and pain at a time when that idea was 
subjected to severe infringements. Help to political prisoners was for him a sign of respect and 
care for the individual, and as such it was a task of civil society.  
Mikhail Vinaver: “how cruelly was this man punished for his optimism!”  
The lawyer and social-democrat Mikhail L’vovich Vinaver (1880-1942?)97 was one of 
the founders of the Moscow Committee of the Red Cross. He signed the letter to the Commissar 
of Justice I.Z. Shteinberg which proposed to create a Political Red Cross in Moscow. His 
signature was also on the officially printed statute of the Society. Besides these two documents, 
Vinaver’s written record is not so extensive and diversified as Murav’ev’s. In his case, however, 
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historians can rely on the large correspondence that he entertained between 1923 and 1936 with 
the political émigré and active sponsor of the Cross, Ekaterina Kuskova. Since these letters did 
not go through the Soviet border, but were all written and mailed during Vinaver’s numerous 
trips abroad, we can assume that they were not censored and that their authors felt rather free to 
express their ideas through this medium.  
Vinaver was an intellectually rounded personality: he closely followed the course of 
Soviet economy as well as the international political and economic developments; he read the 
journals and books published abroad by the Russian émigrés, but was also well informed on the 
political tendencies that animated the Party; in addition, he was very interested in the nationality 
question and in minorities’ rights. In his contemporaries’ memoirs, Vinaver appears as a better 
financial administrator than Peshkova and as a man with much energy, initiative, and sensibility. 
At the same time, the grandson of the krasnokrestovets A.N. Bakh remembered that Vinaver was 
called in his family “the man from Lubianka.”98  
Vinaver was an incurable optimist and a convinced believer in the idea of progress. At 
the time of the foundation of the Cross, he believed that, although “all kinds of zig-zags” were 
still taking place, with the end of the civil war the state would have soon become more solid and 
“regenerate[d] itself.” He recognized that the Russian economic re-birth was happening slowly, 
but he thought that it followed an upward line. In a letter that he wrote to Kuskova in 1923, 
Vinaver was glad to remark a 50% increase in the growth of the country’s industrial 
development and argued that the commercial sector had a positive balance too. Looking back at 
the big changes that Russia had undergone in the years between 1919 and 1923, “from a period 
of chaos and destruction” to one of “construction and creation,” he was positive that the country 
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“will bloom in 10-15 year” and that “politics will follow the economy.”99 In 1927 he wrote 
again: “at the present moment, everything seems difficult in economic and financial terms, but if 
you look at the past and at the future, you will see a line of development, an upward line.”100 
According to Vinaver, the state’s attitude to politically engaged citizens was determined 
by its sense of how frail Russia was. As he claimed, 
If the state keeps persecuting the socialists and part of the intelligentsia, it is because it is 
well aware that the economic concessions [of the NEP]…invariably carry with them also 
political concessions.
101
 
Fearing the compromises of NEP, the state looked at the social revolutionaries and the social 
democrats as its most dangerous competition and felt threatened by the old “cultured 
bourgeoisie.” This sense of panic explained the political persecutions. However, with his 
characteristic optimistic outlook on the future, Vinaver predicted that  
the next 2-3 years will bring not pogroms, slaughter, and violence over Russia, but 
gradual concessions and the gradual, perhaps slow and oscillating, but steady 
involvement of non-Bolsheviks in the government.
102
 
He argued that, by the mid-1920s, the state would have solved all issues concerning the various 
nationalities constituting the Soviet Union and given autonomy to some regions independently 
from their populations’ ethnicity. Indeed, to nurture the country’s productive forces, Vinaver 
found it necessary to combine economic development with a greater autonomy for each 
component of the Soviet Union.
103
 He also appreciated the state’s approach to the peasantry and 
praised the Soviet government for extending the population’s voting rights and investing money 
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in the formation a new professional intelligentsia of teachers, agronomists, and provincial 
doctors.
104
  
The changes that Vinaver hoped for did not come as fast as he wished. In his 
correspondence with Kuskova, he admitted that 1926 had been a difficult year for Russia’s 
economy. There had been shortages of basic necessities and a huge unemployment rate, which 
had especially affected unskilled workers. Vinaver agreed with Soviet ideologues and 
propagandist of the late 1920s that the desperation caused by the global economic crisis would 
have led to a war, which in turn would have triggered a series of revolutions.
105
 He was very 
preoccupied with the issue of industrializing the Russian rural country and frequently lamented 
the slow pace of industrial development as well as the inability of the Soviet industry to absorb 
the many people who moved from the countryside to the cities. He also complained that since the 
cultural level of the village was not increasing, the peasant masses did not understand the 
economic theories behind the state’s policies and saw only the negative consequences that 
impacted their everyday life.  
From his position as educated man, instead, Vinaver could see the collectivization as “an 
economic and political necessity.” He imagined the collective farms as  
big associations where [the state] could employ modern American technology (such as 
tractors and so on), where it could fertilize and use correct agricultural management 
techniques…The fast-growing heavy industry must be the master of raw materials and it 
should not depend on individual consumption.
106
 
Heavy industry, in Vinaver’s view, had to be regulated centrally. As he argued, 
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Despite all the beautiful words, until now the Soviet state…has supported the rich 
peasant, since the bedniak and the sredniak didn’t have anything to give…The 
continuation of this policy would lead in the near future to political consequences, i.e. the 
demand of political power [on the part of the rich peasant]. The Soviet state needs to 
build collective farms where part of the necessary financial means is obtained by 
employing high technology and a better organization.
107
 
Vinaver did recognize an “unhealthy” pace in the collectivization, but justified it as “the 
result of a general psychosis.” As he wrote, 
Of course, there was a hell lot of tragedies, stupidities, and unnecessary cruelties…The 
cities had troubles with the provision of foodstuffs …There still will be penury of meat 
and butter for one and a half years to come, but I think that in 1 ½-2 years from now these 
inconveniences will end and a more or less normal time will come when both goods of 
basic necessity and foodstuffs will be available.
108
 
Vinaver claimed that the Soviet state had undertaken collectivization only after having prepared 
the ground for it in the countryside. In his view, by 1930, the youth, the bedniaks, and a big part 
of the sredniaks already supported the collectivization. For this reason, although “much damage 
has been done,”109 the collectivization would not have caused the collapse of the Soviet regime – 
an outcome that Vinaver wished to avert.  
This activist’s thoughts were always projected into the future. And they were almost 
always optimistic thoughts. In 1932 he still encouraged his correspondent Ekaterina Kuskova to 
wait two-three years before giving up hope on the realization of the revolutionary dreams. 
Vinaver saw “big achievements” everywhere – in the economic, cultural, and political life of the 
country. He wrote: “life in the USSR is softer than it has ever been. In the last 3-4 years there 
have been almost no arrests…”110 As proof of a “softer” political line he bragged that he recently 
obtained a change in sentence from ten years of prison to five years of exile for the socialist 
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Sergei Osipovich Tsederbaum.
111
 Concerning political repression, he argued that, before Kirov’s 
assassination in December 1934, “there was almost none. There were single cases, but no mass 
repression.”112 This statement seems rather paradoxical if we consider that, according to the data 
collected by the human rights association Memorial, in 1933 around 505,000 people were 
arrested for political reasons.
113
 Vinaver might have referred to the period between May 1933 
and December 1934, when the decree of the Party and the Sovnarkom “On the interruption of 
mass exiles of peasants, the regulation of arrests, and the overloading of places of imprisonment” 
enabled a short-lived amnesty campaign. In truth, Vinaver desperately wanted to see the 
symptoms of a changing tide, but his interpretations appear to us rather twisted. For instance, 
concerning the official state attitude towards the intelligentsia, he wrote: “they are releasing the 
engineers. They employ them in the camps.”114 
In January 1935, commenting on the terror that followed Kirov’s assassination, Vinaver 
made another ambiguous statement:  
Do not think that all those who have been shot are ‘innocent’…Most of them are in fact 
spies, counter-agents, etc…Of course, this terror was useless and negative. But one 
should not close his eyes on the big achievements and make all conclusions only 
considering the fact of the terror.
115
 
Vinaver further criticized Kuskova for considering only the “nasty facts,” which prevented her 
from seeing the “big cultural advancements and the fast pace at which the cultural level of our 
life is growing…, the cheerfulness, the big security, the faith in the beautiful upcoming 
future…”116 The use of the word “cheerfulness” (velesel’e) anticipated Stalin’s famous words in 
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his speech at the First All-Russian Meeting of Stakhanovites in November 1935: “Life is better, 
comrades. Life is more cheerful.” Written in a letter dated January 1935, Vinaver’s words were 
not a blind repetition of Stalin’s phrase; they rather reflected the Zeitgeist of the mid-1930s – at 
least for part of the Soviet population. When Vinaver wrote that “everything is calm concerning 
repressions,”117 he probably did not refer to the purges shaking the high echelons of the party 
after Kirov’s assassination, but rather to the situation of ordinary people. And yet, we cannot 
close our eyes to the fact that, in the “happy” years between 1935 and 1941, around 20 millions 
people had been arrested and around 7 millions had been shot while in prison.
118
 
Vinaver’s political and economic beliefs a well as his attitude towards the repressions 
reveal that, in the continuum between loyalty and resistance, he was probably closer to support. 
He once wrote to Kuskova:  
I am completely aware of the negative side of the coin, but I see also the positive one; I 
see that life has become richer and that it moves [underlined in the original]; that the 
distance between the state and the people decreases….The negative side of the coin is 
known to me not less than to you, and I fight against it as I proved with my work, which 
gave me many troubles – personal, material, and family-related.119  
For the sake of relief work, Vinaver lived separated from his wife Elena Germanovna, who 
resided in Warsaw. For the prisoners’ sake, he rejected better job offers. 
It would be simplistic to say that Vinaver approved all the actions of the Stalinist 
government. He wanted to see “glimpses of light” and “positive signs” in the dark reality that 
made his everyday as krasnokrestovets and blindly believed that a more solid politico-economic 
situation would have reflected positively on the fate of the political prisoners. He accepted Soviet 
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authority and looked for the rationales behind the state’s policies arguing that they were dictated 
by historical expediency. In the end, Vinaver was a tragic and contradictory figure who strove to 
understand and adopt the new form of morality that was behind the Stalinist state’s actions.  
Vinaver believed in the potential for dialogue with the Soviet regime. His belief 
translated into pragmatism and a willingness to engage with the circumstances of the time in 
order to advance the cause of help to political prisoners. He once argued that, if the Russian 
intellectuals would have “gone to work,” the state would have changed its attitude towards 
them.
120
 His fate proved him wrong: despite the inexhaustible energy with which he worked, a 
complete reconciliation between him and the Soviet state never happened. On August 3, 1937, 
Vinaver was arrested with the accusation of being a Polish spy. The tribunal of the Moscow 
military district condemned him to ten years of corrective forced labor. His fellow activists in the 
Cross were not able to save him.
121
 As the old socialist and émigré Lidia Dan wrote in a letter to 
Kuskova one year after Vinaver’s imprisonment: “He was arrested for being a Polish spy and all 
his red cross activities were regarded are camouflage for that…How cruelly was this man 
punished for his optimism!”122 Vinaver did not live enough to see the “more or less normal 
times” for which he had been waiting for.  
Ekaterina Peshkova: “one of the few individuals who enjoys the trust of both sides” 
Ekaterina Pavlovna Peshkova (1876-1965) was a socialist revolutionary woman with an 
impressive record of social work. She began her humanitarian activities in Nizhnii Novgorod in 
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the 1890s; in 1904-1905 helped revolutionary sailors in Crimea; between 1908 and 1912 worked 
in émigré mutual help organizations in Paris; and during WWI organized a commission to help 
children victims of the war. Concerning help to political prisoners, Peshkova’s activism dated 
back to the underground pre-revolutionary political red cross. After the February Revolution of 
1917, she led the Moscow office of the Society for Help to Released Politicals. In 1918, she was 
among the founders of the Moscow Committee of the Political Red Cross. In the fall of 1920, she 
also began to work as plenipotentiary of the Polish Red Cross in the Soviet Union and occupied 
this position until April 1937. During WWII, Peshkova was one of the founders and active 
members of a relief organization on behalf of evacuated children in Tashkent. After the end of 
the war, she resumed her advocacy for political prisoners, but this time she had no official 
powers and could only use her personal connections to alleviate the suffering of few detainees. 
Throughout the years, Peshkova consistently built her public persona as Soviet social activist. 
Her private life as Maxim Gorky’s first wife and life-long friend was also harnessed for the 
purposes of her activism.
123
  
Once called by a woman petitioner “the official face of help to political prisoners,”124 
Peshkova was celebrated in most of her clients’ letters for her courage, responsiveness, and 
selfless nature. The majority of the recollections about her that were penned after her death seem 
inspired by a romantic view of the late nineteenth century revolutionaries – an image that 
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memoirists liked to apply to Peshkova as well. The activist Vera A. Peres, for instance, 
remembered Peshkova as:  
a person capable of extraordinary empathy and humanity towards other people, a person 
who loved truth, who strove to make truth prevail over everything, to exculpate the 
victims of mistaken, incorrect accusations and actions, and to liberate them from physical 
suffering. Her love for people and justice opened the way to her intercessions and gave 
great power of persuasion to her appeals.
125
 
Olga Kniper described Peshkova in her elderly years:  
She preserved an absolutely pure soul and mind, faith in Man, and a heart full of love. 
And the complete lack of sentimentalism and bigotry….What a great meaning it had for 
people shunned by all their friends and acquaintances…to come to her, hear her voice, 
and find out at least where their close ones were and what expected them.
126
  
At the same time Kniper recalled that 
E.P. did not waste many words; she was too busy for that. Every time that I came out of 
her office, in the reception room the visitors asked: ‘So, is she very harsh today?’…It 
turned out that, despite her determined appearance, she was a very shy person and it cost 
her much effort to talk with people, for whom she felt sincere pity.
127
  
Olga Chernov’s memoirs offer a similar representation: 
She comported herself in her habitual stern manner, making us feel unsure of what she 
really thought of us. I got the impression from her coldness that she did not approve of 
us. Only later did we find out how much she loved us. Secretly, she had been proud of us, 
but he had been unwilling – or unable – to communicate this at the time.128 
Peshkova’s private correspondence with her old comrade in arms Ekaterina Kuskova and 
her husband Maxim Gorky reveals the face of a woman simply exhausted by her work as social 
activist. Much less optimistic than Vinaver and less intellectually sophisticated than Murav’ev, 
Peshkova would become easily tired from running around and keeping the huge correspondence 
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with the detainees and the prison administrators. In addition, she suffered from frequent 
headaches and sometimes complained about her heart. As Vinaver commented, “this work 
wrecks so much her nerves that from time to time she needs to run away to rest and she does that 
2-3 times a year.”129 Indeed, her visits to Gorky in Sorrento gave her some respite. In the letters 
that she sent to Kuskova from Italy, Peshkova wrote that she used to arrive in Sorrento “half-
dead,” only wishing to stop thinking about her work.130 In November 1931, she wrote that “at 
times it is unbearably difficult, it is even physically impossible to receive the mass of people who 
come to the reception hours.”131 In December 1934, Peshkova wrote that after the reception 
hours she was taken by “an invincible mood of frustration and indifference.”132 
Susan Morrisey has shown that between the 1880s and the 1910s, stress and overstrain 
were very much seen as interlocking problems. The depletion of the nervous system could lead 
to fatigue, and weakness – both physical and mental – could cause headaches.133 Peshkova had 
all the symptoms of nervousness described by Morrissey: mental exhaustion, lack of appropriate 
rest, depleted energy. Together with Vinaver and Murav’ev, the krasnokrestovka used the idiom 
of nerves to conceptualize her afflictions and interpret her physical and mental-emotional state. 
In his 1930 “Autobiographical Note,” Murav’ev emphasized the “excruciating” and “frustrating” 
nature of relief work for political prisoners: “the heavy burden of this organization…is indeed a 
heavy cross…which cost me the loss of much health and energy.”134 Around the same time 
Vinaver confessed: “we are very tired both on the physical and on the nervous level… We can 
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still do much. But our nerves are constantly under great pressure.”135 These activists explicitly 
invoked the nervousness construct in relation to relief work. Referring to general symptoms such 
as exhaustion, weakness, and headaches, Peshkova self-diagnosed her nervousness as a sort of 
professional disease. Thus, the insistence in talking about her nervous weakness provided a 
discursive linkage between her individual state of being and the atmosphere of nervous strain in 
the Cross and, by extension, in Soviet life. Implicitly these discourses blamed the social 
environment of the krasnokrestovtsy’s lives and their incessant struggles to help prisoners against 
the odds of Soviet politics. Indeed, the restorative measure to the implacable demands of relief 
work was to go to Italy and escape the Soviet reality. As a woman, Peshkova wallowed in the 
condition of nervousness and her weaker constitution made her particularly susceptible to 
nervous illness, but it was above all the common diseased socio-political environment that 
strained her nervous system. Vis-à-vis the model of the Soviet social activist as defined by 
severity but fairness, willpower, strength of character, and fortitude, Peshkova appeared rather 
old-fashioned with her bouts of nervous oppression.   
Gorky once described his wife as “one of the few individuals who enjoys the trust of both 
sides.”136 Written in the fall of 1922, when the Cross was re-opened after few months of 
inactivity, this sentence refers to Peshkova’s relationship with Felix Dzerzhinskii and indicates 
that the Cross could continue to help prisoners because the head of the Cheka trusted Peshkova 
personally.
137
 The relationship between Peshkova and Dzerzhinskii was well-known and much 
gossiped about in Russian intellectual circles at home and in emigration. It became the object of 
a lively polemic in 1926, when Dzerzhinskii died and the Cross went through some significant 
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changes. This polemic is relevant to my discussion of the right to be helped because it sheds light 
on an understanding of morality that distinguished Peshkova from Murav’ev and the other 
krasnokretovtsy belonging to the older generation of pre-revolutionary activists.    
On the day of Dzerzhinskii’s sudden death on July 20, 1926, Peshkova wrote to Gorky 
that “Felix” had been “irreplaceable for the Cross” and wondered whether it was still possible to 
continue relief work for political prisoners after his death. She also added: “There is no better 
person, endlessly dear to everyone who knew him.”138 In a private letter to Ia.S. Ganetskii, 
Gorky reported Peshkova’s words and strongly endorsed them. When Gorky’s letter was 
published in the Soviet press,
139
 it provoked an angry reaction, a sense of betrayal, and a moral 
outrage in many Russian émigrés. Peshkova became the object of a powerful moral critique 
which threatened to undermine her legitimacy as krasnokrestovka. For instance, in a letter to 
Gorky, Mikhail Osorgin argued: “I know the difficult path walked by Dzerzhinskii and his 
personal unselfishness…However, a state killer…is no longer a man, but the perversion of the 
idea of man.”140 Since émigré groups were the main financial source of the Cross, Peshkova for a 
while thought that she had to abandon relief work on behalf of political prisoners. As she wrote 
in a letter to Kuskova:  
I don’t hide my opinion on Dzerzhinskii from the émigrés and even consider it my moral 
duty towards him to tell all the good things that I know about him. He so much helped us 
in all these years, getting rid of much useless stuff, a fact that eased the fate of our 
assisted.
141
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In other words, at stake in this polemic was the monopoly over definitions of humanity and 
moral duty. Condemning Dzerzhinskii, the émigrés claimed the superiority of their notion of 
help and their ethos of service. Recognizing the good that Dzerzhinskii did, Peshkova revealed 
herself as less principled and more attuned to the complications and paradoxes of Soviet life.  
This relationship with Dzerzhinskii markedly distinguished Peshkova from other women 
activists such as Lidia Dan, Berta Mering, and Ekaterina Kuskova, who had been members of the 
Cross before emigrating abroad. Again, the key divergence between the pre-revolutionary 
women activists and a Soviet woman activist like Peshkova was a different conception of 
morality. Dan clearly disapproved of Peshkova's “personal relationship” [emphasis in the 
original] with Dzerzhinskii and claimed that even Peshkova's closest collaborators did not known 
anything about it.
142
 “This relationship of hers with Dzerzhinskii is for me like a thunder in clear 
skies.”143 Dan thought that Peshkova's feelings for Dzerzhinskii were “illogical,” since the 
krasnokrestovka had seen his victims more often than Dzerzhinskii himself, and felt “almost 
offended” and “unmotivated to further work with her.” 144 As a result of this scandal, most of the 
old revolutionaries did not trust Peshkova anymore and, after 1926, started to send money to 
Vera Figner, whom they perceived as faithful the old morality of help. 
This was a deciding moment in the life of the Cross: to allow Peshkova to keep doing her 
job after her words of praise for Dzerzhinskii would have meant to accept a radical change in the 
conception of prisoners’ right to be helped. For Dan, Mering, and Kuskova, the coordinates of 
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the only possible moral system were the social and political passions that they had forged in the 
1890s. Instead, Peshkova strove to adapt to the new political fashion of the 1920 and 1930s and 
became used to turning to the state as the exclusive provider of help as well as rights and 
legality.   
The members of the Cross’s Central Committee argued that the émigrés’ critical 
assessment of Peshkova’s personal relationship with Dzerzhinskii should have not induced her to 
give up relief work for the prisoners. As for Peshkova, in the end she cared more about what the 
prisoners themselves thought. In a letter to Kuskova dated October 18, 1926, she commented:  
No one among the prisoners and the exiled reacted like that; there wasn’t even anything 
similar to that. Some got interested in why I spoke in that way about Dzerzhinskii. But I 
did not encounter harsh attitudes towards me…The fact that the prisoners’ trust towards 
me was stronger than their natural unpleasant impressions helped me overcome the whole 
nervous quivering of the last period…145 
In fact, this polemic was much more than “nervous quivering.” It was motivated by the 
very important question of who invested Peshkova with the moral authority to help the prisoners. 
After 1926 it was no longer the old revolutionaries and initial founders of the Cross, but the 
growing cohorts of prisoners themselves, cohorts that were de facto made up of ordinary people 
who did not belong to any party. In a way, this was a moment of democratization. As Peshkova 
wrote, “it is the prisoners and not us who have to decide whether I should keep performing this 
work.”146  
Thus, Peshkova had to balance the dictates of multiple loyalties: to Dzerzhinskii and his 
successors in the state security organs, to the other krasnokrestovtsy, to the Cross’s donors, and 
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to the prisoners themselves. Performing this balancing act, she strove to make the Cross an 
integral part of the Soviet institutional fabric. But her efforts in the end went to naught: the 
Pompolit remained a liminal institution for which there was no more space when Soviet legal 
institutional life solidified in the mid-1930s. I would argue that Peshkova’s liminal position even 
contributed to the decline of the Cross. This woman came from the past: her social origins were 
aristocratic, her party belonging was socialist-revolutionary, and her intellectual background was 
non-Marxist. Like many other emancipated women of her generation, after the Revolution she 
secured an official position in a Soviet institution and ended up belonging to the ruling 
establishment. However, Peshkova had not been educated and professionalized by the Soviet 
state; she never belonged to the new generation of the 1930s, who owned career and prestige 
only to the Party. As the vydvizhentsy that represented the post-revolutionary technical 
intelligentsia were climbing up the ladder of Soviet social mobility, Peshkova’s star was 
gradually, but inexorably falling down. 
5.3 The dialogues  
Negotiating with the state 
The Cross did not work in a vacuum. This organization carried out its provision of help 
with the cooperation of the state. Soviet organs not only let the krasnokrestovtsy visit prisons and 
camps, but they also took into some account the requests and petitions submitted by the society 
and its legal defenders.  
Initially, the Cross attempted to make the cooperation with the state as broad as possible 
by expanding the scope of its legal help. Indeed, through the juridical defense of individuals 
charged with political crimes, the Cross’s lawyers positioned themselves as direct participants in 
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the machinery of the state. A document entitled “Thesis on the provision of juridical help by the 
Moscow Political Red Cross” framed the practice of prisoners’ legal defense as a service to the 
collectivity.
147
 Considering the growing need for court defense among the Soviet population, 
Murav'ev asked the Cassation Tribunal of the VTsIK to admit to its meetings defenders from the 
ranks of the Cross.
148
 In a letter to the Narkomiust, the Cross activists argued: 
The Extraordinary Commissions would be significantly more efficient, if the 
representatives of the Red Cross could take part in the defense in court. This would give 
the representatives of the Red Cross the opportunity to show their collaboration in the 
process itself and would release the representatives of the state from the necessity to 
study the petitions of the Red Cross.
149
 
The author of this letter also remarked that the College of Defenders was overloaded with work 
and did not have enough personnel to deal with it. Finally, the Cross contended that the non-
party nature of its work completely guaranteed the political loyalty of its members.
 
The impartial 
work of the Cross’s lawyers, continued the letter, “could significantly help the uncovering of 
judicial truth.”150 As Murav’ev further explained in a letter to the Chairman of the Moscow 
Soviet, the Cross was neither the representative of the interests of single individuals nor a side in 
a case. Rather, it was an organization interested in the just resolution of every case and with the 
mission to eliminate all possible injustices and mistakes.
151
 What Murav’ev had in mind was not 
a genuine adversarial courtroom, but a system whereby the prosecution and the defense would 
work together to establish the “truth.”   
The attempt to gain a larger and more solid space of judicial action failed and, in practice, 
the krasnokrestovtsy could only “talk” with the authorities. The process of interceding on behalf 
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of prisoners (the so-called khodataistvo) entailed a great deal of negotiation with legal organs 
and high administrative institutions. Several revolutionary tribunals as well as the agencies of the 
political police replied to the Cross’s enquiries concerning the arrested, looked at its intercession 
letters and official petitions, and kept it informed about their resolutions.
152
 When the provincial 
Cheka sections delayed replying to the Cross or distributing the parcels that it sent for the 
prisoners, the All-Russian Cheka ordered them to speed up their administrative procedures.
153
 
The Narkompros collaborated with the Cross in releasing minors who had been imprisoned 
illegally. The Rabkrin also held regular correspondence with the Cross.  
A number of factors might have forced even the most intransigent leaders to do some 
maneuvering in the relationship with the krasnokrestovtsy: the common origins and ideological 
base, the year-long personal contacts and the experience of common underground revolutionary 
activity, the non-Bolshevik past of many individuals in the governing regime, the revolutionary 
merits of some krasnokrestovtsy and their popularity among the democratic strata of the 
population, and – last but not least – the high international authority of Peshkova’s husband 
Maxim Gorky. Indeed, the Cross might have initially emerged as a means to soften and restrain 
the repressions against the Bolsheviks’ former comrades-in-arms and then expanded the scope of 
its work well beyond relief to the arrested members of the oppositional parties.  
Each krasnokrestovets had different personal connections.
154
 Vera Figner negotiated with 
the Central Committee of the Party, while Murav’ev and other lawyers submitted official 
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intercessions with the Presidium of the VTsIK.
155
 The protocols of the meetings of the Cross’s 
Central Committee reveal that the chairman of the Moscow Soviet L.B. Kamenev was a big 
patron of the Cross, ready to intercede with the Cheka on its behalf. For instance, in December 
1919, the Cross forwarded to Kamenev a telegram that it received from a group of politicals 
imprisoned in Nizhnii Novgorod and asked him “not to refuse to give orders to satisfy the 
petition submitted by the prisoners in this telegram.”156 Vinaver and Murav’ev had frequent 
“talks” with Kamenev.157 Supposedly following one of these conversations, the chairman of the 
Moscow Soviet visited some places of imprisonment to check on their sanitary conditions, gave 
orders to the Moscow Cheka to keep the arrested in preventive imprisonment no longer than 48 
hours, and promised to bring the issue of groundless arrests to the attention of the Moscow 
Soviet.
158
 Another time, Murav’ev visited Kamenev and asked him to renew permission to visit 
the Butyrskaia prison to all members of the Cross. Kamenev agreed to talk with Dzerzhinskii 
about this.
159
 Although both Murav’ev and Vinaver had access to Dzerzhinskii, Peshkova – as 
we have seen – was known as the one who could negotiate with Iron Felix in a more personal 
way. I.S. Unshlikht was reported to have fairly positive attitude towards the Cross and, indeed, 
he was the one who signed the permission for the Society to continue its work in November 
1922. Vinaver regularly met with Unshlikht and brought to his attention all the chekists’ actions 
that he found “unacceptable.” If we believe Vinaver’s words, Unshlikht was unaware of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Barbara 
Walker, “(Still) Searching for a Soviet Society: Personalized Political and Economic Ties in Recent Soviet 
Historiography. A Review Article,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43:3 (July 2001) 631-642; see also 
the articles by Kiril Tomoff, Vera Tolz, and Barbara Walker in the special issue of Contemporary European History 
11: 1 (2002) and Barbara Walker’s book Maximilian Voloshin and the Russian Literary Circle Culture and Survival 
in Revolutionary Times (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
155
 GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 27, l. 43. 
156
 GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 8, l. 22. 
157
 Murav’ev had defended Kamenev when the latter was arrested in 1915 at an illegal conference of the Bolshevik 
party. See Ugrimova, “Stoi v zavete svoem…,” 247.  
158
 GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 3, l. 1. 
159
 GARF, f. 8419, o. 1, d. 3, l. 3. 
277 
 
censurable facts occurring in the Gulag and often promised to take measures to improve the 
prisoners’ fate.160 Negotiations took regularly place with Messing, Prokof’ev, Gai, Menzhinskii, 
and Deribas. After Dzerzhinkii’s death in 1926, Genrikh Iagoda always had the last word: he 
could endorse or reject all the negotiations between the krasnokrestovtsy and the lower ranks in 
the police organs.
161
  
Both activists and state officials trod a fine line between formally defined and personally 
negotiated interactions. The krasnokrestovtsy frequently received visits from police officers, who 
came to Kuznetskii Most to discuss the affairs of the Cross. One day, towards the end of 1928, as 
Vinaver was attempting to intercede for some prisoners, a Cheka agent told him:  
‘Let them [the prisoners] file a petition.’ To this I replied that if this was an attempt to put 
us on our kneels, of course, neither I nor Ek. Pavl. (who was standing by my side) will 
agree; but it is another matter if You mean it seriously without forcing us on our kneels 
(bez kolenok). I did not get any clear answer.
162
 
As this episode reveals, the Cross was not willing to bend completely to the whim of the police 
organs. To the contrary, it strove to preserve as much autonomy as possible. There was a sort of 
open dialogue between the krasnokretovtsy and the state authorities: it was a constant bargaining, 
in which each side felt relatively free to criticize the other in a more or less direct way. The 
relationship between the Cross and the state was neither one of opposition and resistance nor one 
of simple submission and blind loyalty.  
As we saw in previous chapters, Soviet agencies shared responsibilities in the 
management of social assistance and their functions often overlapped. The division of labor in 
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caring for and controlling the prisoner population was also characterized by intra-institutional 
frictions, especially between the Cross and the police. Faced with a constant penury of qualified 
personnel, some state representatives addressed single activists with the offer to join state 
commissions for the management of prisons. However, the krasnokrestovtsy systematically 
turned down the state’s propositions, preferring to play the role of prisoners’ intermediaries 
rather than completely merging with the state’s organs – and eventually sharing with them the 
burden of responsibility for the ineffectiveness of their actions.
163
 
In its correspondence with the Gulag superintendents, the Cross made it always clear that 
it acted as the advocate of prisoners whose relatives had asked the relief organization to intercede 
for them. In formulating complaints and demands, the Cross indicated concrete facts and specific 
cases. The motivations for help included pragmatic considerations such as the beginning of the 
cold fall season and the lack of heating in the cells, the penury of beds and sheets to sleep in, the 
spreading of epidemic diseases and the lack of medicines, and the ever present difficulties in the 
provision of foodstuffs. Sometimes the krasnokrestovtsy evoked less material reasons, but they 
always abstained from larger ideological discussions on why political prisoners should be 
helped. In conveying the requests of their clients to the Cheka, the krasnokrestovtsy reformulated 
them and couched them in the neutral and dry language of Soviet bureaucracy. Prisoners’ 
appeals to revise their sentences were divested of all emotionality and boiled down to 
unembellished brief notes such as “the verdict is considered unjust.”164 In drafting longer letters, 
the krasnokrestovtsy took inspiration from the prisoners’ petitions and reiterated the petitioners’ 
reasoning and arguments, but they avoided politically charged tones. The krasnokrestovtsy 
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assessed prisoners’ right to be helped through categories which were not strictly related to 
politics, but rather to the realms of material needs and moral entitlement. These categories 
interspersed their correspondence with the state authorities. 
The prisoners’ poor health conditions were often evoked as a ground for help. In a letter 
to the Presidium of the All-Russian Cheka, the krasnokrestovets Iosif Semenovich Kal’meer 
asked the temporary release of a group of prisoners who were to be transferred from prisons in 
Moscow and Vladimir to a camp in Tashkent. He motivated his request by saying: “among them 
are individuals emaciated by disease and long terms of imprisonment.”165 Prolonged deprivation 
of freedom destroyed the prisoners’ health. In view of this, the Cross frequently advocated for 
release or change of sentence from detention to exile. In a letter to the Cheka, Peshkova asked 
explanation concerning a prisoner who was spending his sentence in the Ekaterinenburg province 
and demanded to reduce the length of his imprisonment “due to his very bad health conditions” – 
to prove which she added a medical certificate.
166
 In a letter dated January 24, 1923, the Cross 
interceded for a certain Isidor Ivanovich Ramishvilli, who was detained in the Iaroslavl' political 
isolator. Isidor was sixty-five year-old and sick with arteriosclerosis. In addition, he recently had 
contracted angina and his nerves were “greatly shaken.” Given his serious health condition, the 
Cross asked to move him to a sanatorium in Moscow. It also argued that this man had no 
intention to engage in political work and was so sick that he could not have done that even if he 
wanted to.
167
 When the Cross asked the Presidium of the VTsIK to prohibit the transfer of the 
prisoner Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov from Kazan’ to Krasno-Kokshaisk, it explained that 
this man “needs urgent surgery, which could not be performed in the city of Krasno-
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Kokshaisk.”168 In sum, old age, sickly conditions, and need for medical help were good reasons 
to move the prisoners to better places of detention, such as camps closer to a railway station or in 
milder climatic regions. 
In line with the conceptions of gender and help that I discussed in the previous chapter, 
women prisoners were frequently presented as sick and weak individuals in need of particular 
care. The female fragile nervous system could be completely destroyed by imprisonment and 
women’s lives were at greater threat than men’s lives in the cold “far North.” For instance, in a 
letter to the Moscow distribution commission, the Cross asked to release a certain Tat'iana 
Mikhailovna Uvarova explaining that this woman had already spent half of her term, but above 
all emphasizing that the prisoner suffered from an acute form of tuberculosis and “the detention 
in prison [was] dangerous for her life.”169 In a letter to the Office of the Procurator of 
Arkhangel’sk, the Cross interceded for the release of Raisa Anisimovna Borts on the grounds of 
her severe illness. This prisoner suffered from heart disease and tuberculosis. “Detention in a 
concentration camp, especially in the difficult climatic conditions of the far North, is fatal to her 
health.”170 Again, as in the case of single mothers, for women prisoners too the motif of sickness 
combined with that of loneliness. In a letter addressed to the Procurator of Samara, the prisoner 
Iulia Nikolaevna Sadykova was portrayed as a “sick woman” suffering from heart disease: “life 
in Samara, where she does not know anybody, has serious negative effects on her.”171  
On the grounds of traditional notions of the family, the Cross often requested to send 
male prisoners to camps where they could be closer to their old mothers or wives with multiple 
young children. In a letter to the Commission on Exiles of the Moscow NKVD section, the Cross 
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asked to suspend the exile of a certain Genrigsen to Norway as his country of origin, because his 
wife was pregnant and they had eight small children.
172
 Loneliness and orphanhood – which in 
this discourse constituted the reverse of family relations – were evoked not in a sentimental and 
melodramatic way, but rather in a matter-of-fact tone. Forwarding the petition of a daughter for 
the revision of her mother's case to the Presidium of the VTsIK, Peshkova wrote: “on my end, I 
ask you to fulfill this petition since the 13-year-old Liubov Radtsig remained alone after the 
arrest of her father and mother, and she does not have anybody who could take care of her.”173 
Political prisoners were the yardstick of socio-political danger in the Soviet Union. As a 
counter-narrative to the official conceptualization of “the politicals,” the Cross often used 
prisoners’ ignorance and darkness as exculpating devices and grounded help in their actual 
harmlessness for the state as dark and ignorant persons. For instance, in a letter to the Presidium 
of the VTsIK, the Cross advocated for a certain Shal'gin who had been accused of political 
crimes and condemned to capital punishment. As the activist drafting this intercession explained, 
“the serious crime committed by Shal'gin is the result of his low level of consciousness.”174 In a 
letter to the Office of the Procurator of Iaroslavl’, the Cross emphasized that the prisoner Tamara 
Ivanovna Kochergina was only nineteen and, because of her “extreme youth,” her release would 
not represent a danger for the state regime and the social order.
175
  
When they deemed it fit, the krasnokrestovtsy played also the cards of “correct” social 
origin, poor economic conditions, and past labor contributions. When the Tribunal of the North 
Railway system condemned to death the employees of its food store Sergei Ivanovich Kulishev, 
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Nikolai Vasil'evich Serikov, and Ivan Sergeevich Lirionov, because they had hoarded some salt 
and flower and re-sold them for their own profit, the Cross argued that their guilt was attenuated 
by the following circumstances: they had a difficult material situation; they came from the 
peasantry; for their entire lives they had earned their bread through their labor; and each of them 
supported a big family. Taking into consideration the social position of the condemned and their 
past as workers, the Cross demanded to suspend their death sentence and replace it with a milder 
form of punishment. Finally, the Cross argued that, with the upcoming anniversary of the 
October revolution, “the satisfaction of this demand would fit with the indulgence that the 
population of the Russian Republic became used to associate with the celebration of the October 
revolution.”176  
The Cross paid attention to the changes in the political climate. For instance, in 1922, the 
Cross interceded for a group of citizens condemned to death with the accusation of “counter-
revolutionary agitation” because, in a public meeting, they had opposed the requisition of church 
property. The actions committed by these men, argued the Cross, had not been performed for 
personal interest and for low and selfish concerns. Their speeches in local meetings against the 
requisitioning of church properties  
were the open interventions of free citizens,…criticism towards the current Soviet state is 
admitted by the current law and, when pronounced in the presence of state's 
representatives, cannot be equated to secret anti-Soviet agitation. The restless social 
mood determined by the historical moment through which Russia was living (that is the 
crumbling of the old system) created among the members of the meeting a certain 
nervous atmosphere, but it is not possible to put the guilt for this exclusively on the 
condemned. This extraordinary time that is now experienced by Russia must serve as an 
alleviating circumstance.
177
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To grant mercy to these men, continued the Cross,  
is not only an act of charity, but also a means to placate passions...To let the condemned 
live cannot represent any danger for the Soviet state; to the contrary, it would reinforce 
the awareness of the masses about the strength and solidity of the Soviet state.
178
 
Apart from passing on petitions from individual prisoners, the Cross sometimes took the 
initiative to advocate for the collective rights of the Gulag population. In these cases, too, we do 
not see much abstraction and theoretical discussion, but rather references to precedents, specific 
laws, and contingent conditions of need. For instance, in a letter dated October 4, 1927, 
Peshkova claimed the right of prisoners’ relatives to visit their close ones in the Solovki camp. 
Her note was characterized by a rare urgency of tone motivated by the fact that navigation to the 
Solovki Islands in the White Sea would soon be closed and the prisoners would have been 
deprived of their right to receive visitations for many months. In a preceding correspondence the 
Moscow section of the Cheka had suggested the Cross to send this request to the Leningrad 
section. Peshkova was not satisfied by this answer and wrote back to the Moscow Cheka with a 
list of camps for which she demanded immediate visitation permits. She wrote:  
In light of the fact that we did not receive any reply from Leningrad, that soon the 
navigation will be impossible, that all prisoners have the right of visitation, and that the 
visitation permits for the Solovki Islands have always be given by Moscow (and not by 
Leningrad), we are demanding that you proceed with their delivery.
179
  
Peshkova did not request visitation permits as arbitrary privileges, but as full-fledged rights. 
Another collective right for which the Cross actively advocated was the right to nutrition.
180
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What took place in the Gulag, argued the Cross, contradicted the picture of prison life 
given in the press. In the spring of 1921, the krasnokrestovtsy proved very critical of an article 
published in Pravda by a member of the newspaper’s editorial board, a certain Nikolai L. 
Meshcheriakov. After a two-and-a-half-hour visit to the Butyrskaia prison, Meshcheriakov felt 
informed enough to write an enthusiastic description of “prison life” in the new socialist state. 
According to him, the common cells had open doors and the prisoners could go for long walks in 
the halls and in the prison yard. He talked about “free socialization” between men and women, 
who readily obtained permission to visit each other in their cells. The superintendents always 
knocked before entering the isolation cells, addressed the prisoners politely, and provided them 
with newspapers, books, and paper to write letters. The prisoners even attended performances 
and lectures.
181
 From its multiple visits to various prisons and from the endless stream of 
petitions that it constantly received, the Cross knew a different story – one of unexpected forced 
transfers, overcrowded and unheated cells, anti-sanitary conditions, spreading of serious 
epidemics, semi-starvation, thefts and arbitrary requisitions of personal belongings, isolation, 
ignorance concerning the reasons for the arrest, rudeness, humiliation, insults, and corporal 
punishments. In short, the regime of imprisonment was “a slow and painful agony.” As a 
krasnokrestovets wrote,  
as a result of all the serious moral and physical suffering, the prisoners’ abjection and 
hopelessness reached extreme limits and produced more than one case of serious psychic 
diseases.  
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Individuals from the administrations “invited” female prisoners into their quarters allegedly for 
cleaning them. “Afraid of punishment and deprived of any defense of their rights, these women 
don't dare oppose the caprice of the prison's bosses.”182  
The krasnokrestovtsy denounced what they called “monstrous forms of arrest,” when “a 
mass of random people [were] arrested who [did] not have any relation to politics,” and were 
kept in prison without being interrogated.
183
 Despite a VTsIK directive instructing the Cheka to 
complete the investigation of political cases within one month from the arrest, the rules 
regulating this process were not strictly observed and the investigations often dragged on for 
weeks and months. Although a directive of the All-Russian Cheka officially mandated politeness 
towards the prisoners, the guards had “not yet learned the new rules of interaction with the 
prisoners” and could not stop viewing the politicals as criminals.184 The Cross appealed for 
political prisoners on the basis of the state rules that the chekists failed to observe. 
Transmission of information is another measure of the Cross’s liminality. Because no 
effective system of either private or administrative correspondence operated in the Gulag, the 
krasnokrestovtsy tried to establish formal arrangements to deliver information to the prisoners’ 
relatives as well as to enhance the communication between them and their close ones in jail. At 
the same time, the Cross sent frequent notes to the All-Russian and the Moscow Cheka 
“informing” them on the “excesses” of the Gulag and demanding to eliminate the conditions that 
triggered hunger strikes, anxiety, and all sorts of extreme situations.
185
 While the Gulag created 
an environment that was ripe for the thriving of panic-spreading “prison myths,” the Cross 
believed that “a-normal” events and “excesses” could be limited through accurate information. 
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Since rumor was a prime concern of Soviet authorities,
186
 the Cross could easily recommend 
itself up as aid to the Cheka – the deliverer of true information to the higher organs of Soviet 
power, the builder of official information networks, and a means against the rumor mill. Indeed, 
the information on the real conditions of the Gulag was not directed at the public sphere – whose 
indignation the Cross did not aspire to arouse – but remained for internal consumption.  
The arbitrariness and the cruelty of the local prison administration were among the 
Cross’s main concerns, since, as a krasnokrestovets put it, “the administration decides the fate of 
the prisoners without being controlled by anybody.” It was above all the remoteness of the camps 
from the control of the central government that turned them into “nests of absolutely 
unacceptable disorders.”187 The misdeeds of local officials are well-known to historians of Soviet 
history. Peter Solomon, for instance, has described the relationship between central instruction 
and local implementation in Soviet criminal justice arguing that “officials in the localities 
sometimes took a casual approach to laws and directives from the center.”188 Local cliques took 
personal advantage of the distance from the center also in the administration of help to political 
prisoners. The Cross reacted by denouncing the negligence and wrongdoings of local officials; it 
criticized the dissonance between the legal policies promoted by the Sovnarkom and the 
Narkomiust on one hand, and the chekists’ actions on the other. The Cross argued that this 
contradiction hindered close contact and constructive collaboration among the state organs.  
In sum, the krasnokrestovtsy did not challenge the central authority, but rather denounced 
the incompetence, sluggishness, and arbitrariness of the camp administration and strove to take 
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measures through the center to fix these phenomena. As the Cross wrote in one of its numerous 
letters to the Cheka and the VTsIK, “we take the liberty to express the hope that the Presidium 
will listen to our voice. Only the awareness of the necessity to perform our duty dictates this 
appeal.”189 In the Cross’s narrative, the violations of prisoners’ basic human rights happened at 
the hands of the local administration and needed to be prevented through the intervention of the 
organs of central government. Lynne Viola has interpreted one’s claim of loyalty to the center 
against erring officials as an aspect of resistance.
190
 Instead of seeing the Cross’s alliance with 
the Presidiums of the Cheka and the VTsIK against the local chekists as disguised resistance, I 
suggest to view this collaboration as a measure of the liminality of an untidy and contradictory 
organization and of the help that it provided to the most marginalized Soviet social group.   
Negotiating with the prisoners  
 Prisoners sent their various requests to the police organs, but they often ‘copied and 
pasted’ the Cross as well, asking for its intercession and advocacy. Most of them knew that the 
final decision on their case would come from the Cheka, but they also believed that the Cross – 
and Peshkova personally – could effectively intercede for them or at least help in speeding up 
procedures. Indeed, prisoners very frequently received replies not directly from the Cheka, but 
through the Cross, which thus confirmed its function as middleman and patron. For instance, in 
March 1927 Emiliia Ivanova Ivant wrote both to the Cheka and to Peshkova saying: “on April 14 
ends the term of my exile. Please send me the documents as soon as possible.” A few days later 
she received the following reply from the Cross: “according to the directive of the Special 
Council of the GPU [Cheka] dated March 28, 1927, you are permitted to live in freedom.”191 
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Almost all communications to the prisoners were like this: concise (never longer than four-five 
lines), with a purely informative content, and a dry, bureaucratic, and legalistic tone.  
The krasnokrestovtsy wanted their clients to explain why they were requesting the visit of 
one of their representatives and what specific legal help they were demanding;
192
 they 
recommended prisoners to give “the most precise” information on the date and place of the arrest 
and to indicate “absolutely literally” the motivation indicated in the sentence.193 The prisoners 
were supposed to send “short, motivated petitions in the name of the OGPU;” the Cross would 
deliver them and keep the prisoners informed.
 194
 The krasnokrestovtsy even devised a specific 
formula to pass over information to the prisoners: “In reply to your enquiry n. …dated…, 
according to the information received from the OGPU, we communicate that….” With these 
words the Cross made its official function as intermediary explicit to the prisoners, as though it 
wanted to avoid any confusion on its position vis-à-vis the Soviet state and its investigation 
organs. There was no sentimentalism in the notes to the prisoners: both the approval and the 
rejection of their requests for release were communicated in a neutral and impassionate tone, 
because political prisoners should not perceive the Cross as an ally against the state or as a site of 
resistance.   
Some prisoners were quite diligent. They understood how the Cross wanted to position 
itself and consequently crafted petitions that were motivated, brief, precise, and unemotional. 
Some petitioners simply wrote that they needed warm clothes, underwear, sheets and a pillow, 
shoes, foodstuff, and tobacco.
195
 One man held in the Taganskaia prison asked the Cross to buy 
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glasses for him.
196
 The student of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute Nikolai Baukevich asked to 
lend him 10-15 rubles which he would have returned as soon as possible.
197
 One prisoner asked 
only for a toothbrush and some toothpaste.
198
 Other petitioners dutifully presented the details of 
their arrest in the cold and polite language of law and then formulated questions that touched 
upon all possible aspects of political imprisonment, from the nitty-gritty rules of prison life (how 
to get a pass to bring books into the prison, how to deliver parcels, etc.) to the most complicated 
legal advice (whether an amnesty could be applied to their case, how to draft appeals to the 
cassation tribunals, etc.). For instance, on October 23, 1927, Grigorii Ivanovich Ivanov-Chernets 
wrote to Peshkova asking to inform him whether the amnesty for the tenth anniversary of the 
revolution applied to his arrested brother, what he needed to do in case it did, and eventual 
explanations on why it did not. “Should I send a petition or better an intercession somewhere? or 
would it all be useless?” he wondered.199 At times, prisoners asked the Cross’s lawyers to 
undertake the defense of their interest and insisted on the modification of the sentences issued by 
the Soviet tribunals. For instance, in a letter dated January 27, 1920, a prisoner proposed to hire 
Nikolai Murav’ev as his advocate. He wrote: “since I have been living in prison for the last 17 
months, I am not well informed on the current order of things: who can advocate for me as 
defender? where do I need to submit demands?”200   
 Other prisoners, however, were less disciplined. Appealing for assistance and 
complaining about wrongful imprisonment and sentencing, this kind of petitioners used disparate 
arguments and emotions to illustrate the injustice of their situation. They were very vocal in 
describing their painful, sad, and desperate situations and often made their stories truly pathetic. 
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These individuals explicitly relied on the kindness and compassion of the krasnokrestovtsy, who 
– as these prisoners believed – were sensitive patrons both worried for the petitioners’ tragic fate 
and able to reverse it thanks to their unique relationship with the Cheka. Women, in particular, 
tended to look at Peshkova as their spokesperson and demanded from her understanding and 
consolation alongside with help.
201
 Lamenting prisoners constructed an image of the 
krasnokrestovtsy as caring and relatively powerful, and then challenged them to act in 
conformity with this image. As Golfo Alexopoulos has shown in her book Stalin’s Outcasts, the 
more helpless the petitioners presented themselves, the more they intensified the obligation of 
the addressees to respond sympathetically. Their laments placed a burden of conscience: the just 
activists needed to help them otherwise they would have been responsible for unpleasant 
consequences, such as starvation and death. Thus, some political prisoners fashioned the 
krasnokrestovtsy as new Soviet patrons, who could not behave like the notorious heartless 
bureaucrats of the old tsarist power structure.
202
 
Judging from the krasnokrestovtsy’s replies to these letters, I would argue that their self-
fashioning did not match with how the emotional/pathetic petitioners approached them. Long 
and dramatic petitions had the same impact (if not less) as short and unemotional ones. For 
instance, when Lidiia Vladimirovna Osipova in 1931 poured all her soul in a series of heartfelt 
long letters to Peshkova, the head of the Cross dryly replied: “The petitions to the GPU [Cheka] 
must be brief and motivated. I will return to you the petitions that you wrote because you need to 
make them shorter.” Only when Osipova finally wrote a proper petition, did Peshkova submit it 
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and inform Osipova that now she should wait a couple of months for an answer.
203
 In 1931, a 
woman named Ekaterina Piotrovskaia wrote her desperate request of help in verses, but the 
lyrical genre did not impress the state functionary Peshkova who replied, 
in reference to your letter, I communicate that it is impossible to give you any 
information since you do not tell when and where you were arrested and did not even 
write your patronymic. We ask you to write your correspondence with us in colloquial 
language – not in verses.204  
The activists dutifully replied to all petitions, attempting to provide the prisoners and their 
relatives with the requested information, but never demonstrating any special empathy or 
compassion.  
By the early 1930s many Soviet citizens looked at the Cross either as a patronage 
institution in charge of political prisoners or as an information bureau providing information on 
the ever growing Gulag.
205
 Sometimes the existence of such an organization seemed as 
improbable to Soviet people of the 1930s as it seems to us. As a woman wrote in 1930: “I 
discovered the existence of the Section for Political Prisoners... I don't even know whether it 
exists in reality; I found out by word of mouth and from unreliable sources…”206 But people 
tried their luck and were regularly rewarded with a reply that, although brief and devoid of any 
sympathy, provided petitioners with much needed information.  
The krasnokrestovtsy adopted an impassive tone in their correspondence with the 
prisoners because they did not want their clients to misunderstand the help that their organization 
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offered. Peshkova and the other krasnokrestovtsy chose to behave not as compassionate 
philanthropists, but as cold bureaucrats. Although they were in fact making many unselfish 
sacrifices, the krasnokrestovtsy did not act as benefactors – “there are no sisters of charity in our 
Society” said Murav’ev.207 The krasnokrestovtsy did not conceive help as the sacred cause of 
religious creed. Their self-representation as state functionaries performing the civil duty of 
assistance to a particular group of Soviet citizens was in line with the rejection of charity that 
was touted by the state and proclaimed by all the institutions active in the field of help. 
 On the other hand, in its communications with the state organs, the Cross had a relatively 
greater freedom of expression than in its correspondence with the prisoners. Here the 
krasnokrestovtsy could stir up a moderate amount of pity and emotions. Need/suffering as a 
category legitimizing prisoners’ right to be helped was evoked alongside with references to laws. 
As we have seen, the krasnokrestovtsy were enraged by episodes of prison arbitrariness and did 
not hide their feelings in the correspondence with the Presidiums of the VTsIK and the Cheka. 
The Cross considered it natural and logical that the prisoners showed opposition to the arbitrary 
actions of the police administration, but its activists could express these thoughts only to the state 
organs, not to the prisoners or the public sphere.  
Epilogue: the end of the Cross 
Keeping the balance while walking on a tight rope was exhausting. The krasnokrestovtsy 
were wracked because they were integrated into the Soviet world, but also dissented with some 
aspects of it. Although nobody in the political elite significantly interfered with the Cross’s work, 
the constant negotiations with the Cheka and the prisoners slowly wore out the activists. And yet, 
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Peshkova and Vinaver liked to emphasize that they could not quit their job, no matter how 
exhausting it was, “because the authorities don’t let anybody else do it apart from me and Ek. 
Pavl…”208 For many years, the Cross was the only state institution performing a difficult, but 
necessary function. 
By the mid-1930s, this situation was bound to change. Peshkova and Vinaver appeared as 
weak, enervated, and unstable victims of Soviet life, while a new generation of healthy, strong, 
and self-disciplined men and women (the so-called vydvizhentsy) proved better able to master the 
forces unleashed by the Stalinist revolution. However, this new generation did not choose to 
constitute the Cross’s new cohort of activists, but rather opted to enter the Cheka. Ironic as it 
might seem, this situation bothered both the social activist Ekaterina Peshkova and the Cheka 
investigator Aleksandra Andreeva.
209
 According to the testimony of Lidia Dan, who met 
Peshkova in the summer of 1935 in London, the krasnokrestovka “complain[ed] that in the 
current GPU [Cheka] there are new people, who don’t understand anything and to whom the old 
names are meaningless.” Peshkova’s complaint almost literally echoed Andreeva’s words when 
she told Peshkova: “the names of Gots and Liber don’t say anything to the new fellows.” 210 The 
new chekists had a different understanding of what a political prisoner was and should be; they 
did not share the same historical references and socialist morality that had made communication 
(if not collaboration) possible between Peshkova and Andreeva.  
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In explaining the closing down of the Pompolit on July 15, 1938,
211
 we need to take into 
purview the political conflicts of the time and the changes in the balance of power and personnel 
in the Bolshevik Party. However, I would argue that among the most important causes for the 
Cross’s fall was the change in values that took place in the mid-1930s in the police. Not only 
new people, but also new organs emerged with the responsibility to control legality in the 
Gulag.
212
 The old generation of krasnokrestovtsy was losing their energy and, despite their great 
experience, their unique approach to help could no longer be sustained. As in the case of 
assistance to morally defective children, from the mid-1930s any organ dealing with political 
prisoners had to be better integrated in the texture of the state. The krasnokrestovtsy had stood on 
the edge of social and political consciousness and on the border of official morality for about 
twenty years. After 1936 there was no more space to stand on the threshold because the country 
had a Constitution, a series of well-established organs, and a new cohort of Stalinist graduates 
who could easily replace the old and old-fashioned krasnokrestovtsy.  
Time was ready for the Cross’s functions to be passed over to new institutions, which 
were better woven in the fabric of soviet and party systems. Indeed, replying to petitions written 
in 1938, Peshkova explained that the Pompolit had ceased to work and could no longer help 
anybody find information on the place of imprisonment and the fate of the arrested. These 
functions were now performed exclusively by the Gulag Administration and the Office of the 
Procurator of the SSSR, to which Peshkova suggested to turn.
213
 Indeed, the procurators of the 
Narkomiust began to process thousands of complaints concerning supervision over the 
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investigation organs and the prison administration. A few month down the road, in its December 
1938 Plenum, the Supreme Court officially began to review and reverse convictions issued in 
political cases. However, something seems to have been lost in this passing over of tasks: the 
nature of the functions once belonging to the Cross changed as the center of gravity shifted from 
help to a poorly performed supervision of legality.
 214
    
Conclusion 
Instead of assuming oppositional tension between the state and a group of activists 
engaged in relief work on behalf of the most marginalized Soviet population, in this chapter I 
argued that what might be read as conflict can be better understood as productive interplay, for 
together state authorities and social activists searched for a dialogue in controlling and caring for 
political prisoners. The krasnokrestovtsy were ready to cooperate with the state to make their 
country stronger. They repeatedly showed themselves working not to oust the regime under 
which they lived, but to perfect it. They were able to complicate the state’s policy of repression 
without challenging the new order and, above all, without undermining its legitimacy and 
authority in the eyes of the public, because their interventions never acquired an undesirable – 
from the government’s perspective – broad public resonance. On its part, the new government 
initially supported people who strove to be useful to the state independently from their party 
membership. Although Soviet ideology did not accept any compromise with charitable 
movements, many political leaders collaborated with an organization which provided social help 
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voluntarily and on the basis of donations.
215
 Thus, I argued that the state authorities adopted a 
flexible approach toward the organization of social assistance to political prisoners. In the end, 
the prison population was so big that the state could not easily expel it from the body politic. It 
was there all the time, as an abscess which the state could neither ignore nor completely excise.   
The Cross’s office at Kuznetskii Most was a liminal space where the continuum between 
loyalty and resistance could be literally seen every day. To its reception room came hundreds of 
prisoners’ relatives, but state officers too walked over from Liubianka Square to visit the 
krasnokrestovtsy in their offices. Looking at Kuznetskii Most from a distance, the émigré Berta 
Mering exclaimed: “with such a pleasure I would be again in the Kuznetskii!”216 Her words were 
echoed in 1942 by V. Dinesman, E. Gorbunova, and M. Savenko: “involuntarily the thoughts go 
back to the past, to the years when You [Peshkova] carried out that wonderful work, in which we 
had the good fortune and joy to take part.”217 It must have been a special space indeed, where old 
women revolutionaries such as Vera Figner, Ekaterina Kuskova, Berta Mering, and Lidia Dan 
could for a while still nurture the ideas and efforts of the pre-revolutionary ethos of help to 
political prisoners, while Ekaterina Peshkova and Mikhail Vinaver realized that only by 
becoming insiders of the Soviet governmental organs they could effectively provid help to this 
population. In this liminal space, the former socialist revolutionary Peshkova and socialist 
democrat Vinaver shared office with a convinced outsider of party politicking such as Nikolai 
Murav’ev. Claiming a legal benefit for political prisoners, they all appealed on the base of state 
rules. However, while for the more principled Murav’ev the decision to appeal to state rules 
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reflected a philosophical conviction about universal human rights, for the more compromising 
Vinaver and Peshkova it represented something closer to a strategy. 
Most krasnokrestovtsy conformed their conduct to the state’s wishes and expectations 
regarding their role in the prison system. They molded themselves from old regime opponents 
into Soviet social activists. But this did not mean a shift of their primary loyalty away from the 
prisoners. Their goal remained service to the prisoners as the weakest members of the Soviet 
social system. The Cross was not hostile to Soviet power writ large but to excessive 
encroachments on the rights and dignity of the prisoners. Their disagreements with the state 
related to the severity of the punishment, but the krasnokrestovtsy neither challenged the basis of 
the Soviet state nor sought to mitigate the prisoner’s guilt. Like other Soviet legal agencies that 
aimed at curbing illegal practices in the administration of justice, the Cross functioned as a 
restraint on the Cheka, an agency which checked rampant violations to legality on the part of 
local officials and plenipotentiaries.  
Using an officially recognized vocabulary of help, the Cross claimed membership into 
the Soviet institutional system of assistance. Indeed, the krasnokrestovtsy often contended that 
the “correct and systematic help” that they provided to prisoners in collaboration with the prison 
administration was a way to counteract the penury of foodstuffs and the spreading of diseases in 
the Gulag.
218
 Not too differently from the defectologists, the disabled members of VOS and 
VOG, and the activists of Ommlad, the Cross made all possible efforts to convince the higher 
organs of government that it was correctly assisting a needy population and thus deserved 
official support. Unfortunately, by 1937-1938 the Soviet state decided to divert its patronage 
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from semi-institutionalized organizations such as Peshkova’s Cross and Kashchenko’s Medico-
Pedagogical Station to the agencies that firmly belonged to its system of welfare and justice.  
Finally, help to prisoners fits with the larger story of help to marginalized social groups 
that I have told in this dissertation not only because of the relationship between the activists and 
the officialdom, but also because of the way this help was conceptualized. Assistance to political 
prisoners was a duty that the Cross performed as a state institution for the benefit of citizens who 
had no material means and were separated from their families. As such help was grounded in the 
legitimizing categories of need, suffering, and social vulnerability. Not unlike other marginalized 
groups (such as morally defective children and unmarried mothers), political prisoners were 
represented by their activists as the wretched victims of abjection, left alone to the whim of fate. 
For them as well as for the other needy populations of early Soviet and Stalinist Russia, help was 
possible on the basis of the formal rules of Soviet law, but also by reference to the informal rules 
of socialist morality. As we have seen, when it came to the right to be helped, a vague line 
separated legal arguments, socio-political projects, and moral ideas.  
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Conclusion 
Striving to master the endless confusion about who enjoyed the right to state assistance in 
early Soviet and Stalinist Russia, men and women of various convictions, ages, and social 
backgrounds operated through the categories of what I call “the right to be helped.” This was not 
a unitary understanding of people’s legal rights to welfare, but rather an undercurrent of thought 
and a shared practice which regulated actions and crucially shaped how individual people made 
their case, various experts and social workers sustained it, and higher authorities recognized or 
denied it. The right to be helped was a distinctive rights consciousness that emerged in Soviet 
people’s orientations and decisions on how to legitimize help. The habit of seeking state 
audiences for claiming this right and the frictions that sometimes ensued in the process bound the 
right to be helped to ideas and experiences that, ultimately, defined the moral order of Soviet 
socialism.   
While socialism has been often historicized as a socio-political project entailing a vision 
of the state, the society, and the subjectivities of a future order, this dissertation has reclaimed a 
central place for how notions of rights and help shaped the socialist order of the present. Indeed, 
for the people living in Russia after the Revolution, socialism was no longer an abstract 
symbolism of protest, nor was it only a moral order of the future. Rather, socialism meant the 
realization of specific demands in their present everyday lives. The assertion of material security 
was the principal right of the Soviet people since, to distinguish itself from the capitalist states, 
the Soviet government touted the rights to social welfare as the only rights that really mattered to 
its population. Soviet individuals expected a credible commitment from the state to realize these 
rights. In other words, the very political principles of the socialist order, which mandated state 
responsibility to help suffering citizens, led the people living in that order to demand help in their 
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present lives. Precisely because the Soviet government justified itself in terms of providing a 
more humane alternative to the societies dominated by market forces, people used socialist 
conceptions of protection to affirm popular rights and notions of legitimacy.     
Although ethical notions of entitlement to care were central to Soviet socialism, they 
were rooted in competing logics of political ideology, economic exigency, and morality. Rights 
were in friction with other trends, especially with the aspiration to control through care. It is by 
exploring the tensions between these ideas and the often troubled dialogues among multiple 
historical actors that my story of the right to be helped has offered a new way into the history of 
Soviet socialism. As a result of both the frictions between alternative ideas of help and the 
interactions between various social forces, this story reveals how people have interpreted what 
socialism meant in the moral order of their present. Indeed, the dynamics between state leaders, 
social activists, and single individuals that I have described in this dissertation ran deeper than 
the administration of welfare. They saturated politics, science, the workings of institutions, and 
ideas of gender. They flavored both ideology and experience, thinking and feeling. As such, 
these dynamics gave rise to a set of ideas not only about rights and help, but also about Soviet 
socialism and its moral order.  
The history of Soviet socialism between the Revolution and the aftermath of the Second 
World War looks very different not only if we move our focus from the socio-political project of 
the future to the moral order of the present, but also if we shift attention from the employed, 
healthy, and usually male industrial workers celebrated in official discourse and policy to the 
people whom that discourse and policy often marginalized. When we analyze closely how 
political leaders and social activists thought and acted in relation to morally defective children, 
blind and deaf-mute adults, single mothers, and political prisoners, we see that their ideas about 
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help entailed placing marginalized people at the center of the socialist moral order. Indeed, the 
very terms of Soviet social help – labor and usefulness, but also need, suffering, and 
vulnerability – forced leaders to take marginalized people and their activists seriously in the 
quest to invent socialism. In addition, the meaning of socialism hinged in no small part on how 
marginalized people and their advocates interpreted its role and function in their everyday lives. 
The reason for this is simple: when marginalized people sought to set standards of rights and 
protection, they had to explain why. The necessity – and the burden – to legitimize their right to 
be helped meant that marginalized people and their activists played a significant role in 
interpreting the terms of this right and how they should be applied in practice. The people who 
ran the Narkomsobes, the Medico-Pedagogical Station, VOS and VOG, Ommlad, and the 
Political Red Cross could influence how and whether official rules applied, what rights looked 
like, and what forms control could take.  
Alongside marginalized people, marginal spaces – be it territories far away from the 
center or institutions at the periphery of the administrative structure – have appeared in this 
dissertation as the places where most ideas about the right to be helped and the socialist moral 
order were tested. By looking at this right from the angle of Perm’, this dissertation has shown 
that the rationality officially ascribed to the Soviet socio-political project of care and control fell 
apart under the pressure of material exigencies as well as ideological incongruities. Besides the 
success case of the Medico-Pedagogical Station in Moscow, welfare facilities in the Perm’ 
province have revealed a picture of disarray, chaos, and outright desperation. Despite the 
aspiration to channel all social phenomena into the strictures of state planning and the 
stigmatization of anything disorganized, Soviet help – as many other projects of the Soviet state 
– operated in haphazard and unconventional conditions. For instance, describing the workings of 
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some of Narkomsobes’s local sections in the Perm’ province, chapter 1 has revealed that the 
Soviet administration of social assistance to the uninsured and unemployed was marked by 
duplication and jurisdictional confusion, with local circumstances and preferences having the 
upper hand in determining an individual’s right to state assistance. In other chapters we saw that 
not only in Narkomsobes but also in various VOS, VOG, and Ommlad sections, local 
administrators lacked clear ideas about who was eligible for assistance under the ever-changing 
Soviet laws and gave very personal interpretations of people’s legal entitlements.  
Since social insurance was officially presented as the core institution of the Soviet system 
of welfare, the Narkomsobes and the other organs that catered to the needs of unemployed and 
uninsured people occupied a marginal position in the Soviet administrative structure. These 
spaces were not only marginal but also liminal, because they represented sites in-between 
designations – even literally so – where processes of interaction could effectively take place and 
where officialdom and individual people could connect. In these institutions, a very vague line 
separated what aspects of social help the state chose to address in formal procedures and what 
was left to the individual social worker to decide through informal mechanisms. Throughout the 
sections of this dissertation and in particular in chapter 5, I discussed how activists and state 
officials trod this fine line between formally defined and negotiated dimensions of the right to be 
helped. The state tried to establish an objective procedure to regulate assistance, but it 
simultaneously relied on activists in liminal institutions to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis and 
to draw on networks of personal connections, knowledge, and opinion. This introduced an 
important element of pliability in the Soviet welfare system. Operating from positions of 
marginality, activists in these institutions had some space to democratize the moral order of 
Soviet socialism in their daily lives. Their liminality opened up the possibility of intervention, 
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although hierarchies of economic exploitation and political domination were nonetheless 
assumed within it. 
Agreeing with Homi Bhabha that “history happens ‘outside’ the centre and core,”1 in this 
dissertation I chose to analyze how people at the margins of traditional historical narratives of 
early Soviet and Stalinist Russia understood the categories that legitimized their right to be 
helped and then projected their understandings onto the socialist moral order of their present.  
The first and perhaps most important of the terms and categories defining the right to be 
helped was labor (trud). Indeed, the right to social assistance and the right to work were 
imbricated both in the official mind and in popular consciousness. Several chapters in this 
dissertation have revealed the equation and conflation of help and employment, and argued that 
the slippage between them was the product of shared objectives. According to the Soviet logic of 
help, state assistance could not be received for free, but had to be earned through labor. In this 
respect, the right to be helped was grounded in a certain formal equality among all Soviet 
citizens: the carriers of bodily or mental handicaps acquired social rights in the same way as the 
able-bodied, namely through their labor. Marginalized people and their activists did not contest 
this logic, but rather contended that real equality lay in the guarantee of equal conditions for 
acquiring rights through labor. When Soviet authorities became confronted with the increasingly 
onerous demands of an industrializing country, they attempted to turn applicants for help into 
applicants for jobs, thus completely blurring the distinction between the right to be helped and 
the duty to work. 
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Within the category of labor, the idea of social usefulness (poleznost’ dlia obshchestva) 
and that of merits earned through services (zaslugi) had great significance. The two concepts 
were closely related, as social usefulness was a tool to evaluate individuals and a measure of 
individual worth, while merits were markers of evaluations grounded in one’s social utility. 
Unable to prove their social utility in the present, marginalized people often referred either to 
their past services or to the ones they would perform in the future – if finally put in the 
conditions to be useful. Within this framework, the marginalized could still represent themselves 
as useful and worthy.  
While labor was the paramount category that defined social usefulness and thereby 
largely legitimized help, need was also frequently evoked in the discourses of state actors, 
activists, and individual people. Like labor, need was closely tied to notions of human dignity 
and moral entitlement.
2 
However, more than labor, the category of need – and the ideas of 
suffering and social vulnerability related to it – had different currency for the four groups of 
marginalized people that I explored in this dissertation. Blind and deaf-mute activists strongly 
refused to represent their constituencies as the objects of pity, because they believed that the 
compassion of the able-bodied did not bring any benefit to them, but only humiliation. 
Helplessness (bespomoshchnost') had a negative valence for the disabled because it was a quality 
that the able-bodied attributed to the disabled in order to deprive them of their rights. On the 
contrary, for single mothers helplessness was a very legitimate cry for help. Need and suffering 
were a good reason to help lonely abandoned women as much as orphan and defective children. 
Compassion brought benefits to prisoners too, especially to those who accepted to be 
emasculated and victimized for the sake of obtaining basic protection.  
                                                          
2
 Mark Steinberg, “Emotions History in Eastern Europe,” October 2011, unpublished. 
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At the same time that the question of abnormality and difference – be it moral 
defectiveness, physical disability, female helplessness, or political danger – characterized the 
activists’ writings, discourses of model subjectivity were defining the emergence of Soviet 
socialism. This dissertation has located the meaning of socialism not only in the idea of 
normative subjectivity, but also in the history of help to those who deviated from the norm. The 
different subject positions enabled by the terms of the right to be helped (the striving and the 
suffering, the deserving and the needy) reveal two important facets of Soviet subjectivity. First, 
normative subjectivity was ambivalent because it was produced in the moment of differentiation. 
In other words, normalization is a form of subjection that requires abnormality. Second, the 
measure of acceptable subjectivity in the early Soviet and Stalinist experience was not one’s 
flawlessness, able-bodied-ness, subscription to gender roles, or even absolute political loyalty, 
but rather the willingness to overcome defectiveness and disability, gender disruptions and 
political unreliability. This implies that the healthy, happy, and achieving person of much official 
ideology was not the only Soviet subject. Deviancy from the imagined exemplary norm of 
physical, gender, social, and political fitness was a Soviet subject position too, and it was 
accepted as long as it came with the effort to overcome it. Finally, the experience of hardship 
provided an alternative marker of exemplary Soviet subjectivity – one that legitimized 
assistance. 
Concepts and practices of labor and need as well as the spectrum of subjectivities that 
they entailed had developed by the mid-1920s and remained largely stable until the late 1940s. 
Despite this general coherence, however, the years between the Revolution and the aftermath of 
the Second World War saw some changes in the ways in which labor and need combined to 
legitimize Soviet marginalized communities’ right to be helped and inform their understanding 
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of the socialist moral order. These changes largely depended on the context of the Soviet 
economy and politics. The first major shift took place in the late 1920s, when most activists 
narrowed their definition of the right to be helped to the right to a job that would have given 
them economic stability. The idea of satisfying people’s psychological as well as material needs 
disappeared from most documents written in the period between the implementation of the first 
Five-Year-Plan in 1929 and the end of the Second World War. The second shift occurred 
towards the end of the war, when activists forcefully added happiness to the articulation of their 
right to be helped, desiring the lives of their constituencies to be not only socially useful, but also 
somehow pleasurable.
3
 As we read in a document drafted by the Narkomsobes in the late 1940s, 
the meaning of Soviet help became  
to create – in every enterprise, kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and state institution – the conditions 
that would allow the pensioners to study and raise their qualification, that would open up 
for them perspectives of professional growth and give them not only material security, 
but also moral satisfaction.
4
  
This quote reveals the post-war desire to cater to the physical needs as well as to the 
psychological suffering of marginalized people. It also shows that labor remained the key 
category of the Soviet right to be helped, but it became also the path to true happiness for the 
Soviet marginalized populations.
5
 In the immediate post-war period, employment re-emerged to 
be the means giving not only the proverbial “crust of bread,” but also joy and psychological 
well-being. In chapter 3, I discussed this shift from labor to life and happiness in relation to 
blinded veterans, a group that was particularly effective in pushing for the recognition of their 
                                                          
3
 If we agree with Sara Ahmed that the politics of unhappiness are a form of political action, then disabled people’s 
silence over happiness in the years between 1929 and 1945 might have expressed their disenchantment and 
alienation. Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). See also Steinberg 
“Emotions History in Eastern Europe.” 
4
 GARF, f. 413, o. 1, d. 1632, l. 124. 
5
 On the meaning of labor for the Soviet blind in the years between 1945 and the perestroika see M. Galmarini, 
“Autobiography and the Soviet Blind-of-War: Reintegrating the Disabled Self and Turning Defects in Advantages,” 
paper presented at the Conference of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, Washington 
DC, November 2011. 
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psychological needs and in voicing demands for less material rights. The importance in the post-
war period of feelings, desires, and impulses that were not neatly in line with concepts of 
productivity is an issue that this dissertation has only gestured to. More research would reveal 
whether the post-war emphasis on joy and hope that I observed in the case of blind veterans is 
applicable to other populations and their understanding of the right to be helped.   
 Ultimately, in this dissertation I argued that a seemingly simple welfare preoccupation 
was in fact related to complicated conceptions of socialist morality and that Soviet marginalized 
people figured prominently in these conceptions. While my focus has been on activism on behalf 
of marginalized individuals and how this activism had the potential both to empower the 
marginalized and to reinforce the very terms of their marginalization, more research is needed to 
probe whether emancipation from below was at all possible. Could emancipation occur in the 
acts by which marginalized people themselves stake their claims and identify the means and 
mechanisms to manage need and marginalization? And could socialism be a framework that 
makes it feasible to press demands for help and integration? Unveiling how people accomplish 
the work of emancipation is crucial to our understanding of how political and moral orders shape 
individual lives and define cultures.  
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